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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
The Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990 had roots in centuries of sectarian rivalries and decades 
of social and political inequality. The financial and political inequality led to increased 
sectarian enmity and unrest. The sectarian and social tensions were amplified by increasing 
numbers of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas. The enmity between the affluent, 
conservatives and Christians on the one hand, and the poor, leftists, Muslims and Palestinians 
on the other escalated into civil war in April 1975. After a year of fighting, the leftist-
Palestinian militias were nearing a military victory over the Christian militias.1 
 
The first phase of the civil war was brought to an end between June and November 1976, 
when Syria intervened militarily to save the Christians. Syria wanted to control Lebanon for 
geopolitical and traditional reasons. Lebanon was a part of historical Syria, from a Syrian 
point of view. The administration of US President Gerald Ford learned that Syria had plans to 
intervene in March 1976. The US was afraid that Israel might counter-intervene, turning the 
civil war into a regional war. Such a war would sabotage the contemporary US initiatives in 
the Middle East, led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Israel did not counter-intervene, 
at least not at the time. Israel first intervened in Lebanon in 1978.2 
 
What were the US policies toward the Lebanese civil war in from 1975 until the Syrian 
intervention on June 1, 1976? Why was the US so eager to stay on the outside? Why did the 
                                                
1 Cleveland, William L. and Bunton, Martin. A History of the Modern Middle East. Fourth edition. Westview 
Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2009: 217-20, 225-30, 382-5; Hirst, David. Beware of small states. Lebanon, 
Battleground of the Middle East. Nation Books, New York, NY, 2010: 11-13, 81-94, 99-111; Khalidi, Walid. 
Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East. Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA, 1979: 37-8, 40-2, 53-8, 58-65; Khazen, Farid El. The Breakdown of the State in 
Lebanon, 1967-1976. I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, 2000: 38-40, 106-8; Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel 
S. The Palestinian People. A History. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003: 264-272; O’Ballance, 
Edgar. Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92. MacMillian Press ltd, Basingstoke, 1998: vii-viii, 5; Rogan, Eugene. The 
Arabs. A History. 2011: 264-274, 303-4, 477-8, 478-80; Traboulsi, Fawwaz. A History of Modern Lebanon. 
Pluto Press, London and Ann Arbor, MI, 2007: 105-9, 156-83, 194, 206; Waage, Hilde Henriksen. Konflikt og 
stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. Cappelen Damm Akademisk, Kristiansand, 2012: 217-20, 224-31; Yapp, M. E. 
The Near East Since the First World War. A History to 1995. 1996: 107, 268-70 
2 Cleveland and Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2009: 385-7; Hirst. Beware of the Small States. 
2010: 112-15; Khalidi. Conflict and Violence in Lebanon. 1979: 58-65; Khazen. The Breakdown of the State in 
Lebanon. 2000: 340-2, 345-9; Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York, 
NY, 1999: 1039-51; Rogan. The Arabs. 2011: 484-6; Gerges, Fawaz A. ”Lebanon” in: Sayigh, Yezid and 
Shlaim, Avi (eds.). The Cold War and the Middle East. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997: 93-5; Shlaim, 
Avi. The Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books, London, 2000: 340-7; Traboulsi. A History of 
Modern Lebanon. 2007: 199-201; Waage. Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. 2013: 230-4; Yapp. The 
Near East Since the First World War. 1996: 270-2 
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Americans wait so long, and why did they do so little? And last, how important was the US 
effort in preventing an Israeli counter-intervention? 
 
The Making of US Policy Toward the Middle East 
To understand how the US approached the Lebanese civil war, it is important to look at how 
US policy has been formed towards the broader Middle East. 
 
US Middle East policy was – and still is – a struggle between foreign interest and domestic 
pressure, which the principal foreign policymakers attempt to balance.3 These policymakers 
are usually the President, the Secretary of State and a handful of key advisors. These advisors 
are mainly connected to the President in the White House or the State Department. The White 
House advisors include the National Security Council, which Kissinger led from 1969-1975. 
The advisors in the State Department are made up of both elected officials and civil servants. 
Additionally there is the Director of Central Intelligence, head of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Defense Department. In special emergencies Kissinger would gather 
representatives from all of these group in a Washington Special Actions Group to discuss US 
policy. The influence of foreign interests, domestic pressure and individual policymakers are 
discussed below; with emphasis on the Cold War and the Ford administration.4 
 
US Interests in the Middle East 
American post-war foreign policy has been dominated by realism, a theory of international 
relations. From the realist perspective the world is in a state of anarchy, where states struggle 
for power. The state must ensure its own security. The self-preservation of the state has 
preeminence over other foreign policy priorities, such as moral considerations. The state 
makes rational assessments of its international interests and threats, and forges policy based 
on these assessments.5 
 
                                                
3 Quandt, William B. Peace Process. American Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. 
Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., University of California Press, California, 2005: 7-11; Shannon, 
Vaughn P. Balancing Act. US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Ashgate, Burlington VT, 2001: 3-4 
4 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger. Partners in Power. Penguin Books, London, 2007: 84-85; Hanhimäki, 
Jussi. The Flawed Architect. Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press, New 
York, NY, 2004: 24  
5 Dunne, Tim and Brian C. Schmidt. ”Realism” in Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.) The 
Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations. Fourth edition. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008: 92-5; Hook, Steven W. U.S. Foreign Policy. The Paradox of World Power. Third edition 
CQ Press, Washington, 2011: 70-71; Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 4 
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In the Cold War era the US had three primary interests in the Middle East: Limiting Soviet 
influence, securing access to Arab oil and supporting Israel.6 
 
The US adopted a policy of containment toward the Soviet Union, to prevent Moscow from 
expanding its influence throughout the world. Washington actively avoided direct military 
conflict with Moscow. During the 1960s the US grew more reluctant to military intervention 
in the Middle East. The concern was that a US move would be matched by the Soviet Union. 
The strategic implementation of containment has varied greatly, but the basic policy remained 
unchanged throughout the Cold War.7 
 
The principal material interest in the Middle East was securing access to inexpensive Arab oil 
to the US and its Western Allies. The US grew increasingly dependent on Arab oil in the 
1970s. It was in US interest to maintain a stable Middle East, secure a steady supply of oil. 
Access to Arab oil was perfectly compatible with limiting Soviet influence. The principal oil 
producer in the region was anti-communist Saudi Arabia.8 
 
Israel-US relations were strengthened during the presidencies of Ford’s predecessors John F. 
Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, marked by increased economic and 
military support. There were already domestic reasons for supporting Israel, as will be 
presented below. Additionally, Nixon and Kissinger came to see Israel as an intrinsic part of 
containment.9 
 
A key feature of US Middle East policy throughout the Cold War is globalism, and its 
preeminence over regionalism. Globalists, largely represented by politicians, perceived the 
world as a Cold War struggle between Moscow and Washington. Regionalists, largely 
represented by experts in the State Department, saw the Middle East as region with causes 
and actors separate from the Cold War.10 
 
                                                
6 Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 11 
7 Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 11-12; Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 4 
8 Karsh, Efraim. “Israel” in: Sayigh and Shlaim (eds.). The Cold War and the Middle East. 1997: 165; Quandt. 
Peace Process. 2005: 12-13; Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 4-5, 9-10 
9 Karsh. “Israel.” 1997: 163-6; Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 13-14 
10 Christison, Kathleen. Perceptions of Palestine. Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. University of 
California Press, California, 1999: 125-9; Spiegel, Steven L. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict. Making America’s 
Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985: 4 
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Domestic Pressure and Foreign Policy 
US foreign policy has also been shaped by domestic pressure. A largely pro-Israeli population 
and powerful pro-Israeli lobbies has dominated the domestic pressure on US Middle East 
policy, and still does. The lobbies directly affect the US Congress, while the popular opinion 
makes for electoral considerations. Their impact stems from a pro-Israeli consensus in the 
American population and media, as well as networking contacts and funds.11 
 
The US population perception of the Middle East has generally followed Israel’s perspective 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is derived from a sense of political and religious 
identification, amplified by the atrocities of the Holocaust. From an American perspective 
Israel is a Western democracy surrounded by dictatorships. Unlike European democracies, 
Israel and the US have a shared identity as pioneers. The religious identification stems from 
the Bible and the Torah’s common roots.12 Many Christians also support Israel with reference 
to the Bible: According to the Bible, the Jews’ return to Palestine is a prerequisite to the 
Second Coming of Christ.13 
 
The Israel-centered perspective is present in American policymakers, who represent the 
public.14 The policymakers’ perspectives on the Middle East form their assumptions about the 
region, and thus the shaping US foreign policy.15 US foreign policymakers have a vast supply 
of academics specializing in Middle East and other regions, especially in the State 
Department. These experts rarely influence decision-making in foreign policy. Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research from 1975-1978 Harold Saunders remarked 
that policymakers, notably Kissinger, often acted on their assumptions and instincts. Facts and 
perspectives supplied by experts that do not fit their perceptions are disregarded.16 
 
Electoral considerations also play a role in policy making. Jews make up only a few per cent 
of the US population. However, most of the Jewish population has traditionally lived in swing 
states, states that are especially important to the outcome of the Presidential Election. Still, the 
most influential pro-Israeli group in a US election is not the American Jewry, but rather 
                                                
11 Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 5-8 
12 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 2-3; Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 13 
13 Mearsheimer, John J., Walt, Stephen M. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Penguin Books, London, 
2007: 133 
14 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 11-12 
15 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 9-10 
16 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 9-13 
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Conservative Christians. Arab lobbies and voters do not make up any comparable pressure or 
electoral group.17 
 
Between popular opinion, media and pro-Israeli lobbies, the members of the US Congress 
have strong incentives to support Israel. The incentive to oppose a president that criticizes or 
pressures Israel is even stronger – especially for a Member of Congress who opposes the 
president. The president wields executive power, but Congress might restrain or pressure the 
president in the shaping of Middle East policy. A US initiative that pressures Israel is likely to 
meet strong opposition from the US Congress. Congress will pass legislations and resolutions 
or block presidential bills in order to keep the executive branch aligned with Israel. Generally, 
there has been political benefit in a pro-Israeli stance, for congressmen and presidents alike.18 
 
The domestic and popular reasons for supporting Israel were not always compatible with the 
strategic aim of access to Arab oil. This has created a general discrepancy between the elected 
officials in Congress and the civil servants in the State Department. The former have 
generally leaned toward an Israeli perspective, while the latter have generally been more 
sensitive to the Arab states’ point of view. Developing policies that would achieve both of 
these goals were left to the individual administrations.19 
 
The Individuals: Ford and Kissinger 
US Middle East policy is shaped by the chief foreign policymakers in an administration. 
These policymakers are usually the President, the Secretary of State and some key advisors. A 
new presidential administration is bombarded with numerous arguments from lobbies, 
Congress and the State Department who attempt to guide the policymakers through the 
Middle East. Faced with this “mountain of “facts”” policymakers simplify and generalize in 
order to develop a Middle East policy.20 
 
Overarching foreign interests and domestic pressure made up the general guidelines for 
Middle East policy during the Cold War. Still, there was room for personality and creativity. 
                                                
17 Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 6-8 
18 Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 5-6, 9 
19 Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 12-13; Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 4-5, 9-10 
20 Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 9 
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The individual policymaker’s beliefs, values, experiences and background might lead to 
innovative assessments and strategies.21 
 
US administrations would assess US foreign policy interests at the beginning of the tenure.22 
Altered perceptions at the start of the presidential period were likely to abate over time.23 
 
The globalist-regionalist struggle had its heyday when US foreign policy was a struggle 
between President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the White House and Secretary of 
State William Rogers at Foggy Bottom. The struggle was toned down as Kissinger replaced 
Rogers in September 1973.24 
 
The perceptions of the president and his closest circle of foreign policy advisers is an 
important party in the way each administration tackles the Middle East.25 In 1975-1976 
Kissinger was the most defining figure in US foreign policy, due to Ford’s lack of foreign 
expertise. Ford had decades of political experience from the House of Representatives, but 
had virtually no experience with foreign policy. He had only been Vice President for eight 
months when the Watergate scandal forced Nixon to resign. Ford had full confidence in 
Kissinger’s abilities and judgment. In the words of Jussi Hanhimäki, Professor of 
International History, “Ford was convinced that Kissinger was a genius.”26 
 
Kissinger grew up as a Jew in Nazi Germany. Kissinger fled Germany in 1938, but lost 
several family members to the Holocaust. He returned to Germany as a part of the US Army. 
In the US, Kissinger had studied International Relations. Kissinger belonged to the realist and 
globalist tradition of International Relations and held a professorate at Harvard University 
before entering office in 1969, first as National Security Advisor, then as Secretary of State 
from 1973.27 
 
                                                
21 Shannon. Balancing Act. 2001: 8 
22 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 10 
23 Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 9 
24 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 10, 125-9; Yaqub, Salim. “The Weight of Conquest: Henry 
Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” in Logevall, Fredrik and Andrew Preston (eds.) 2008. Nixon in the 
World. American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008: 227-8 
25 Quandt. Peace Process. 2005: 9 
26 Hanhimäki. The Flawed Architect. 2004: 362-3. For Hanhimäki, see: 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/directory/_/people/hanhimaki, visited on November 10, 2014 
27 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 10; Dallek. Nixon and Kissinger. 2007: 79-82, 432-3; Hanhimäki. 
The Flawed Architect. 2004: xix, 2-6, 30-1 
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As a statesman Kissinger was secretive and manipulative. He preferred covert action, inspired 
by the 19th century politics on which he had written his doctorate. At one point Kissinger’s 
machinations and paranoia made President Nixon consider firing him, wondering if “Henry 
needed psychiatric care.” 28  Despite his clandestine traits, Kissinger was a successful 
negotiator, a trait that proved beneficial in the Arab-Israeli talks from 1974 to 1975. Despite 
his popularity, he had a disdain for domestic politics.29 
 
Kissinger was firmly rooted in realism and globalism: His primary policy goal was to increase 
the US’ power at the expense of the Soviet Union. Kissinger’s Middle East strategy was to 
strengthen the US’ allies, while thwarting Soviet allies and initiatives. Whether a certain 
decision was beneficial to US interest in itself was subordinate. Soviet initiative with merit 
should be sabotaged, as the overriding perspective was the Cold War power struggle.30 
 
The most prominent example of Kissinger’s globalist approach to the Middle East is the 
Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement of January 1974. The agreement relieved 
international pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied territory, without great 
concessions from Israel. The agreement also strengthened Egypt-US relations, at the expense 
of Soviet influence.31 
 
Primary Sources 
The Gerald Ford Presidential Library is located on a campus belonging to the University of 
Michigan, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. The library holds millions of written documents, 
including foreign relations sources. The library has provided this thesis with some 9000 
pages. Most of these are telegrams, or cables, between the State Department in Washington 
D.C. and US embassies in the Middle East. Most of the cables related to Lebanon went to and 
from the Beirut, Damascus and Tel Aviv embassies. The rest of the cables are communication 
between the State Department and the US delegations in Amman, Cairo and Jeddah (Jidda). 
 
                                                
28 Hanhimäki. The Flawed Architect. 2004: 8 
29 Hanhimäki. The Flawed Architect. 2004: xiv-xv, 7, 187-8 
30 Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 1999: 125-9; Hanhimäki. The Flawed Architect. 2004: 30-1; Spiegel. The 
Other Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1985: 4 
31 Yaqub. “The Weight of Conquest” 2008:  227-8 
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The Beirut cables describe the situation in Lebanon, meetings and interviews with Lebanese 
actors and assessments of the situation and Middle East actors. The Damascus cables are 
largely concerned with Syrian leaders and their reactions to the situation in Lebanon. 
 
The Tel Aviv cables concern Israeli reactions, but are less detailed and comprehensive than 
their Syrian counterparts. The US would have had several channels of communication to 
Israel and thus be less dependent on the embassy. Kissinger had frequent contact with Israel’s 
ambassador to the US, Simcha Dinitz. 
 
The Amman cables include contact with the Jordanian leadership, who sometimes worked as 
an intermediary between Syria and the US. The Egyptian and Saudi cables are mostly contact 
with the leaderships. 
 
The cables make up the most abundant sources, but also the least informative. Most of the 
cables go to the State Department. A cable from Beirut tells nothing of how they were 
received in Washington. The cables that were sent from Washington are more informative. 
Even cables with direct instructions from the State Department only reveals fragments of US 
policy. However, large numbers of cables might indicate the strategies US policymakers 
employed. 
 
Among the presidential library sources are also several memoranda, talking points for 
meetings, contingency papers etc. It is not always self-evident what the policymakers made of 
this information or who even saw them. It can be equally difficult to discern which 
policymaker requested the papers and for what purpose. Combined, these cables, memoranda 
etc. help give a comprehensive picture of Washington’s foreign policy. 
 
The archives of the State Department in Maryland might also have contributed valuable 
information. The Ford library was chosen over the National Archives for several reasons: 
Firstly, the principal executive power was the president, not the State Department. Secondly, 
the National Archives are digitalized to a greater extent than the Ford sources. These online 
sources, The National Archives, Access to Archival Databases have supplied the Ford- 
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sources. There is a great deal of overlap between the two archives. There is not apparent 
consistence in why two similar documents are available in one archive or another.32 
 
More concrete information is found in memoranda of conversations, so called memcons. The 
memcons of the Ford library are largely digitalized and have been obtained online. The 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) also provided valuable memcons. 
 
The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library Digital Collections has mostly supplied the thesis 
with memcons. Memcons are transcripts or summaries from meetings. The level of detail 
varies greatly. There is no way of determining what might have been omitted, simplified or 
misunderstood. Still, these documents provide valuable information. In meetings among US 
policymakers the conversation is informal and direct, as opposed to the diplomatic and often 
vague language used in cables. In meetings with foreign officials the conversation is more 
formal or even deceptive, but still more direct than written communication.33 
 
The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) collection on the Ford administration has 
been accessed online.34 The volume of the Ford FRUS that have been most valuable to this 
thesis has been volume 26, “Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976”.35 Chapter five of volume 26 
focuses on the Lebanese civil war.36 All the documents within this chapter are memcons, 
largely from the spring of 1976. 
 
Literature 
The secondary sources used for this thesis can be roughly divided into two groups: Those on 
Lebanon and those on US foreign policy. The literature on Lebanon includes books on 
Lebanon’s history and works that focus on the civil war period. The latter provide the bulk of 
the material for this thesis, supported by the former. Most literature includes the entire civil 
war (1975-1990) or later periods of the war.  
 
The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon by Farid el Khazen is the most detailed book on the 
1975-1976 phase of the Lebanese civil war and its causes.37 Khazen provides an in-depth 
                                                
32 http://aad.archives.gov/, visited on October 11, 2014 
33 http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/docs.asp, visited on October 11, 2014 
34 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/nixon-ford, visited on October 11, 2014 
35 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26, visited on October 11, 2014 
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analysis of the socio-economic and sectarian disputes that dominated the pre-war years and 
the civil war itself. Khazen devotes much attention to the Palestinian guerrillas and how their 
presence and armed struggle affected Lebanon. Khazen’s sources include Lebanese media, 
interviews with and testimonies of principal Lebanese actors, official data and unpublished 
documents regarding the Lebanese and Palestinian groups.38 
 
While Khazen provides a Lebanese perspective, a Palestinian point of view is provided by 
Armed Struggle and the Search for State by Yezid Sayigh.39 Sayigh’s timespan and focus is 
not centered on the Lebanese civil war. Still, hundreds pages of the massive book cover the 
PLO’s presence in Lebanon. Like Khazen, Sayigh has a greater level of detail than most 
books on the subject. Sayigh’s sources include interviews with numerous Palestinians leaders. 
Sayigh has also seen the Palestinian resistance movement from the inside, as a part of the 
Palestinian delegation in the period surrounding the 1993 Oslo Accords.40 Sayigh has had 
unique access to several Palestinian guerrilla archives, as well as personal insights to several 
PLO officials.41 Sayigh’s occasionally even refers to secret US documents that are still 
classified in 2014.42 Sayigh thanks Professor Fawwaz Traboulsi at the Center for Arab and 
Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut for the sources. It is not clear 
how Traboulsi has obtained these sources.43 
 
Both Khazen and Sayigh mention the US involvement in the 1975-1976 period of the civil 
war. The sections on the US resemble conclusive summaries, compared to the in-depth 
analysis that otherwise characterize their works. 
 
None of the works are dedicated to the Ford administration’s policy toward the Lebanese civil 
war. The different works illuminate different parts of US foreign policy. The literature can be 
divided on two levels. On the first level: Some works cover the foreign policy of several 
administrations, while others focus on specific administrations or policymakers. On the 
second level: Some works cover foreign policy in general, while others focus on the Middle 
East.  
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The Flawed Architect by Jussi Hanhimäki is a comprehensive study of Kissinger as a 
statesman during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ford.44 The Lebanese civil war is 
only briefly mentioned, as is the case with most works concerning Ford and Kissinger. 
However, Hanhimäki supplies an understanding of the inner workings of US policymaking 
under Kissinger. 
 
Several books cover the US and the Middle East. However, they do not focus on the Nixon-
Ford administrations specifically. These give valuable insight to the general development of 
the US’ Middle East policy. All the literature on US foreign policy touch upon the Nixon-
Ford administrations’ major Middle East efforts; the bilateral Arab-Israeli agreements of 1974 
and 1975. These Middle East efforts provide the backdrop and framework for how the 
administration tackled the Lebanese civil war. 
                                                
44 Hanhimäki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect. Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY, 2004 
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Chapter 2: 
Origins of the Lebanese Civil War 
 
“Nobody wins civil wars. The losers lose, the winners lose”45 
 
Lebanon is a bountiful country, largely separated from the rest of the Middle East by 
mountains. Throughout history present day Lebanon has been home to several of small or 
persecuted groups of the Middle East. The Maronites arrived present day Lebanon in the 
600s. They were Christians, named after the Syrian saint Maron. Other Christian groups 
followed, notably the Greek Orthodox. Muslim forces conquered Lebanon during the Muslim 
expansions of the 630s. After the Muslim schism, Lebanon was home to both Sunni and Shia. 
An offshoot of Shia Islam called the Druze appeared in the present day Lebanon 11th century. 
These five groups, or sects, make up present day Lebanon, along with 13 others. The sects’ 
struggle for power has resulted in several violent clashes and civil wars, notably the civil war 
of 1975-1990.46 
 
Osman Rule 
In 1516 the Osman Empire conquered the Mamluk dynasty, gaining control of present day 
Lebanon.47 Until the end of the First World War, the central areas of contemporary Lebanon 
would remain under the control of Istanbul. During the four hundred Osman years power 
shifted between Beirut and Istanbul.48 
 
Periods of free trade and semi-autonomy made the appointed leaders of Lebanon rich and 
ambitious. The Osman Empire allied itself with different groups; beheading or deposing one 
leader and replacing him with another. Istanbul was first allied with Druze chiefs. Istanbul 
later relied on Sunni and Maronite chiefs as well. During the 1700s a Maronite-Sunni alliance 
emerged, leaving the Druze in the cold. The powerful Chehab family converted from Sunni 
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48 Rogan. The Arabs. 2011: 45-49; Salibi. A House of Many Mansions. 1988: 65-7; Waage. Konflikt og 
stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. 2012: 51-53, 212-213 
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Islam to Maronite Christianity before the 1800. Maronite rule was consolidated during the 
first half of the 19th century. The Maronite families dominance over Lebanon was repeatedly 
challenged, especially by the Druze. However, Maronites have been the dominant sect since 
the 1800s.49 
 
The French Mandate 
France created present day Lebanon in 1920. The Maronite’s ties to France stretch back for 
centuries. The Maronites joined the Catholic Church in the 1180s, entering a formal union in 
1736. During the 1800s foreign powers sought to increase their influence in this prosperous 
area. The European powers started arming the rivaling sects. Russia supported the Orthodox 
Christians, France supported the Maronites and Britain supported the Druze. The involvement 
of the great powers fuelled sectarian violence, culminating in the Druze uprising of 1838 and 
the civil war of 1860. The Second French Empire saved the Maronites, when the Christian 
group was about to be wiped out by the Druze. Napoleon III was eager to increase France’s 
power in the Levant. French ambitions in the area stretched back to Napoleon Bonaparte, 
uncle of Napoleon III. France sought to weaken the Osman Empire, and demanded the 
Maronites be given greater security and autonomy. The common Catholicism of French and 
Maronites made them natural allies. France’s involvement further consolidated Maronite 
rule.50 
 
The Osman Empire was on the loosing side of the First World War and it’s Levantine areas 
were divided as spoils. France and Great Britain were victors and set about dividing the 
Middle East amongst them, creating the present day borders.51 In the Sykes-Picot agreement 
of 1916, Britain and France planned to divide the Levant among them. The French mandate of 
present day Lebanon and Syria were established in 1920. France carved Lebanon out of Syria 
to create a state for the Maronites. The Maronite heartland, Mount Lebanon, stretches from 
the area around Beirut and north along the coast toward Tripoli. To the French Mount 
Lebanon seemed a small area for a state. Pressed by Maronite leaders, France expanded 
Mount Lebanon to the south, east and north, creating a Greater Lebanon. Mount Lebanon was 
                                                
49 Rogan. The Arabs. 2011: 45-49, 82-102, 109; Salibi. A House of Many Mansions. 1988: 65-7; Traboulsi. A 
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far from homogenously Maronite, or even Christian, in 1920. Adding the eastern Beqaa 
valley and today’s southern Lebanon made Lebanon even less homogenous. The newly 
created Greater Lebanon consisted of a multitude of sects, with differing ideas of nationality. 
The Muslim communities of Lebanon felt Arabic, Muslim or Syrian; not Lebanese.52 
 
The National pact and Independence 
There has not been a Lebanese census since 1932. It is still disputed. The 1932 census showed 
a slight Christian majority. The three largest groups were, in descending order: the Maronites, 
the Sunnis and the Shias.53 
 
Lebanon gained independence in 1943. Leaders from the major Lebanese sects agreed to 
divided power among themselves. The agreement is referred to as the National Pact. As a 
French Mandate, Lebanon had been established as a republic. However, rather than a 
traditional democracy, each sect was given a certain share of power. The balance of power 
was based on the 1932 census, giving the Christians a 6 to 5 majority in the Lebanese 
Parliament. Governmental positions were distributed accordingly, as they had been during the 
French Mandate: A Maronite President, Sunni Prime Minister and Shia speaker of the 
Parliament. The Druze, Orthodox Christians and other groups held various lesser positions. 
Over the following decades the Muslim population growth outstripped the Christian 
population growth. The National Pact remained unchanged, despite the shift in population 
ratio. Between 1943 and the mid-1970s, Muslim’s grew increasingly discontent with the 
disproportionate distribution of power.54 
 
The 1958 Crisis 
From an American and European point of view, post-war Lebanon appeared to be a well 
functioning, prosperous and relatively free country. Centuries of lucrative trade and ties to 
France had made Lebanon by far the most Western of the Arab states in the region.55 
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At the other end of the political spectrum, pan-Arabism was on the rise. This brand of pan-
Arabism was a secular Arabic nationalism infused with socialism, seeking to unite the Arab 
peoples and nations. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s subsequent 
rise to power started a wave of pan-Arabism in the Middle East. In February 1958 Egypt and 
Syria formed The United Arab Republic. Though short-lived, the alliance caused pan-Arabist 
sentiments to spike in Lebanon. Pan-Arabism appealed to those that saw themselves as Arab 
or Syrian, rather than Lebanese. The pro-Western Chamoun government starkly opposed Pan-
Arabism.56 
 
The pan-Arab uprising converged with the discontent with the 1943 National Pact. Lebanon’s 
laissez-faire economy had led to economic inequality. Nepotism and sectarian bias ensured 
low social and geographical mobility. The class divide largely followed the sectarian divide: 
Muslim’s, especially Shias and farmers, did not fail to notice that the suburban Christians had 
more money and more power.57 
 
The presidential election to elect Chamoun’s successor was scheduled for the fall of 1958. 
The 1923 constitution stated a Lebanese president could not be reelected. Chamoun bought 
votes and tried to change the constitution to get himself reelected. His political opponents 
took to arms and revolted in July 1958. Muslim-dominated, rural areas joined the uprising. 
Some of Chamoun’s opponents were Christian, but the 1958 crisis turned into a sectarian civil 
war, pitting Christians against Muslims. Lebanon became de facto fragmented: The 
government’s authority was limited to central Maronite areas, while Muslim provinces were 
under rebel control.58 
 
President Chamoun wanted the US to save the Christians, rather than the Maronites 
traditional ally, France. The Suez Crisis two years earlier, made Chamoun realize that the US 
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was a more valuable partner. In the Suez Crisis of 1956, Britain, France and Israel had 
mobilized their forces to prevent Egypt from nationalizing the Suez Canal. The US, led by 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, had restrained the European and Israeli powers. In July 
1958 Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower doctrine, formulated in 1957. The doctrine promised 
US assistance to states threatened by Soviet aggression. There were communists among 
Chamoun’s pan-Arabist enemies, but the rebellion of 1958 was not of Moscow’s making. The 
Eisenhower administration was suspicious of Chamoun, who they perceived as 
antidemocratic. However, Chamoun’s request was just preceded by the Iraqi revolution, 
which toppled Iraq’s pro-western democracy. The CIA wrongly asserted that the Iraqi 
revolution was inspired by Moscow, convincing Eisenhower to send forces to Lebanon.59 
 
The 1958 civil war lasted three months. Some 2000 Lebanese died in the 1958 civil war. The 
15 000 US Marines did not fire a single shot, but US mediation bring about a compromise. 
Chamoun was succeeded by Fouad Chehab, a candidate acceptable to both Christians and 
Muslims: He was perceived as moderate, and less pro-Western than his predecessor. 
Additionally, Chehab had the army commander during the crisis, and largely kept the army 
from participating. Chehab’s more Arab-friendly government helped lessen the sectarian 
animosity. In the end there was “no vanquished and no victor.”60 The conflict was resolved, 
but not its causes.61 
 
The Palestinians 
The presence of 300 000 Palestinian refugees was one of the contributing factors to the 
outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. At least 100 000 Palestinians refugees had arrived 
in Lebanon by 1950, following the Arab-Palestinian War of 1948.62 The Palestinian refugees 
were initially beneficial to Lebanon. The Arab countries’ economic boycott of Israel 
increased Lebanon’s trade, further strengthened by the arrival of wealthy and middle class 
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Palestinians.63 The following waves of Palestinian refugees were increasingly poor, making 
the Maronite establishment increasingly skeptical of the refugees. By the 1950s, stateless and 
impoverished Palestinians populated refugee camps throughout Lebanese coastal towns and 
the underprivileged southern Lebanon. Before long, the Maronites wanted the Palestinians 
moved to Syria or returned to Israel.64 
 
In addition to the coastal towns, there was a large Palestinian presence in southern Lebanon. 
Southern Lebanon was largely rural, poor and Shia dominated. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Lebanese economy waned. The vast majority of the population was already poor compared to 
the elites, causing increased unrest as the cost of living rose. The Six-Day War of 1967 
displaced further Palestinians, increasing their numbers in Lebanon.  By ca. 1970 the number 
of Palestinian refugees was at least doubled. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon further 
polarized the country’s population. One side wanted the Palestinians gone; the other 
sympathized with the Palestinian’s circumstances.65 
 
The wealthy Maronite community in particular, along with their Christian and Muslim allies, 
saw the refugees as a burden to their society. The Christians had gradually realized that they 
were a minority, and would never grant citizenship to more than a hundred thousand 
Palestinians. Being predominantly Muslim, citizenship to several hundred thousand 
Palestinians would ruin the Maronite’s claim to power.66 
 
Many Muslims, especially the poorer Shia dominated population of southern Lebanon, 
sympathized with the Palestinians. They lived largely in the same urban or southern areas. 
Both groups were relatively poor, compared to the Maronite and Sunni elites. They also found 
common ground in their lack of political influence over the lands they deemed their own.67 
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The Cairo Agreement and the Palestinian State-Within-a-State 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in Cairo 1964, as a puppet 
organization controlled by Egypt and Nasser.68 Israel’s Arab neighbors were humiliated in the 
1967 Six-Day War. The Palestinian national movement became disillusioned with the Arab 
states. They no longer believed that the Arab countries would deliver their homeland and 
decided to take matters into their own hands.69 In 1967 Yasser Arafat’s party Fatah joined the 
PLO. Being the largest of the Palestinian groups, it immediately gained control of half of the 
seats in the PLO’s legislative branch, the Palestine National Council (PNC). In 1969 Fatah 
gained executive control over the PLO. Arafat was appointed chairman. The PLO had grown 
out of Nasser’s shadow and become an independent organization.70 
 
The PLO that emerged after the Six-Day War was controlled by Palestinians. The new PLO 
was independent of Arab tutelage, pan-Arabism and was more militant than before. As of 
1968, Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon were used as bases for Palestinian 
guerrilla attacks on Israel. Israel answered with counter attacks. The violence quickly 
escalated and both sides were attacking and killing civilians. Southern Lebanon became an 
Israeli-Palestinian battlefield, further polarizing and destabilizing the volatile country.71 
 
The Israeli counter attacks were a direct message to the Lebanese government to control the 
Palestinian guerrillas. The Lebanese government had neither the strength nor the will to 
answer the Israeli attacks. However, the government was equally unable to control the 
Palestinian guerrillas. The Lebanese government did not have the strength to expel or subdue 
the Palestinian guerrillas. The presence of the Palestinians caused a rift within the 
government, which had to be reformed. Popular support for the Palestinians was on the rise. 
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Fighting broke out several times between guerrillas and the Lebanese army, as the latter 
attempted to stop their attacks. The PLO, however, wanted to increase the military presence in 
Lebanon and did not yield. Army officials met with PLO representatives several times to end 
the fighting, without success.72 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian and Lebanese-Palestinian violence escalated throughout 1968 and 
1969. Sunni Prime Minister Rashid Karami finally asked Nasser for help. A deal was struck 
on the November 3, 1969, known as the Cairo Agreement. The PLO promised to coordinate 
its guerrilla attacks with the Lebanese Army. This was ignored. The concrete effect of the 
Agreement was that the PLO was free to attack Israel from Lebanon, much to the dismay of 
the Maronite community. While promising to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty, the PLO gained 
control over the Palestinian refugee camps. In reality, the Palestinian refugee camps became 
autonomous areas under PLO control. The PLO introduced taxes and conscription. The long-
term consequences were, firstly, increased cross border violence between Palestinians and the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Secondly, the PLO was able to build a Palestinian mini-state 
within Lebanon, a State Within a State. A Palestinian mini-state was not compatible with a 
sovereign Lebanon. This paradox became increasingly obvious in the following years, as the 
Israeli-Palestinian retaliation spiral continued.73 
 
Black September – Palestinian Expulsion from Jordan 
Jordan had received even more Palestinian refugees than Jordan after the 1948 war. In the 
Six-Day War Israel occupied the rest of what had been Palestine. 300 000 Palestinians fled 
east from the West Bank, in to Jordan. The number of Palestinians in Jordan was 750 000 by 
1970, rivaling the same size as the Jordanian population. The Palestinian refugees and 
guerrillas posed a direct threat to Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan: The Palestinian state-
within-a-state in Jordan was operating independently of the Hussein government. By 1970 the 
Palestinian mini-state had it’s own administrative, social, and economic networks. Radical 
left-wing Palestinians openly plotted Hussein’s downfall. As in Lebanon, the mini-state 
became a safe haven for Palestinian guerrillas. From their bases in Jordan, they launched 
attacks on goals in Israel. Israel answered by conducting military raids against the Palestinian 
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camps in Jordan, harming both Palestinians and Jordanians. Both Palestinians and Israel 
defied King Hussein’s jurisdiction. Hussein could not hope to challenge Israel successfully, as 
he had learned from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Hussein’s only solution to save his throne was 
to subdue the Palestinians.74 
 
Within the Levant, Hussein was a comparatively weak head of state, but he maintained close 
relations with his Bedouin military troops. In June 1970 he attacked Palestinian refugee 
camps. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had abducted the US 
Embassy’s first secretary and occupied two Amman hotels, holding some eighty guests 
hostage. The PFLP was a radical left wing member of the PLO.75 
 
On September 6, 1970, Hussein got the excuse he needed to go to war against the 
Palestinians. The PFLP landed three hijacked civil airplanes in the Jordanian desert. TV 
stations from all over the world covered the story, propelling the Palestinian cause to the 
center of international attention. The passengers were released, before the planes were 
spectacularly blown up. The Jordanian Army stood by, unable to stop the PFLP. Hussein was 
humiliated. The PFLP had showed the whole world that they would not abide Hussein’s 
authority, and that Hussein was unable to hinder them.76 
 
Hussein moved against the Palestinians camps again on September 15. The attacks were 
indiscriminate, killing civilians and guerrilla members alike. Over the next ten days, 3000 
Palestinians were killed. After ten days of fighting, Hussein and Arafat signed an armistice 
agreement brokered by Nasser. The Egyptian leader died just days later, on September 28.77 
 
By July 1971 the guerrillas were largely expulsed from Jordan. The PLO headquarters were 
relocated to Beirut. In 1971 the numbers of Palestinians in Lebanon reached 300 000. 
Undaunted by their expulsion from Jordan, the guerrillas continued their attacks against 
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Israeli targets. Israel continued their counter attacks. The Palestinian-Israeli violence was now 
concentrated on the already volatile country.78 
 
Discontent and Civil Unrest 
Lebanon experienced economic growth between 1965 and 1975, but the growth mainly 
benefited the wealthy. In the 1950s 50 per cent of the population worked in farming, but by 
1975 the number had dropped to 20 per cent. The changing job market caused large 
migrations and emigration. Syrian workers immigrated to do manual labor and construction 
for lower wages than the Lebanese, resulting in increased unemployment. Economic growth 
in combination with unchecked speculation doubled the cost of living between 1967 and 
1975.79 
 
In a society of sectarianism, nepotism and privileges, the economic growth did not alleviate 
the uneven distribution of wealth; it accentuated it. This caused a rapid centralization and 
urbanization of the population. The periphery, particularly the south, became sparsely 
populated and poorer. The intellectual and economic elite flocked to the cities. The major 
factor in the urbanization was not the elites, but unemployed farm workers and those 
displaced by the Israeli counter-attacks in southern Lebanon. Property speculation made 
central Beirut rich and luxurious. The eastern and southern suburbs were transformed in to a 
poverty belt, compromising of impoverished Lebanese and Palestinian refugees. The sectarian 
divisions mirrored the economic division. Christians dominated the wealthier areas, while 
Shias and Palestinians dominated the poverty belt.80 
 
By the presidential election of 1970, there was broad support for reforming Lebanese finance. 
Farmer revolts started in 1968 and from 1970 there were clashes with Lebanese gendarmerie. 
Members of the Saiqa guerrilla joined the farmers. The Saiqa guerrilla was sponsored and 
partially controlled by Damascus. Salah Jadid, Syria’s head of state had founded Saiqa as a 
Palestinian group of the Syrian Ba’ath party. As Hafez al Assad replaced Jadid as the leader 
of Syria, Damascus briefly lost it’s control over Saiqa. The Lebanese left and opposition 
parties soon adopted these struggles and gained leadership of the rural uprising. President 
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Suleiman Frangieh (1970-1976) appointed Saeb Salam (1970-1973) his first Prime Minister. 
Salam tried to restructure Lebanon’s sectarian system of education and finance. He feared that 
ignoring the unrest might lead to a national uprising. His ministers found themselves thwarted 
by the clandestine economic elite. Salam’s first cabinet collapsed in 1972. Instead of 
reformation, Frangieh’s term as President saw increased nepotism and corruption.81 
 
Sectarian Violence 
After Black September thousands of Palestinian refugees arrived, followed by more 
Palestinian guerrilla fighters and the PLO leadership. Black September strengthened the 
Palestinian guerrillas resolve to remain independent of the Arab states. Palestinian guerrillas 
took revenge on King Hussein by assassinating the Jordanian Prime Minister in November 
1971. The influx in guerrilla fighters led to an increase in Maronite-Palestinian violence, as 
well as further escalating the Palestinian-Israeli spiral of reciprocation.82 
 
The Palestinians guerrillas allied themselves with the Lebanese opposition. Like the 
Palestinians and the opposition, Maronites also had paramilitary branches of their 
organizations. The two most prominent Maronite militias in the mid-1970s were Pierre 
Gemayel’s Phalangists and the Tigers of former President Camille Chamoun. Both Gemayel 
and Chamoun thought that the growing Muslim population and their increased discontent was 
a threat to the Christians’ position and safety in Lebanon. 83 
 
In March and April 1973, fighting broke out between the Lebanese army and Palestinian 
Guerrillas. In April three Fatah leaders were assassinated in Beirut, in an Israeli raid. The 
Lebanese National Movement arranged massive demonstrations against the government. The 
National Movement, founded in 1969, was a coalition of left wing and Arab nationalist 
parties. Prime Minister Salam demanded the resignation of newly appointed army 
commander, Maronite General Iskandar Ghanem. President Frangieh’s supported Ghanem, 
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and Salam stepped down from his last period as Prime Minister. Unchecked by Salam’s 
protests, the violence between the PLO and the Lebanese army spiraled. 84 
 
Kamal Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist Party led the National Movement. Jumblatt was 
a prominent leader of the Druze and had been one of Chamoun’s principal opponents in the 
1958 civil war. Jumblatt had political pedigree. The Jumblatt family was among the 
prominent Druze tribes in the uprising in 1838.85  It had been created as an alliance of 
communist, Druze and Pan-Arabist organizations. The PLO and the National Movement were 
both opposed to the sectarian and laissez faire economic politics of Lebanon. Both groups 
wanted the Lebanese government to protest the Israeli raids in Lebanon. The National 
Movement and the PLO were both opposed to the Lebanese status quo, making them natural 
allies. In the conflicts leading up to the Civil War, two blocs would rise as the prominent 
protagonists. The PLO-National Movement alliance made up the opposition-bloc. They 
attracted Shia, the left wing, Palestinians, Druze and anyone else in favor of reform. The 
Phalangists and Tigers of Gemayel and Chamoun made up the conservative bloc, attracting 
Maronites in particular, as well as some Sunni and others who benefited from not reforming 
the Lebanese society.86 
 
Salam’s successor, Amin Hafiz, managed to bring about a new settlement with the PLO, but 
was soon relieved of his duties. The conservative Sunni oligarchs did not approve of Hafiz, 
and Frangieh did not challenge their view. In an effort to reconcile with the opposition, the 
President asked National Movement leader Jumblatt to name the next Prime Minister. 
Jumblatt chose Taquiyuddin Solh, from the important Sunni family bearing his name. 
Frangieh’s courtship with Jumblatt did little to appease the National Movement. To make 
matters worse, he estranged his Sunni allies. Frangieh made several attempts at forming new 
governments, but they all proved short-lived. Frangieh’s presidency was characterized by 
inability and instability.87 
 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 provided a slight breather for Lebanon. The war had shown the 
Palestinian guerrillas that Israel was not invulnerable. After the war, the Palestinian-Israeli 
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raids escalated again.88 Israel was eager to strike hard against the Palestinians. With the 
increased violence of late 1973, Israel had a pretext for increasing their retaliatory strikes. 
Israeli launched air strikes against Lebanon, carrying out more than fifty air strikes in 1974.89 
Only one fifth of the Israeli attacks struck guerrilla bases. Most of them struck civilian targets, 
harming both Lebanese Shia Muslims and Palestinians. The spiral of violence caused a two 
front pressure on the Lebanese government. On the one hand, the Muslim and Palestinian 
communities and guerrillas called for the government to bring an end to the Israeli raids. On 
the other hand, Israel was pressuring the Lebanese government to control the guerrillas. 
 
In the first half of the 1970’s the 1932 census was further from the truth than ever. Even the 
Maronites realized that there was certainly no Christian majority. Social, economic and 
political inequity was greater than ever. The Palestinian presence heightened these 
differences. By allying themselves with the National Movement and jeopardizing Lebanon’s 
relationship with Israel, they became the ultimate enemy of the Maronite elite. By 1975, the 
number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was nearing 350 000.90 
 
The years of Israeli-Palestinian violence strained the Lebanese society. Shias and the 
opposition blamed the government for not defending them from Israeli attacks. The Maronites 
blamed the Palestinians for attracting Israel’s attention in the first place. In the first half of the 
1970s, thousands of people fled southern Lebanon to escape the Israeli attacks. Those 
displaced by the Israeli attacks flocked to the cities. President Frangieh had been unable or 
unwilling to stop the urbanization and centralization of the economy. Rural migrants joined 
those fleeing from the violence of southern Lebanon. The poverty belt encircling Beirut 
reached 500 000 inhabitants by 1975. The belt was made up of everything from squatters and 
unemployed Shia farmers, to Palestinian refugee camps and guerrilla bases. The increased 
number of Palestinian camps and bases in Beirut led to increased violence and Israeli attacks 
in and around the capital, increasing the pressure on the government.91 
 
The clashes in the spring of 1973 had started an arms race between the Lebanese factions. 
One side wished to maintain the political system, the other to reform it. Maronites dominated 
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the former, particularly Chamoun, Gemayel and their respective guerrilla groups. On the 
reformist side were Jumblatt and the National Movement, and the Palestinian groups. The 
spring of 1973 had taught the Maronite leaders that the Muslims could not be controlled, no 
matter who was appointed Prime Minister. The violence increased, fuelled by Israeli attacks, 
civil unrest, political impotence and an abundance of firearms.92 
 
Lebanon’s problems began at its conception. A Lebanese newspaper editor likened the 
creation of Greater Lebanon to “the squaring of the circle.”93 The sects of Lebanon had too 
diverging identities to be fused in to a cohesive and sovereign state. The sects’ continued 
segregation was enabled by the sectarian system of the 1943 National Pact. The 1932 census, 
and thus the distribution of power, was increasingly unrepresentative of the population. 
Decades of economic inequality created increased envy and enmity between the Lebanese 
sects. The arrival of ever more impoverished Palestinians, Palestinian guerrillas and Israeli-
Palestinian violence brought the tension of the Lebanese society to the breaking point. The 
tension peaked in the spring of 1975, culminating in a civil war that would last fifteen years.
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Chapter 3: 
The Civil War begins 
 
“I have no particular interest in Lebanon’s internal affairs if they do not 
involve outside countries. I don’t want us involved in their internal affairs.”94 
 
By 1975, Lebanon was home to over 300 000 Palestinians. Following the 1969 Cairo 
Agreement, the Palestinian refugee camps had turned into a state within a state. The camps 
were under the control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rather than the 
Lebanese government. Following the Six-Day War in 1967, southern Lebanon became a 
scene for cross-border violence between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian 
guerrillas. Southern Lebanon was generally rural and poor, predominantly inhabited by Shia 
Muslims. Shias were the most politically underrepresented of Lebanon’s three major religious 
groups. The government’s inability to provide security for the southerners led to increased 
discontent from the Shias in the south towards the Maronite Christian dominated leadership. 
Spearheading the Lebanese pro-Palestinians was the Lebanese National Movement. The 
National Movement was a coalition of leftists and Arab nationalists, led by Druze chief 
Kamal Jumblatt. The Maronites, on the other hand, blamed the Palestinians for provoking 
Israel.95 
 
By 1975 the Lebanese powder keg was ready to blow. The uneven power distribution of the 
sectarian democracy, the economic inequality, the Palestinian refugees and the Israeli-
Palestinian violence had polarized Lebanese politics. Every faction was armed to the teeth. 
 
Step-by-Step. Kissinger’s Diplomacy 
At the heart of US’ Middle East effort at the time was Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy, a 
reaction to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat had tried in vain to 
reach out to Israel and the US since the early 1970s. Having exhausted his diplomatic 
capabilities, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack on Israel on October 6, 1973. The 
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first Arab attack was a success, and took Israel by surprise.96 By the end of the month, Israeli 
troops were approaching Cairo and Damascus. A cease-fire was arranged.97 
 
Rather than bringing Israel and all its Arab neighbors to the negotiation table, Kissinger 
talked to the Arab countries one by one. Kissinger would mediate, shuttling between Israel 
and the Arab states in question. Kissinger preferred a step-by-step approach: Each agreement 
was consciously limited in scope, rather than comprehensive and final. Kissinger found it 
easier to get concessions from the polarized opponents when focusing on a limited set of 
issues, rather than forcing Israel to deal with all Arab states and all issues simultaneously. 
Kissinger largely avoided discussing what to do about the Palestinians. Kissinger learned that 
the Arab countries were more willing to ignore the Palestinians when approached one by one, 
than when the Arab-Israeli conflict was raised in the UN. Kissinger also found that in bilateral 
agreements, the Arab states would settle for very small concessions. 
 
Shuttles with Egypt, Jordan and Syria were planned. The first Egyptian-Israeli agreement was 
signed on January 18, 1974. An Israeli-Syrian agreement followed on May 31, 1974. Both 
were characterized by partial withdrawals of Israeli troops and UN peacekeeping forces in 
buffer zones between the Israeli and Arab armies. After the Syrian-Israeli agreement, it 
became difficult to secure another agreement. The first attempts at an Israeli-Jordanian 
agreement were unsuccessful. In October 1974 the Arab League summit in Rabat recognized 
the PLO, not King Hussein, as the sole representative of the Palestinians and the occupied 
West Bank, which had been under Jordanian control prior to the Six-Day War. When Hussein 
could no longer negotiate with Israel over the West Bank, the unborn Israeli-Jordanian 
agreement fell apart.98 
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The step-by-step diplomacy was a part of Kissinger’s globalist policy: Demonstrating to the 
Arab countries that progress could be made, but only by abandoning Moscow for 
Washington.99 It was a limited success: Kissinger helped contrive the first Arab-Israeli 
agreements. From a US realist and pro-Israeli perspective, he managed to relieve the pressure 
on Israel without Israel making major territorial concession. Israel was allowed to reinforce its 
occupation and the shuttles wrested regional influence away from the Soviet Union, which 
was largely kept outside of the US-led political process. Kissinger’s diplomacy also had 
negative ramifications: Firstly, the agreements did not solve any substantial problems. 
Secondly, the rest of the Arab world was estranged; which would haunt Israel and the US for 
decades to come. Lastly, Moscow understood that Washington was trying to lure its allies 
away from the Soviet Union. This proved a setback to American-Soviet relations.100 
 
January Violence 
1975 started with several IDF raids against Palestinian guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon. 
Lebanese and Palestinians alike were displaced from homes and farms, disturbing the crucial 
tobacco harvest. Angry locals stormed the municipal building in the town of Marjayoun, 
where they came to blows with Lebanese security forces. By the end of January, fighting 
erupted between Christian and Palestinian militias in Beirut. Police was dispatched, but 
proved unable to enforce a cease-fire. The Lebanese government was criticized left and right. 
The political left, spearheaded by Kamal Jumblatt and the National Movement, criticized the 
government for not protecting the southern population, largely made up of underprivileged 
Shia and Palestinian refugees, from Israeli attacks. At the other end of the political spectrum 
was Maronite Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Phalangists (also known as the Kataeb). This 
fascist-inspired Maronite party and its militia criticized the government for not controlling the 
Palestinians and breaking down their state within a state.101 
 
                                                
99 Dawisha. ”Egypt” 1997: 40; Hanhimäki. The Flawed Architect. 2004: 320-2, 324-5, 329; Quandt. Peace 
Process. 2005: 138-41; Rogan. The Arabs. 2011: 467-8, 487; Shlaim. The Iron Wall. 2000: 321-2; Spiegel. The 
Other Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1985: 283-305; Waage. Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. 2012: 396-8; 
Yapp. The Near East since the First World War. 1996: 423; Yaqub. “The Weight of Conquest” 2008: 228, 237 
100 Dawisha. ”Egypt” 1997: 40; Hanhimäki. The Flawed Architect. 2004: 320-2, 324-5, 329; Quandt. Peace 
Process. 2005: 138-41; Rogan. The Arabs. 2011: 467-8, 487; Shlaim. The Iron Wall. 2000: 321-2; Spiegel. The 
Other Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1985: 283-305; Waage. Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. 2012: 396-8; 
Yapp. The Near East since the First World War. 1996: 423; Yaqub. “The Weight of Conquest” 2008: 228, 237 
101 Khazen. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon. 2000: 267; O’Ballance. Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92. 
1998: 7; Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State. 1997: 360; Traboulsi. A History of Modern Lebanon. 
2007: 24 
Chapter 3 – The Civil War Begins 
 30 
The cross-border violence was followed by rumors that Israel was going to intervene 
militarily in southern Lebanon, to put an end to the guerrilla activity. Israeli Foreign Minister 
Yigal Allon told the US that he was disappointed with the Lebanese government. Allon 
thought Lebanon should have suppressed the Palestinian guerrillas, like Jordan did in 1970.102 
Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council (NSC) assessed the situation for Kissinger: 
In Oakley’s opinion, Allon misunderstood the Lebanese situation: Lebanon could not wage 
war on the guerrillas as Jordan had done in 1970. The Lebanese government did not have the 
military strength or stability of King Hussein.103 Allon was also worried about the Saiqa 
guerrilla’s presence in Lebanon. 104  Saiqa was a Palestinian militia under Damascus’s 
leadership.105 Israel would consider Saiqa operations against Israeli targets as a direct threat 
from Syria. Kenneth Keating, US Ambassador to Israel, asked Allon if Israel would use the 
guerrillas or the Syrian presence as an excuse to occupy southern Lebanon. Allon replied that 
Israel had “no current plans to invade”. The threat of an Israeli intervention in Lebanon would 
continue to dominate the Ford administration’s perspective on the Lebanese Civil War.106 
 
Oakley did not judge the situation to be an immediate threat to Washington’s diplomatic 
strategy in the Middle East. At the time, Washington was planning to produce a second 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement. A shuttle was scheduled for March. However, Oakley stressed 
that continued or escalating violence between the IDF and the guerrillas was likely to trigger 
an Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon. Such a war would jeopardize Kissinger’s Shuttle 
Diplomacy. Oakley reasoned that increased Israeli military action short of an invasion would 
tighten Syria’s power over Lebanon. Oakley reckoned the US’ best option was to keep the 
IDF out of southern Lebanon.107 
 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Colby sent Kissinger a memo on January 
30. Colby largely agreed with Oakley’s analysis. The CIA Director saw the weak Lebanese 
government holding the shortest straw, being under pressure on two fronts: The first front was 
Israel and the Phalangists, who wanted Beirut to control the Palestinian guerrillas. The second 
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front was made up of the victims of the IDF attacks and their leaders.108 Colby and Oakley’s 
analysis both mentioned Lebanon’s sectarian divide, but failed to point out its centrality to the 
Lebanese problem. This lack of interest in Lebanon’s internal affairs was in accordance with 
Washington’s prevailing realism and globalism. The important question was whether the 
violence in Lebanon would jeopardize the upcoming negotiations for a second Egyptian-
Israeli agreement.109 
 
The overarching US policy goal was the planned Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Unless Lebanon 
escalated into a regional war, it was no threat to US policy – and by extension of no interest. 
The only proposed strategy was to restrain Israel. There were two problems with this strategy. 
Firstly, it did not attempt to provide a solution to the violence. Secondly, as Oakley noted, this 
approach would meet resistance from the Israelis. Israel preferred violence in southern 
Lebanon to violence near Israeli settlements.110 The US sought to avoid dealing with Lebanon 
before the spring shuttle. 
 
The Sidon Shooting 
In late February, fishermen in the Lebanese city Sidon were demonstrating against the 
Maronite-owned fishing company Proteine. Maarouf Saad, a Sunni opposition politician and 
parliament member, led the demonstration. Led by former president Camille Chamoun (1952-
1958), Proteine had received a grant on fishing in the high season. The Proteine conflict was 
relatively small and the company was preparing to make amends to the fishermen. However, 
the Lebanese opposition presented the Proteine conflict in a national perspective, painting it 
as a symbol of the Maronite’s oppression of the Muslims. During the demonstration, Saad 
was fatally wounded by a gunshot. Rumors started circulating immediately. Some claimed 
that Saad was shot by leftists hoping to inflame the Lebanese conflict. Other’s thought Saad 
had been liquidated by the army, acting on the behalf of the government or Chamoun. Several 
accusations and theories have been launched, but Saad’s murder remains unsolved. After the 
shooting, Muslim and Palestinian militias took control of Sidon and closed off the city. The 
government dispatched the army to regain control over Sidon. Five days of fighting ensued. 
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This added to the leftist perception of injustice: The Maronite capitalists and the Maronite 
army had seemingly allied against the Shia fishermen.111 
 
Jumblatt came under pressure from the left to react to the government’s handling of the Sidon 
shooting. The National Movement had a de facto veto over the government. At the other end 
of the political spectrum, the Phalangists had equivalent veto over the government. The 
Lebanese government was based on a fragile compromise between these archenemies, and 
both had the power to render the government ineffective. Jumblatt did not want to topple the 
fragile government and blamed the army instead. He subsequently called for the resignation 
of the army commander, the Maronite Iskandar Ghanem. The Maronite camp led a rally in 
support of the army, attended by 35 000 people. Saad’s funeral turned into a counter-
demonstration supporting the PLO, where 150 000 attended. While the violence in January 
had increased polarization and enmity, the Sidon shooting brought Lebanon’s precarious 
peace to the breaking point.112 
 
The March Shuttle 
Kissinger’s March shuttle was a failure. Following the previous agreements, both Israel and 
the US had changed heads of state. Golda Meir was eventually toppled by consequences of 
the 1973 war and succeeded by Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin was less experienced than Meir and led 
a weaker government. Rabin was under domestic pressure. After three weeks of shuttling, 
Kissinger returned to the US without a new agreement. Ford and Kissinger were furious with 
Israel. They found the Rabin government weak and inflexible. The Ford administration 
stopped signing arms deals with Israel and the White House’s relationship with both Israel 
and Congress plummeted.113 
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The NSC assembled central policymakers on March 28, just after the failed shuttle, to discuss 
the possibility of a new regional war in the Middle East.114 Kissinger said that Israel would 
soon see mounting tension along its Syrian and Egyptian borders, coupled with increased 
PLO guerrilla activity from Lebanon. Kissinger also feared another war would draw in the 
Soviet Union and possibly the UN, bringing a halt to the US’ unilateral diplomacy. Secretary 
of Defense James R. Schlesinger thought a potential Israeli attack on Syria would go through 
Lebanon. Two weeks before the Lebanese civil war, the US’ greatest concern regarding 
Lebanon was not the Lebanese conflict itself, but an Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon. This 
would remain the Ford administration’s primary concern.115 
 
Civil War 
The fighting in Sidon had brought Lebanon to the brink of civil war. Lebanon took the plunge 
on April 13: Phalangist leader Gemayel and his entourage were attacked outside a church in 
the Beirut district Ain el-Rammaneh. Gemayel’s bodyguard was killed. The assailants were 
rumored to be Palestinian. Bent on retribution, Maronite militiamen attacked a bus passing 
through Ain el-Rammaneh, killing the nearly 30 Palestinian passengers. The tensions that had 
been mounting between the leftist- and Palestinian militias and the Phalangist militias 
exploded in violence and retaliation throughout Beirut. Different militias built roadblocks and 
checkpoints, sealing off the Beirut districts they dominated. Civil life in the capital dissolved. 
Security forces were dispatched, but could not stop the fighting. The government was losing 
control over Lebanon. As Gemayel pointedly stated: “There is not one government, but many 
in Lebanon.”116 Fighting quickly spread to different parts of the country.117 
 
Kissinger’s globalist perspective led him to ignore the sectarian aspect of the Lebanese 
conflict. On April 14, Ford asked Kissinger about the “significance” of the violence in 
Lebanon.118 Kissinger replied that it was a conflict between the Lebanese government and the 
PLO over the Palestinian state within a state. However, the principal actor fighting the PLO in 
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early April was the Phalangist militia, not the Lebanese government’s forces. Kissinger might 
have oversimplified the Lebanese situation to convey what he perceived as a Maronite-
Palestinian conflict. Still, Kissinger’s statement seems to show a lack of knowledge about or 
interest in the actual conflicts in Lebanon.119 Nearly six months later, on October 10, 
Kissinger still showed little understanding of Lebanon’s problems. CIA Director William 
Colby and William Clements of the State Department informed Kissinger of Lebanon’s 
complex problems, but Kissinger was uninterested.120 
 
Government Breakdown 
The conflict soon reached the Lebanese government. In response to the Ain el-Rammaneh 
events of April 13, Jumblatt and the National Movement called for the isolation of the 
Phalangists and dismissal of their cabinet ministers. Arafat and his entourage were reluctant 
to support the National Movement’s demand, as they tried to maintain an image of non-
interference in Lebanon. Arafat would rather have the Phalangists disarm and enter into a 
political dialogue, than to see them politically isolated. After pressure from its members and 
allies, the PLO leadership endorsed Jumblatt’s demand for isolation. Sunni Prime Minister 
Rashid Solh publically blamed the Phalangists for the Ain el-Rammaneh incidents. In 
response, the Phalangists withdrew its support for the government. On May 15 Prime Minster 
Solh was forced to resign.121 
 
President Suleiman Frangieh appointed a new cabinet on May 23, comprised of army officers. 
The Maronite camp, especially the Phalangists, supported the new government, which was 
seen as anti-Palestinian. For the same reason, the Military Cabinet was opposed by the 
National Movement and widely unpopular with the Muslim population. The otherwise 
politically diverse Sunni population was unified in its opposition to the new government. 
Syria also disliked the new government. Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam went 
to Beirut to confront the President. Frangieh buckled under Syrian pressure and the cabinet 
resigned after only a few days. From now on, Syria would be instrumental in Lebanon. Sunni 
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leaders rallied behind their preferred candidate for the premiership, Rashid Karami. Karami 
started working to assemble a new cabinet.122 
 
US Ambassador George McMurtrie Godley sent Kissinger his analysis of the Lebanese 
conflict on June 11. This was the first comprehensive American analysis in the 1975-1976 
Lebanese Civil War. Godley presented it as mainly three conflicts: Firstly between Lebanese 
nationalists and Palestinians, secondly between the right- and left wing, thirdly between 
Christians and Muslims. He highlighted the Palestinian’s role, remarking that the National 
Movement-Palestinian alliance seemed to have the upper hand in the fighting. Godley saw the 
Lebanese conflict intrinsically linked with the Palestinian question. As long as the Palestinian 
situation remained unsolved, Lebanon’s problems could only be contained. To contain the 
situation, Beirut needed a stronger and more effective government. Godley was optimistic 
that Karami might be the right man for the job.123 The ambassador did not offer policy advice: 
“no one can see what can be done other than to preach moderation, negotiation of cessation of 
bloodshed, etc.”124 By the end of June, Lebanon was becoming so dangerous that Americans 
travelling to Beirut were being stopped at the airports. Some American citizens in Beirut had 
been relocated to remove them from the fighting. Godley recommended making basic 
planning for a potential evacuation of American citizens.125 
 
The Karami Government and the July Cease-Fire 
Karami had a hard time forming a new government, as the Phalangists, the National 
Movement and the PLO all had a say. In the end it was Syria who strong-armed an agreement. 
The Karami-cabinet was officially formed on July 1, due to Damascus’ ability to negotiate 
with the Christians and put pressure on the Muslims. A cease-fire was established, which 
lasted until mid-August. The PLO, however, mostly stayed out of the violence throughout the 
fall.126 
 
US Ambassador to Syria, Richard Murphy, lauded Damascus’ conciliatory role in Lebanon in 
a cable to Washington. He acknowledged that Syria had self-serving interests in Lebanon, but 
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rejected the view of “some Israelis,” that the Syrians were driven by territorial ambitions. 
Murphy acknowledged Damascus’ ambitions, but argued that the current Syrian effort was an 
attempt to stabilize Lebanon. As Murphy saw it, Damascus hoped to avoid choosing between 
the PLO and a stable Lebanon. The Syrian leadership tried to increase Damascus’ control 
over the PLO, to rid them of their Lebanese dilemma.127 
 
Abduction 
As the Karami-cabinet was coming together, US Colonel Ernest Morgan was abducted in 
Beirut. Morgan arrived Beirut 29 June for a layover. According to the State Department, 
Morgan was returning to his post in Ankara after an exercise in Pakistan.128 The Colonel took 
a taxi to the airport for some “reading matter”, and was seized on his return to Beirut.129 The 
perpetrators handed Morgan over to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General 
Command (PFLP-GC); a Palestinian organization under Syrian influence. The perpetrators 
demanded food and supplies for the Beirut district Karantina. 130  Karantina was an 
impoverished refugee camp and the base for several Palestinian guerrillas.131 
 
Arafat was eager to demonstrate his usefulness to the US: The PLO, and Arafat personally, 
started working for Morgan’s release, for which he received a discrete acknowledgement 
from the US.132 Arafat had been eager to establish contact with the US since the spring of 
1973.133 The PLO had made two overtures to the US during the first half of 1975. In 
February, the US Embassy in Beirut had received a Lebanese envoy claiming the PLO 
leadership was prepared to recognize Israel in exchange for involvement in the US peace 
process.134 However, Kissinger was not interested in the PLO: Kissinger instructed the 
embassy to neither rebuff nor encourage further overtures from the PLO.135 The second 
advance came on March 28, when Arafat met US Senator George McGovern in Beirut. Arafat 
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told the senator that the PLO had a realistic and pragmatic attitude to a settlement with Israel. 
McGovern was not thoroughly convinced. Moreover, McGovern was a Democrat and would 
likely have little influence on Republican foreign policy. Arafat’s repeated overtures did not 
bring him closer to negotiations.136 
 
The Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrian governments also began efforts to secure Morgan’s 
release.137 Syria used the Saiqa guerrilla to investigate.138 Ambassador Godley told Lebanese 
Foreign Minister Philippe Takla that the US held the Lebanese government responsible for 
Morgan’s security, to which Takla consented.139 The US did not want to act independently in 
Lebanon.140 Kissinger thought the US should not meet the abductors demands. He told Ford 
and presidential advisor Brent Scowcroft that paying would encourage abduction of 
Americans. Kissinger did not believe that Morgan’s life was at risk.141 
 
On July 8, the State Department started suspecting that the Lebanese government might not 
secure Morgan’s release.142 Washington started considering other means, estimating that 
meeting the demands would be about $300 000.143 Godley replied that publically denying 
paying could be coupled with a delivery through a third party.144 On July 11 food and aid 
poured into Karantina, under the auspices of Lebanese Prime Minister Karami.145 Officially, 
the US did not comply with the abductors’ demands. However, historian Edgar O’Ballance 
claims the US Embassy paid for Karami’s Karantina project.146 O’Ballance’s claim cannot be 
confirmed, but this solution, meeting the demands through a third party, had been suggested: 
Washington had calculated the cost and Godley had suggested using a third party.147 On July 
12 Colonel Morgan was released unharmed. Washington knew that Syria had worked behind 
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the scenes to release Morgan and reckoned Damascus had played an important part in 
Morgan’s release.148 
 
It seems strange that a US officer travelling from Pakistan to Turkey would make a stop in 
war-torn Beirut. Kissinger told Ford it was a “State-Defense foulup” that Morgan was ever in 
Beirut.149 Seeing the fighting in Beirut first hand, it seems even stranger that the officer would 
hail an unprotected taxi for something as trivial as newspapers. American newspapers printed 
rumors that Morgan had claimed to be on a mission to arm the Phalangists, which the US 
denied.150 The Lebanese press and leftists circulated several rumors and speculations: that 
Morgan was on a covert mission for the CIA or that his capture was orchestrated in order to 
legitimize US intervention.151 The abduction was nonetheless widely condemned by both the 
PLO and the Lebanese press.152 The US State Department and the Beirut embassy denied CIA 
involvement and affiliation regarding Morgan and his abduction.153 The State Department 
instructed Beirut and other Middle East embassies to limit comments on Morgan to the 
press.154 There is an abundance of declassified sources on Morgan’s abduction. However, 
they cannot confirm nor debunk the many rumors surrounding Morgan.  
 
Renewed Fighting 
The cease-fire of late June lasted until the end of August. Jumblatt and the National 
Movement issued a reform program on August 22, calling for a less sectarian democracy. 
Gemayel and the Phalangists were strongly opposed to any such reform. They feared that if 
they lost their upper hand in the Lebanese political system, they would lose the ability to 
ensure their security. Gemayel demanded security before reforms could be discussed. 
However, the National Movement did not want to give up their military upper hand for 
Gemayel’s word that reforms would be discussed. Fighting broke out between Christian and 
Muslim militias, spreading to northern and eastern Lebanon. The PLO stayed out of the 
fighting that flared up in the late summer of 1975. However, as the violence escalated, 
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especially towards the beginning of 1976, the PLO was gradually drawn back into the fray. In 
September, Karami wanted to dispatch the army. He wanted the army to separate the warring 
factions. Karami was stopped by the National Movement’s de facto veto over his government. 
The National Movement saw army involvement as favoring the Christian demand for security 
first. Jumblatt would not budge.155 
 
The fighting escalated in September. The parliament building in Beirut was sacked, rendering 
the cabinet largely ineffective. Lebanon’s big brother Syria then took the reins again: Foreign 
Minister Khaddam brought the Lebanese factions to the negotiation table, forming the 
National Dialogue Committee on September 24. The 20 members of the National Dialogue 
Committee represented the major Lebanese factions. The Palestinians were not involved. 
Syria had previously been the only authority that could enforce cooperation. A cease-fire was 
declared on October 2, but broken by the Phalangists on October 7. Syrian Foreign Minister 
Khaddam was unable to strong-arm an immediate cease-fire, as he had in the beginning of 
July.156 
 
Sinai II 
In the meantime, Kissinger had produced a second Egyptian-Israeli agreement. The Sinai II 
agreement was eventually signed on September 4 1975, more than 19 months after it’s 
predecessor. It was to be Kissinger’s third and last Arab-Israeli agreement.157 The Sinai II 
agreement involved Israel pulling back some 30-60 kilometers in the Sinai Peninsula. 
Washington poured out money to both Israel and Egypt to facilitate the agreement.158 The US 
also promised Israel to not engage in official talks with the PLO until the PLO acknowledged 
Israel’s right to exist.159 
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To Egyptian President Anwar Sadat Sinai II meant entering into a state of non-belligerency 
with Israel control, regaining control of the Sinai Peninsula oil fields and massive sharp 
increase in economic aid from the US. The US aid allowed Sadat to reopen the Suez Canal.160 
To Henry Kissinger, the Sinai II agreement was a victory in the globalist struggle against the 
Soviet Union, Egypt’s traditional backer since the 1950s. It also relieved the pressure on 
Israel. The agreement gave the Ford administration a foreign policy success, after spring 
shuttle fiasco. Kissinger did not want to embark upon a new shuttle until after the 1976 US 
Presidential Election. During the election year US officials sought to garner support from the 
pro-Israeli population, not to be in a negotiation that might strain the Israeli-American 
relationship.161 
 
To Syria, Sinai II meant estrangement from Egypt. To Assad, Sadat had left him alone as 
Israel’s last neighboring enemy. It also meant that Syria’s hope of regaining any of the Golan 
Heights was put on hold. Israel had occupied the Golan in the 1967 War. Regaining the Golan 
was of great importance to Assad. He had first tried to win Golan back by force, in the 1973 
War. Assad had, in keeping with Kissinger’s policy, learned that only the US could help him 
with Israel. But with the signing of Sinai II, Damascus’ door to Washington was shut. The 
Arab world at large was critical of the Sinai II agreement. Assad wanted to capitalize on this: 
He sought to accumulate power to rival Sadat as the Arab strongman. Assad had fixed his 
eyes upon dominating Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance. To Lebanon, the Sinai 
II agreement meant increased Syrian involvement. For the next year Assad sought to 
dominate Lebanon with increasingly forceful methods, to the increasing frustration of Arafat. 
This led to increasing Palestinian-Syrian estrangement throughout the 1975-1976 part of the 
civil war. As all of Kissinger’s Arab-Israeli deals, Sinai II meant the marginalization of the 
Palestinians.162 
 
Rumored Interventions 
By the end of September, President Frangieh and his political allies were exploring the 
possibility of having a foreign power intervene in Lebanon. An envoy of President Frangieh 
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approached the US Embassy on September 22, asking about a US military intervention. The 
envoy was the Greek Orthodox cabinet minister Ghassan Tueni. The Eisenhower 
administration had intervened in the 1958 Lebanese crisis, and the Maronites were hoping the 
US would once again save the Maronites. Godley rejected the idea, and was backed up by the 
State Department. Godley replied that he hoped the Arab countries could solve Lebanon’s 
civil war.163 While Syria was not mentioned specifically, its unequaled position in Lebanon 
meant that it would likely be a large factor in any “Arab” solution.164 
 
In the last half of September, the governments in Amman, Beirut and Damascus reported 
rumors of an Israeli intervention. All three decried such a move.165 With a US intervention off 
the table, the Lebanese Christians were inclined toward a Syrian intervention. Lebanese 
Foreign Minister Takla visited Washington on September 30. He warned Kissinger that 
Syrian military intervention might at some point be the solution for the weak Lebanese 
leadership.166 Takla was aware of Syria’s ambitions to dominate Lebanon, but thought 
Damascus could help Lebanon in the short run.167 Takla, himself a Greek Orthodox, was 
afraid that Israel would intervene in Lebanon, under the pretext of “protecting the Christians 
of Lebanon”.168 Kissinger and Takla agreed that an Israeli intervention would destabilize both 
Lebanon and the Middle East. The US had already told Israel to stay out of Lebanon, 
Kissinger said. However, Kissinger warned against a Syrian intervention. The US could only 
restrain Israel if Syria stayed out, he warned Takla.169 
 
Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft discussed Syrian intervention in Lebanon briefly on October 9: 
Kissinger was certain a Syrian invasion would provoke an Israeli counter-invasion. The 
increasingly violent Lebanese civil war was in danger of turning into a regional conflict, but 
the trio was at a loss for policy. Kissinger concluded the brief discussion on Lebanon: “On 
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Lebanon, we have nothing to propose.”170 This statement sums up US policy, or lack thereof, 
on Lebanon so far in 1975.171 
 
Developing a US Policy Toward Lebanon 
So far, the Ford administration had mostly ignored the Lebanese Civil War. The US Embassy 
in Beirut had ignored both Christian and Palestinian approaches. Washington had repeatedly 
supported this position. In 1975 Lebanon was of minimal importance to the US. Lebanon was 
not a major supplier of oil and there was no threat of increased Soviet influence. There was 
international trade in Beirut, but its importance had waned with Lebanon’s economic 
recession in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither was Lebanon, or even the PLO, a serious threat to 
Israel’s security.172 
 
In October Washington’s interest in Lebanon increased, and the US began developing a more 
involved policy. Both Lebanese and regional factors facilitated the change in US attitude: 
Internally, the fighting had escalated beyond the violence of the spring. The violence 
paralyzed the Lebanese government. The Syrian leadership, who had largely ended the 
fighting of the spring, was unable to establish a lasting cease-fire. Moreover, the violence 
posed a threat to US citizens in Lebanon. There were also regional factors: The signing of the 
Sinai II agreement had freed the US to look at other factors in the Middle East. Rumors of 
both Israeli and Syrian interventions propelled Lebanon to the forefront of the White House’s 
attention. The US reasoned that outside military interference would jeopardize Kissinger’s 
diplomatic framework, particularly Sinai II. The US’ reasoning was that a Syrian intervention 
would cause an Israeli intervention and vice versa. If Israel intervened, it would occupy 
southern Lebanon and wage war on the PLO. If the Syrian Army stood by as Israel wiped out 
the PLO, Washington reckoned Assad would have to come to the PLO or lose his domestic 
and Arab standing. Washington concluded that foreign intervention was likely to cause an 
Israeli-Syrian war, which would complicate a new Israeli-Syrian agreement in the future. 
Additionally, Washington thought Moscow would be compelled to get more involved, to save 
the Soviet equipped Syrian Army from defeat at the hands of the IDF. The US would then 
have to support Israel. Moreover, the US thought an Israeli-Syrian war was likely to turn into 
an Arab-Israeli war. Sadat in Egypt would come domestic and regional pressure to revoke 
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Sinai II in objection to the Israeli intervention. In short, the Lebanese Civil War was of no 
interest to the US, but was “a dangerous sideshow” that might ruin Kissinger’s Middle East 
policy.173 
 
The fighting in the fall of 1975 became bloodier than it had been during the spring. Lebanon’s 
civic and political life became submerged in the war. The parliament could not assemble 
regularly, disabling the legislative branch of Lebanon. The members of the government were 
increasingly becoming parties in the conflict: The antipathy between Prime Minister Karami 
on one side, and Interior Minister Chamoun and President Frangieh on the other, was 
rendering the executive branch of Lebanon ineffective. The increased violence was posing a 
danger to US citizens. An evacuation plan was being kept on hold, pending further 
instructions. The Lebanese Army had been a pacifying force between the factions in the 
spring, but in the fall of 1975 the army was gradually becoming an actor on the Christian side 
of the civil war. The polarization of the army was a result of the power struggle between 
Maronite Interior Minister Chamoun and Sunni Prime Minister Rashid Karami.174 
 
On October 10 Ambassador Godley recommended increasing the US effort in Lebanon.175 
Godley postulated a situation where the US would be drawn into the civil war: Increased 
Palestinian involvement would cause Israel to entering the conflict, pulling the US in with it. 
Alternatively, the US could get more involved before the civil war turned into a regional one. 
Godley feared that the Christians assumed the US would back them up no matter what, even 
if he continually rebuffed Christian leaders that inquired about US involvement. Godley 
thought the best approach was western diplomacy and pressure on the Christians, coordinated 
with Syrian pressure on the National Movement and the PLO. The internal actors in Lebanon 
were unable to calm things down. Even Syria was unable to strong-arm an agreement. Godley 
argued that the regional power struggle following Sinai II was distracting Syria from 
containing the Lebanese conflict.176 
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The White House summoned a group of key policymakers in a Washington Special Actions 
Group (WSAG) meeting, to discuss Lebanon on October 10 and 13. Kissinger’s principal 
concern was preventing a situation where civil war endangered the Sinai II agreement or 
American influence in the Middle East. The WSAG was a group comprised of members from 
several departments, gathered to develop a US response to sudden events and crises. 
Kissinger headed the October WSAG meetings on Lebanon, with representatives from the 
Departments of State and Defense, the NSC, the CIA and the topmost military command. 
President Ford was not present.177 
 
The group discussed Lebanon with reference to the recurring rumors of and requests for 
intervention. The problem, the groups agreed, was that a foreign intervention in Lebanon 
would disrupt the US diplomatic efforts with Israel’s neighbors, especially the recent 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement. A Syrian intervention was not presented as a problem in itself. 
The WSAG agreed that Syrian intervention would certainly trigger an Israeli counter-
intervention. Even if Syria was to enter under the pretext of helping the Christians, Kissinger 
was sure that Israel would intervene militarily. In case of a dual intervention, the 
policymakers thought Lebanon would become a battleground for an Israeli-Syrian war. 
Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and a key player in Kissinger’s 
diplomacy, thought Sinai II might survive an Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon. However, the 
WSAG thought an Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon was likely to draw in other Arab states in 
the region and turn into a new Arab-Israeli war. The group concluded that a dual intervention 
was the worst possible outcome in Lebanon.178 
 
The WSAG raised two situations that would provoke outside intervention: Firstly, a radical 
Lebanon dominated by Jumblatt and Arafat. Secondly, a Lebanon so submerged in chaos that 
either Syria or Israel would intervene to stabilize Lebanon. Israel would intervene to prevent 
Lebanon from turning into a state that sanctioned or aided guerrilla attacks on Israel. Syria 
wanted to dominate Lebanon to rival Egypt as one of the great Arab power in the Levant. 
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad could not dominate Lebanon if it was in constant conflict 
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with Israel. Israel was militarily superior to Syria. Assad would rather intervene and take 
control of Lebanon than see Israel doing the same.179 
 
The State Department summarized that the US should work to prevent the Lebanese conflict 
from turning into a Middle East war. In particular, this meant to keep Israel and Syria from an 
intervention that might antagonize the other. The Lebanese conflict itself was not a primary 
concern. The State Department summary did not make a distinction between Israeli and 
Syrian intervention. Syrian intervention was only deemed a major concern because it was 
taken for granted that Israel would follow.180 
 
The WSAG went on to discuss how intervention might be avoided. The CIA and the State 
Department supplied extensive working papers. The papers saw Syria as the only power able 
to stabilize Lebanon. The main US goal was identified as avoiding a regional war involving 
Israel, with emphasis on the survival of Sinai II. The papers recommended that the US allow 
the Syrian political effort, but dissuade a military intervention. In addition the US should 
work to limit the spiraling violence. The increasing intensity of the war polarized the 
Lebanese, impeded the Syrian effort and might provoke both Israeli and Syrian. Escalation 
could be limited by involving outside powers: Different Arab states, including Saudi Arabia 
and Libya, had some influence with various leftist and Palestinian factions. France and the 
Vatican also had some authority over the Maronites. Washington decided to approach these 
Arab and European powers, hoping to keep the civil war from escalating.181 
 
The WSAG started discussing how the situation might be solved. US or joint Arab military 
intervention was dismissed without discussion. The group started looking at how the civil war 
might be calmed down, hoping this would remove Israeli and Syrian incentives to intervene. 
CIA director William Colby started to discuss what could be done regarding Lebanon’s 
internal problems: He said the Muslims must be awarded more prominent position in the 
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Lebanese society.182 Kissinger did not want to discuss such regionalist details of Lebanon’s 
problems. He promptly put his realist globalism back on the agenda.183 
 
“I want to define our own interests. I have no particular interest in Lebanon’s internal affairs if 
they do not involve outside countries. I don’t want us involved in their internal affairs. Our 
concern is to prevent outside interference.”184 
 
Colby raised Lebanon’s internal problems again, later, suggesting that the US work to bring 
about a dialogue. Kissinger reiterated his objection to direct US involvement. “I don’t want us 
to get in.”185 
 
The WSAG agreed that the US should not get involved in Lebanon, militarily or politically. 
The US should rather try to influence the situation indirectly, letting an Arab state assume the 
leading role. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements wanted to place Saudi Arabia at 
the center of the US effort. Kissinger, however though the new Saudi leadership was too weak 
to handle the Lebanese situation.186 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had been assassinated in 
March and been replaced by the inexperienced Khalid.187 Kissinger and the rest of the WSAG 
agreed that Syria had to be placed at the core of the US’ approach to Lebanon.188 
 
The policymakers agreed that Washington should not interfere with Damascus’ effort, as long 
as Syria did not annex Lebanon, or the Israeli or Lebanese government objected. Kissinger 
wanted to tell Damascus that “we are holding the Israelis back but not in every 
contingency.”189 As long as Syria did not intervene militarily, the US could keep Israel out of 
Lebanon. Alfred Atherton mentioned that even if an Israeli counter-intervention could not be 
avoided, it might be delayed. Kissinger decided the US needed to find out how much Syrian 
involvement Israel could tolerate before intervening. The group decided that the US should 
keep a low profile in the conflict. Kissinger decided to keep Egypt Israel, Saudi Arabia and 
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Syria informed of the US involvement. He wanted to ask for advice and avoid the impression 
that the US was colluding with any of the other parties.190 
 
To support Damascus’ effort in Lebanon, Washington would work to get Lebanese actors to 
support Syria. Colby wanted to strengthen the “moderates” in Lebanon, meaning Karami and 
Chamoun, and weaken the “extremists”, the National Movement, the PLO and the 
Phalange. 191 Sisco and Kissinger agreed on conferring with Lebanese foreign minister 
Philippe Takla. However, Kissinger did not want to contact any other actors before conferring 
with Saudi Arabia and Syria. Washington decided to appeal to the Phalangists and the PLO to 
cool down conflict. The US would contact the Phalangists directly, through the embassy in 
Beirut. Washington would ask Saudi Arabia to restrain the PLO, as Saudi Arabia was an 
important benefactor of the PLO.192 
 
Ford and Kissinger talked about the Lebanese Civil War on October 16. The meeting was 
more reminiscent of a briefing than a policy discussion. Ford asked if the US could send 
troops to Lebanon, as Eisenhower did in 1958. Kissinger replied that Egypt would object, 
jeopardizing the implementation of Sinai II. Ford agreed that the US had “to keep anyone 
from intervening.”193 
 
In summary, the US policy toward Lebanon developed by mid-October was keeping Lebanon 
calm. The overarching policy goal was to avoid a regional war. Such a war might endanger 
the implementation of Sinai II. The general outline of the US strategy sketched at the WSAG 
meetings was to calm the actors. Syria was to be approached directly. PLO was to be pacified 
through Saudi Arabia. The strategy to calm down the Phalangists remained uncertain. 
Atherton wanted to correct the Phalange misperception that the US would come to their aid as 
they had done in 1958. Kissinger was afraid this rejection would cause the Phalangists to lose 
hope completely, awarding the National Movement and PLO a swift victory. The WSAG 
wanted to apply the “keep cool” strategy to Israel as well.194 In Kissinger’s opinion the US 
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did not have much leverage on Israel. Kissinger wanted to ask Israel precisely how far Syria 
could go before Israel would intervene.195 
 
Implementing US Policy 
To carry out the decisions of the WSAG meetings, Washington contacted the embassies in 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Israel.  
 
The US Ambassador in Jidda talked to several Saudi leaders. The WSAG wanted Saudi 
leaders to use their influence with the factions in Lebanon, hoping the increasingly bloody 
civil war could be calmed down. The Saudis agreed with the US’ approach and said they were 
already talking to Arafat and Jumblatt, as well as Frangieh. However, the Saudis were 
pessimistic. The Saudi leaders said the actors in Lebanon could be reasoned with, but they 
had little control of their own troops. Saudi Arabia concluded that there was little they could 
do to affect the Lebanese Civil War, and offered no advice to the US Ambassador.196 
 
Word from Cairo was much the same. US Ambassador to Cairo Hermann Eilts spoke with 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy. Fahmy said Egypt too was preaching moderation to 
the factions in Lebanon. Like the Saudis, Fahmy had little advice to offer the US, other than 
to restrain Syria. Fahmy thought Syria was “actively helping to fan the blaze” in Lebanon.197 
This was contrary to the US understanding of Syria’s role. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt 
and Assad of Syria had been at loggerheads since the signing of the Sinai II agreement. Sadat 
had actively tried to sabotage the Assad’s standing in the Arab world ever since. Sadat did not 
want Assad to emerge as the Arab leader who had solved the crisis in Lebanon. Fahmy urged 
the US to do anything to limit Syria’s aggravation of situation.198 
 
Godley, The US Ambassador in Beirut, was afraid that the enmity between Assad in Syria 
and Sadat in Egypt would inflame the violence in Lebanon. Godley saw Assad as the only 
force able to calm the Lebanese situation. Godley hoped Eilts could convince Sadat to tone 
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down his criticism of Assad’s role in Lebanon. This would greatly increase the chance of a 
more stable Lebanon, in Godley’s opinion.199 
 
Following Godley’s query, Eilts told Washington that the US should avoid giving specific 
counsel as to how Egypt should handle Lebanon. The Egyptian government was highly 
suspicious of Syria’s intentions in Lebanon. After the signing of Sinai II, Assad had criticized 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and his government.200 Sadat and Fahmy visited the White 
House in late October 1975. Sadat and Lebanon was briefly discussed. The Egyptian leaders 
did not openly criticize Assad, but thought someone else should take over the mediation 
process. Sadat suggested the Arab League. The Egyptian president begged his American 
colleague to keep Israel from intervening in Lebanon.201 
 
Kissinger was positive to the Syrian effort in Lebanon. Kissinger told Assad, via Ambassador 
Murphy in Damascus, that the US was working to keep Israel from intervening in Lebanon. 
However, he warned Assad, the US could not restrain Israel if Syria intervened. Kissinger 
asked Assad to share his future plans on Lebanon.202 Assad was reluctant to show the US any 
concrete plans. Ambassador Murphy told Kissinger that Assad was openly suspicious of the 
US. According to Murphy, Assad thought the US was using the Lebanese Civil War to divert 
attention from Sinai II. Assad inquisitorially asked why Kissinger had mentioned the Israeli 
intervention. Murphy thought Assad was suspecting an Israeli-US conspiracy on Lebanon. 
Murphy assured Assad that there was no collusion. When asked for advice, Syrian Foreign 
Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam told the US to preach moderation and reconciliation to the 
factions in Lebanon. Throughout 1975 Arab and US policymakers talked about preaching 
moderation and reconciliation, without affecting the Lebanese situation much. Only Syria had 
been able to force the Lebanese factions to cooperate. However, the current Syrian effort, the 
National Dialogue Committee, had so far been unable to calm down the Lebanese situation.203 
 
Ambassador Malcolm Toon talked to Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon October 14, after 
being instructed by Kissinger.204 Toon reminded Israel to stay out of Lebanon. Allon 
promised to practice restraint, but said that Israel would consider Syrian intervention a direct 
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threat to Israel’s security.205 However, Allon noted that Syria seemed to be following Israel’s 
public statements closely, adjusting their actions so as to minimize the chance of a 
confrontation with Israel.206 
 
Kissinger instructed ambassador Toon to probe Allon on how Israel would react to a potential 
Syrian intervention. Washington wanted to find out if there was some kind of intervention 
Israel would tolerate.207 Allon replied that Israel’s reaction to a Syrian intervention would 
depend on the size, intention and location of a Syrian intervention. Allon would not give an 
estimate to what Israel could tolerate, but said Israel would confer with the US before 
intervening.208 
 
Washington paid the Lebanese Civil War little heed the first six months. Lebanon’s problems 
were overshadowed by Kissinger’s diplomacy. As Washington saw the Lebanese Civil War 
as an internal affair, it was of little importance to the globalist thinking that dominated US 
foreign policy. However, after the Sinai II agreement was signed, the US picked up rumors of 
foreign intervention. The possible implications intervention might have on the US influence 
in the region suddenly made Lebanon more important. Specifically, Washington was worried 
that intervention would lead to an Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Middle East, ruining 
Kissinger’s diplomatic effort. 
 
By October 1976, the US had come to view Syria as the most capable power in Lebanon. 
Damascus had showed its ability to put pressure on the Lebanese, factions, including 
President Frangieh. The US credited Syria with establishing the Karami government, 
establishing the cease-fire that lasted through the summer and assisting in the release of 
Colonel Morgan. However, the Syrian effort was becoming ineffective and Lebanon was 
suffering as a result: Damascus was unable to enforce a political settlement through the 
National Dialogue Committee. Damascus was equally unable to stop the fighting. Several 
cease-fires were announced, but they were all broken within days. The violence spiraled, as 
the Lebanese politicians were unable to control their militias. The PLO had refrained from 
large-scale involvement in the fighting since the spring, but Arafat was unable to enforce non-
involvement and the PLO was gradually drawn back into the civil war. 
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Chapter 4: 
Syria’s Changing Alignment 
 
 “We just cannot seem to influence the situation. I don’t think we have the 
capacity.”209 
 
After a summer of relative calm, the Lebanese Civil War had reignited in the end of August 
and escalated during September. The civil war took a turn for the worse in late October 1975. 
Leftist and Maronite forces clashed in a violent offensive to gain control over the Beirut hotel 
district on October 24. The “Battle of the Hotels” was the final blow to Beirut’s hotel 
industry, which had so far remained somewhat functional.210 The hotels were captured for 
their strategic value: The towering buildings were excellent vantage points and militia bases, 
from which the occupants could sniper and shell their enemies. When Muslim forces seemed 
to be winning the battles, Interior Minister and Maronite Camille Chamoun sent 2000 army 
soldiers into the area, to act as a buffer between the fighters. The deployment of the army 
brought the fighting to an end and saved the Christian militias trapped between Muslim 
towers from being defeated. Fighting spread throughout Lebanon and Beirut was being 
submerged in a state of total war. The death tolls rose and international businesses left 
Lebanon, leaving vast numbers of people without employment and income.211 
 
For the first six months of the civil war, the US had tried its best to avoid involvement. In 
September Kissinger had completed his last Egyptian-Israeli shuttle, resulting in the Sinai II 
agreement. The US had become more involved in October, when Washington began to 
suspect that Israel or Syria would intervene in Lebanon, resulting in regional war and ruining 
the US diplomatic framework in the Middle East.212 
 
The US had encouraged all Arab states to preach moderation to all the factions in Lebanon, 
but the state of war had not abated. On the contrary, it had taken a turn for the worse with the 
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Battle of the Hotels. Kissinger and his State Department staff discussed the increased violence 
on October 28. The problem, according to Assistant Secretary Alfred Atherton, was that the 
supply of weapons was seemingly infinite.213 Syria was supplying the leftists, and Atherton 
reckoned Israel was arming the Christian groups. Kissinger and Under Secretary Joseph Sisco 
concluded that there was little chance of a swift end to the civil war, as neither side seemed to 
be running short on weapons or manpower.214 In Sisco’s opinion, Lebanon could only be 
stabilized if the sectarian distribution of power was redressed. Kissinger brushed him aside, 
reminding him “there isn’t anything we can do.”215 Sisco concluded: “We just cannot seem to 
influence the situation.”216 
 
The foreign power most involved in Lebanon during the Civil War was Syria. President Hafez 
al-Assad wanted to rival Egypt’s Anwar Sadat as the Arab strongman in the Levant. Assad 
saw Lebanon, as well as Jordan and the Palestinian resistance movement, as within his sphere 
of interest. Following the Egyptian-Israeli Sinai II agreement of September, Syria had 
amplified its effort in Lebanon. To fortify his power over Lebanon and demonstrate his 
resolve, Assad needed to stabilize Lebanon. The latest and largest Syrian effort to end the 
civil war was the National Dialogue Committee, initiated in late September. In the Dialogue 
Committee, Syria tried to bring about a political settlement between the Lebanese factions.217 
 
The Collapse of the National Dialogue Committee 
The Dialogue Committee was presided over by Chamoun and Karami. Both the leftist-
Muslim Lebanese National Movement and the rightist-Christian Phalangists were represented, 
while the PLO announced its support from the sidelines. Syria led the mediation effort, 
spearheaded by Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam. National Movement’s call for 
reform of the sectarian political system was at the heart of the discussions. Gemayel insisted 
that reform was a discussion for parliament. Gemayel threatened to leave the Dialogue 
Committee if it adopted any reforms on the political representation.218 
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By early November, the Dialogue Committee had still not succeeded in limiting the violence. 
France and the Vatican both sent emissaries to Lebanon within the first half of the month, but 
made no impact. They both talked to Christians and Muslims, and tried to exert influence 
where they could, without luck.219 
 
Kamal Jumblatt, Druze chief and leader of the leftist Lebanese National Movement, wanted to 
reform the political system, abolishing sectarian prerogatives in Lebanon. Most of the 
Dialogue Committee approved of somewhat reducing the political sectarianism, including 
Maronite Raymond Eddé, leader of the Lebanese National Bloc. The troika of Maronite 
leaders blocked the Dialogue Committee’s attempts at political reform: Phalangist leader 
Pierre Gemayel, along with his allies Interior Minister Chamoun and President Frangieh.220  
 
The Dialogue Committee was doomed from the get go. Chamoun only attended the first 
sessions. Chamoun was one of the principal actors on the Christian side of the conflict and the 
Interior Minister in Karami’s cabinet. With him gone, the Committee had little chance of 
producing results that would materialize. The principal matter of discussion was the sectarian 
political system, so when Gemayel boycotted these discussions, the Dialogue Committee was 
terminal. There was no basis for a consensual approach in Lebanon. The Maronite and 
Muslim blocs were too far apart to find grounds for compromise. This was especially true for 
the Gemayel and the Phalangists, and Jumblatt and the National Movement. Additionally, no 
Lebanese authority could implement any changes that would end the civil war. In the nine 
sessions and two months that made up the Dialogue, each party reiterated its already well-
publicized views. The Dialogue Committee grew into a rising screaming contest, only 
drowned out by the increasing cacophony of the violence outside. On November 24, the 
unsuccessful Dialogue Committee held its last session.221 
 
On November 1, as the Committee was failing, the US Ambassador to Lebanon sent 
Washington his policy recommendations. The recommendations of the Ambassador, George 
McMurtrie Godley, focused on Syria, Karami and the Maronites. Godley urged Ford or 
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Kissinger to issue unambiguous support for Prime Minister Karami’s attempt at arranging a 
lasting cease-fire. The Ambassador hoped such a statement would calm down the Phalangists 
and their allies.222 Kissinger sent a statement supporting Karami, to be issued from the Beirut 
Embassy. Washington thought it unlikely that the statement would have any impact.223 
Godley also thought the US should promote France as mediator, as the French had historical 
and strong ties to the Maronites.224 Washington was supportive of a French initiative. The US 
Embassy in Paris started inquiries.225 France’s involvement began immediately, and would 
increase in the first half of 1976.226 
 
Ambassador Godley underlined the importance of keeping the Syrian diplomatic effort going. 
As long as Damascus’ political efforts did not fail, Godley wrote, Assad had no reason to 
increase his military effort. The Embassy received reports that Syrian military, disguised as 
Saiqa militia, were fighting along National Movement and PLO troops in Zahlé, a Christian 
town in the Shia dominated Beqaa Valley.227 Assad had introduced Saiqa forces into Lebanon 
since June 1975.228 Godley thought the increased presence of Syrian fighters was likely to 
infuriate the Maronite leaders, further thwarting Assad’s diplomatic effort. This would give 
Damascus’ an increased incentive to use military force.229 
 
Washington thought increased Syrian military involvement would provoke Israel to intervene 
in southern Lebanon, possibly causing an Arab-Israeli war.230 Washington did not issue any 
public support for Assad and Khaddam’s effort in Lebanon. The US would not have wanted 
to be identified with Syria, to avoid provoking Egypt or, more importantly, Israel. Ford and 
Kissinger did not follow up on Assad’s Lebanese effort until 1976, when Washington once 
again grew afraid of an Israeli intervention.231 
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The Frangieh-Karami Accord 
Between themselves, the Maronite trio of Chamoun, Frangieh and Gemayel controlled the 
army, the government and the largest Christian militias. Arafat, and Jumblatt blocked the 
army from direct participation in the fighting and the government was increasingly 
impotent.232  The army enabled the illegal deliveries of arms to the Maronites. Karami 
thought the president was sabotaging him. In protest and frustration, Karami isolated himself 
in the government building. By the start of November the Frangieh-Karami partnership was 
bordering on enmity.233 
 
A motley collection of powers tried to resolve the Frangieh-Karami conflict: French, 
Palestinian, Papal and Syrian mediators contributed to thawing the ice-front between Frangieh 
and Karami.234 In keeping with Kissinger’s words to his staff on October 28, the US stayed 
out of any mediation.235 The Frangieh-Karami Accord came about on November 14. The two 
agreed to work more closely and discuss the political system.236 As a nod to the National 
Movement, Karami hinted that the representation of Christian and Muslim representatives 
might be changed from 6:5 to an equal distribution.237 Jumblatt rejected this idea on principle. 
Jumblatt and The National Movement’s goal was to abolish the confessional system 
(deconfessionalism), not to amend it.238 Some Muslims, including the National Movement, 
thought a 1:1 distribution of legislative representatives was a lesser injustice than 6:5. But 
being the majority, they still saw equal distribution as overrepresentation of the Christians.239 
 
Syria’s Changing Alignment 
Syria’s mediation was unable to lead the Dialogue Committee to compromise, but Khaddam’s 
effort was not fruitless. The two months of meetings allowed Syrian Foreign Minister 
Khaddam to alternately pressure and support the Muslim bloc, especially Jumblatt and the 
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National Movement. Damascus was exploring their power over the different Muslim factions 
in Lebanon.240 
 
As the Dialogue Committee stalled and later failed, Assad began looking for a different 
approach in Lebanon. His association with Arafat and Jumblatt did not help in fortifying 
Syria’s power over Lebanon, so Assad started making overtures to Maronite leaders. Assad 
first approached Gemayel, who was invited to Damascus on December 6. Assad and Gemayel 
found they could cooperate: Gemayel agreed to support political reform in exchange for 
Assad controlling the Palestinian guerrillas.241 
 
Syria was traditionally the supporter of radicals and Palestinians. However, Syria’s interests 
took precedence over Assad’s allies. Syria’s, or rather Assad’s, overarching interest was his 
regional standing. In this light, Assad came to see Yasser Arafat as his main contender for 
influence in Lebanon. Though formally staying out of internal matters, the PLO had strong 
influence on both Shia and Sunni Muslim camps. Additionally, the PLO constituted the 
foremost military force on the leftist-Muslim flank of Lebanese politics.242 
 
The PLO leadership had suspected a change in Syria’s position in October and tried to 
preempt it. In late October secret talks were held between Christian leaders and PLO 
representatives. The two groups agreed to cease hostilities and start talks to reach a political 
solution.243 Arafat and Fatah were growing skeptical of Syria’s involvement in Lebanon. 
Fatah-leaders thought Maronite-Syrian rapprochement would strengthen Assad’s power over 
Lebanon, including the Palestinian groups located there.244 The Christian-Palestinian talks 
might have been Arafat’s attempt at forestalling Christian-Syrian conciliation. 245  The 
agreement was never realized and had no practical impact on the civil war. Jumblatt opposed 
the agreement and the Palestinians did not follow up the talks. Even if the Palestinians had 
pursued the negotiations, Christian representatives lacked the support of the three key 
Maronite figures: Frangieh and his Chamoun and Gemayel.246 
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Black Saturday 
As Gemayel was visiting Assad in Damascus, four Phalangists were found murdered at dawn 
on Saturday December 6. The victims were bodyguards of Gemayel’s son, Bachir. Bent on 
revenge, Bachir and his militiamen checked identity cards along roadblocks in Beirut. 
Muslims, militia members and civilians alike, were abducted or killed on the spot. The 
Maronite fighters killed at least 70 people, possibly hundreds. An even greater number was 
abducted.247 
 
Bent on retribution, Muslim fighters abducted 150 Christians on Sunday 7. Numerous 
abductees were killed right away. National Movement and Palestinian militias launched an 
attack on Phalangist forces the following Monday, reigniting the Battle of the Hotels. Even 
more roadblocks materialized in Beirut, further fragmenting the war torn capital. The spiral of 
revenge lasted for the remainder of the year. Militias under rejectionist or Syrian control 
plundered the Beirut banking district. Official buildings throughout the country were 
occupied by whichever militia was in power. Lebanon lost its last resemblance of 
normality.248 
 
Washington took a gloomy view on Lebanon by the end of 1975. The US perceived the 
Phalangists and the National Movement to be too far apart to find any basis for compromise 
or negotiations. Violence kept worsening and nothing seemed to indicate a change for the 
better. A peaceful solution was nowhere in sight.249 
 
As 1975 was coming to an end, the civil war was worse than ever, and further than ever from 
reconciliation. The weak Lebanese central authority had all but collapsed. The country had 
descended into anarchy, different areas were under the control of different militias. The 
Christian-conservative and Muslim-leftist blocs were miles apart from any agreement. The 
same situation was mirrored within the blocs: No two groups could agree on a wide array of 
issues other than who to fight. No leader had complete control over their own militia, even 
less so over their allies. None of the actors had any control of the direction of the war.250 
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Partition: A Christian Lebanon 
In late December 1975, Maronite militias began evicting Muslims from areas under Christian 
control. In the first half of January 1976 Maronite leaders started hinting at partitioning 
Lebanon, creating a separate Christian state. Damascus retaliated by threatening to annex 
Lebanon if it was partitioned. The army, mainly controlled by Interior Minister Chamoun, 
stood by, as Lebanon seemed to be splitting into two separate units: One Christian and one 
Muslim.251 
 
In early January 1976, Ambassador Godley described Lebanon as calm, but further from a 
political settlement than ever before. A cease-fire had been announced which let everyday life 
return to the Lebanese capital. A meeting of Maronite leaders on December 31, 1975, had 
rallied around the 6:5 representation of Christians to Muslims in the Lebanese Parliament. 
This was a rejection of the most essential of the Muslim grievances, demolishing any room 
for dialogue and compromise. With increased polarization and no solution in sight, fighting 
was bound to flare up again soon, reported Godley.252 
 
Within two weeks of the New Year fighting broke out again. Maronite militias began 
“cleansing” Christian areas, expelling Palestinians from areas under Maronite control.253 On 
January 12, the Phalangist and Tigers militias, controlled by Gemayel and Chamoun 
respectively, started by attacking the Palestinian refugee camp in Dbayeh. The Christian 
coastal town Dbayeh lay within the Maronite heartland Mount Lebanon. The expelled 
Palestinians were actually Maronite Christians. At the same time Maronite militias laid siege 
to Karantina and Tel al-Zaatar refugee camps. The areas comprised Shia slums, Palestinian 
refugees and Palestinian guerrilla groups. Karantina and Tel al-Zaatar were located in eastern, 
Christian-controlled Beirut, connected to the Christian heartlands northeast of the capital. The 
National Movement and PLO responded by attacking Christian towns. The Christian areas 
around Damour were laid under siege by National Movement and PLO forces. The Christian 
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coastal town Damour lies between Beirut and Sidon, in traditional Druze heartland, Chouf. 
Interior Minister Chamoun sent the Lebanese military to defend Damour.254 
 
The US had stuck by its policy of non-involvement since October, but the Lebanese Civil 
War once again attracted US attention in January. The common factor between the increased 
attention in October 1975 and January 1976 was the perceived threat to US diplomacy in the 
Middle East: Specifically, a situation that might cause Israel to intervene in Lebanon. The 
current fighting and expulsions in the Maronite heartlands led the State Department to believe 
that Christian militias were securing Christian core areas. Kissinger’s staff interpreted the 
Christian fighting as a move towards de facto partition of Lebanon. Syrian Foreign Minister 
Abdul Halim Khaddam said Syria would annex Lebanon in the event of serious moves toward 
partition. Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres stated that Israel might answer militarily if 
Syria intervened. Egypt answered, saying that Egypt would mobilize if Israel sent troops to 
Lebanon. The US was opposed to both partition and outside intervention. Both were now 
judged to be increasingly likely, potentially resulting in an Arab-Israeli war.255 
 
Washington followed developed or continued four strategies in Lebanon: Firstly, to limit or 
hinder a Syrian military intervention, while assessing what would provoke an Israeli 
intervention. Secondly, the US would attempt to keep the civil war from escalating further. 
Washington established contact with several Lebanese actors and appealed to Arab and 
European states to use their influence to calm down the Lebanese. Thirdly, the US would 
work to limit the flow of arms to Lebanon and lastly, to keep the Soviet Union out of 
Lebanon.256 
 
Preventing Intervention 
Hoping to prevent an overt Syrian intervention, Washington reminded Damascus that the US 
would not be able to stop an Israeli counter-intervention, if Syria intervened first.257 Kissinger 
also tried to pressure Syria through Jordan. King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan was going to 
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Damascus to meet Assad, and asked for US opinions. Kissinger and Hussein both wanted 
Assad to practice restraint.258 King Hussein had better relations with the Maronites, Israel and 
the US than most Arab states and was visibly worried about a regional conflict. Though 
opposed to Syrian intervention, Hussein suggested a Jordanian-Syrian peacekeeping force. A 
mixed Arab force was eventually realized, but not until late October 1976.259 
 
Kissinger received word on January 19 that the number of Syrian controlled fighters in 
Lebanon was swelling. The number of Syrian troops now in Lebanon was thought to pose a 
fatal threat the Christians. The Secretary asked the CIA to check the information. The CIA 
reported that 1000 PLA and Saiqa fighters had entered Lebanon in mid-January 1976. This 
marked an increase of the size of Assad’s forces in Lebanon by a third. CIA informed 
Kissinger that if Assad’s 4000 fighters and the PLO launched a joint, all-out attack, the 
Maronites would be overrun. However, Arafat had not committed all his fighters yet and 
Assad and Arafat’s fighters hat not joined forces, the CIA informed. Kissinger also received 
word from Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam that Damascus might send in more fighters, 
even Syrian regulars disguised as Palestinian fighters. The NSC regarded Assad’s troop 
movements as the preliminary phase of a Syrian intervention. Kissinger apparently shared this 
information with Simcha Dinitz, Israel’s ambassador to the US: Kissinger would let Syria 
know the US knew of their movements, he promised Dinitz. Israeli intelligence also reported 
that Damascus had sent additional PLA fighters into Lebanon.260 
 
Damascus told Washington that Frangieh had requested a Syrian intervention.261 The State 
Department acknowledged that the US might not be able to hinder a Syrian intervention. If 
Syria intervened, Alfred Atherton told Kissinger, the US needed to make the best of it.262 
Atherton reasoned that the US should nevertheless continue its efforts to dissuade Assad from 
an intervention. An eight-page document followed the memo, but its contents are classified.263 
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Simultaneously Kissinger continued to remind Israel that an Israeli intervention in Lebanon 
would be a disaster to Israeli and American interest.264 
 
Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, was sure that the 
Christians’ demise was looming. The Christians were not. Saunders supplied Kissinger with a 
memo on the subject on January 20. The memo was based on research from intelligence 
branches of the NSC, CIA and the State and Defense departments.265 
 
Israel shared the impression that the increased number of PLA troops now in Lebanon was 
enough to crush the Christians. Kissinger told Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon that this 
was not true, though US intelligence agreed with Israel. There are several possible reasons for 
this contradiction. Kissinger might not have received Saunders’ intelligence before instructing 
Tel Aviv. It is also possible that he rejected it. Thirdly, Kissinger wanted to keep Israel from 
physically coming to the Christians’ aid. The US told Israel not to make any drastic moves in 
Lebanon without consulting Washington first.266 
 
Kissinger wanted to convey the importance of not deploying more Syrian troops of any kind. 
The Secretary instructed ambassador Richard Murphy was to approach the Syrian Army’s 
Chief of Staff, Hikmat al-Shihabi.267 The US reminded Shihabi that Israel was bound to 
counter-intervene, if Syria continued to send in Syrian troops.268 
 
US Mediation 
The US Embassy in Lebanon was instructed to contact the principal Christian and Muslim 
leaders in Lebanon, both in Government and outside, but not President Frangieh. 269 
Washington wanted to take a more strident position with the Maronites, insisting that the US 
was opposed to a partition of Lebanon. The US wanted the Christians to take initiative for 
cease-fire, insisting that political reform was the only way to stabilize Lebanon in the long 
run. The US claimed to be willing to get discuss specific political settlements with the 
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Christians. The Embassy in Beirut was not to tell the Muslims that the US was taking a more 
strident position with the Christians. Washington was afraid that the Muslims would press the 
Christians harder, militarily or politically, if they believed the Christians did not have the US’ 
support.270 
 
Lebanese Prime Minister Karami threatened to resign in objection to what Karami perceived 
as the Lebanese Army becoming a part of the Christian side of the conflict, as seen in 
Damour. Washington thought increased army involvement on the Christian side and increased 
Palestinian involvement on the other side was amplifying the sectarian and geographical split 
of Lebanon. The amplified Palestinian effort was deemed to bring Israel closer to intervening. 
The mounting tension left any hope of political settlement even less realistic than 
previously.271 The prime minister was always a Sunni. Washington perceived Karami as the 
only Sunni who was capable of handling the situation; and assured him of the US’ support. 
Washington feared that Karami’s removal would only increase sectarian polarization.272 
Ambassador Godley had returned to the US on January 16, diagnosed with cancer, and was 
temporarily replaced by the Embassy’s second in command, charge George Lambrakis.273 
Lambrakis reported that Karami’s resignation did not seem to be wholly sincere. Frangieh and 
Karami were negotiating over the latter remaining in his post.274 Frangieh allegedly wanted 
Karami to stay.275 Just like Washington, Damascus preferred Karami to any other candidates, 
and was reportedly pressuring him to remain in office.276 Within a week, Syria had convinced 
Karami to retract his resignation.277 
 
US Ambassador to Syria, Richard W. Murphy, was instructed to contact the Syrian 
government. Washington urged Damascus to use any influence on PLO and other Palestinian 
forces to refrain from all out war against the Christian forces. Murphy encouraged Damascus 
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to renew its mediation effort, assuring the Syrians of the US active support.278 Indeed, the US 
had supported the Syrian mediation effort since at least early October.279 Murphy was 
instructed not to tell the Syrians that the US was approaching European governments. The US 
correctly identified that Lebanon was a matter of prestige and influence for Assad.280 
 
Washington asked France, Great Britain and the Vatican to appeal to the Maronites to cease 
hostilities and lift the blockade on Tel al-Zaatar and seek a political solution. The US told the 
Europeans that the Christian’s partitioning of Lebanon would end in in another Arab-Israeli 
war.281 The US also asked Israel to encourage the Christians to seek an agreement to end the 
civil war. The US wanted Israelis to tell the Lebanese Christians to be flexible in their 
demands, and that Israel and the US agreed on the matter.282 
 
Despite his assurances to Assad, Kissinger was growing skeptical of Syria’s influence. 
Washington was losing faith in the Syrians’ ability to secure a political solution and their 
cease-fires did not last. More than this, Kissinger dreaded increased Palestinian and Syrian 
control over Lebanon: He hypothesized a confrontation state that would threaten Israel. The 
US did not want to take center stage, but did not want Syria to dominate Lebanon. The issue 
was not with Syria’s approach: Contacting the US Embassy in Paris, Kissinger recommended 
France take on a central role, using Damascus’ effort as a template.283 
 
The US Ambassador to Paris reported that French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues had 
considered involving the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This initiative had been 
abandoned for now, after the Lebanese government discouraged UNSC involvement. 
Sauvagnargues had reported that Assad and Frangieh had reopened negotiations. Frangieh 
appeared to be more open to Syrian proposals than before.284 Within days, Sauvagnargues 
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announced an “exploratory initiative”. 285 His press briefing was carefully worded, avoiding 
any details or particulars. The two main points, however, were in keeping with US policy: 
Firstly, Sauvagnargues called for cooperation, from Lebanese as well as international actors. 
Secondly, the short announcement made repeated references to preserving Lebanon’s political 
and geographical integrity.286 To the US, French officials specified that the initiative would 
only be instigated if Syria’s latest mediation effort failed. Paris also specified that France was 
prepared to take a leading role, but not prepared to go it alone. This would mean an increased 
effort from the US. On the one hand Kissinger wanted an alternative to Assad, but on the 
other, it had been a continuous priority to keep US involvement at a minimum.287 
 
Though the US was growing distrustful of Syria’s power over Lebanon, the State Department 
did not propose major changes in Washington’s approach to Damascus. Washington’s 
instructions for Ambassador Richard Murphy in Damascus were familiar: Encourage the 
Syrian mediation effort and attempts at securing cease-fires, while reminding Damascus not 
to intervene.288 Alfred Atherton of the State Department recommended the same approach 
towards Egypt: encouraging Egypt to preach moderation where they had influence.289 
Kissinger asked Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy for his opinions, reminding Fahmy 
that the Sinai II agreement was at stake.290 Fahmy answered that Egypt and the US largely 
agreed. Egypt supported the idea of making France a mediator, as it would limit Syria’s 
influence. Fahmy was eager to continue coordinating with the US on Lebanon. The Egyptian-
Syrian relationship had taken a severe blow with the signing of Sinai II. Fahmy did not dwell 
on the poor relations, but stated that cooperation between Cairo and Damascus was unlikely 
to produce anything. Sadat had also sent an unspecified number of Fatah fighters to Lebanon, 
to counter the enlarged number of guerrilla troops under Assad’s control.291 
 
Hussein of Jordan was also asked to use his influence with Lebanese factions to lessen the 
fighting and promote compromise.292 The US had used the same approach since October: 
asking any country with influence over the Lebanese factions to stop fighting and seek a 
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pragmatic solution. This appeal, in one form or another, had repeatedly been issued from 
Washington since October, though it had so far failed to influence the Lebanese Civil War. 
 
Limiting the Flow of Arms 
The US wanted to restrict the “virtually unlimited flow of arms” to the various Lebanese 
militias.293 The idea had been launched in early December 1975, but was not followed up at 
the time.294 Kissinger, with his globalist approach, would have ignored the idea until the 
Lebanese Civil War was threatening US policy. According to the State Department, weapons 
to the Muslim groups passed mainly through Syria, while Christian groups bought weapons 
commercially from Western Europe.295 Washington asked Damascus to limit the flow of 
weapons to the Muslim groups, but Syria refused. While arms flowed incessantly to the 
Christians, Syria would not curb the Muslims’ continued supply of weapons. The State 
Department would contact the US’ “Western European allies” and asked various embassies to 
approach their host governments.296 Washington doubted whether the initiative would yield 
any results.297 
 
Atherton and the State Department were pessimistic about possibility of mediation, as the 
Christians were too confident. Only military setback or decreased flow of arms would bring 
the Christians to negotiate, according to Atherton. He also reckoned that Israel would be 
willing to accept limited Syrian intervention, as long as Assad stayed out of southern 
Lebanon. Atherton underlined the importance of stabilizing the Lebanese Civil War, 
reasoning that it was likely to turn into regional war if not checked.298 
 
Soviet Involvement 
Second Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert F. Ellsworth ordered an estimation of possible 
Soviet reactions to the Lebanese crisis. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provided the 
estimate. The DIA deemed increased Soviet dedication very probable. Kremlin was thought to 
increase its military presence in the Mediterranean and increase alert on Soviet bases. 
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Moscow would probably also encourage its partners to impose an oil embargo on the US and 
refuse the US use of air bases. The DIA was 95% certain Kremlin would increase distribution 
of military equipment to Syria. The likely scenarios were consistent with previous 
assessments. Only an oil embargo would be considered serious. The DIA thought it extremely 
unlikely that Soviet would dispatch troops to the Levantine countries. Only if the IDF 
threatened Damascus, there was a real possibility of Soviet troops to Syria.299 
 
Robert Oakley passed the calculation on to Brent Scowcroft. Oakley recommended waiting 
for assessments from CIA and possibly the State Department. The DIA-paper did not 
elaborate on the possibility of Israeli of Syrian intervention. Oakley thought intervention 
unlikely in January 1976. However, the chance of intervention was bound to increase with 
continued stagnation in Lebanon.300 
 
On January 22 Karantina fell. Phalangists entered, killing and expelling civilians. National 
Movement and PLO troops retaliated by entering Damour and the cluster of nearby Christian 
towns. Civilians were massacred in Damour as well, and numerous rapes were reported.301 
Oakley claimed the conflict around Karantina and Tel al-Zaatar had aggravated the Lebanese 
conflict. The isolation of the camps had provoked the PLO’s first full and overt military 
conflict with the Phalangists. In addition, the Phalangists’s initial success had increased the 
number of troops from Syria. There was no indication that fighting would subside. This made 
the US’ vocal encouragement of moderation and outside non-involvement even less audible. 
To Oakley, there was less chance of ending violence and reaching compromise than ever.302 
 
Maronite-Syrian Rapprochement and the January Cease-Fire 
On January 21 Khaddam and Shihabi and other Syrian officials arrived in Beirut, to coerce 
the factions into a cease-fire. Frangieh, Chamoun and Gemayel had conferred amongst 
themselves. The three Maronite leaders were now prepared to reach an agreement with 
Damascus, according to Lambrakis. He thought this warranted some optimism regarding a 
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political solution in Lebanon. Lambrakis understood Damascus to represent the Lebanese 
Muslims in the Maronite-Syrian dialogue. On January 23 Syria managed to arrange a new 
cease-fire. Assad deployed Syrian-controlled PLA troops to maintain the cease-fire. The 
troops were dispatched along the Green Line, the demarcation-line separating the leftist-
Palestinian dominated West Beirut from the Christian dominated East Beirut.303 
 
Damascus and the Maronite leadership had been growing closer since the failure of the 
Dialogue Committee. Assad had approached Frangieh in late December 1975, suggesting that 
the two might develop a political solution. Following the January 23 cease-fire, Frangieh 
announced that a comprehensive political solution was to be arranged. Frangieh and Karami 
visited Assad in Damascus, where the three drafted a political solution for Lebanon.304 
 
The Constitutional Document 
Frangieh and Karami returned to Damascus on February 7, to put the finishing touches on a 
joint reform program under Syrian auspices. The talks resulted in the Constitutional 
Document, presented on February 14. The Document replaced Christian dominance with an 
equal representation of Christians and Muslims in Parliament. The presidency, premiership, 
and position of House Speaker remained reserved for the Maronites, Sunnis and Shias 
respectively, but the president’s powers were curtailed in favor of the prime minister. 305 
 
The Constitutional Document made Syria’s shifting alignment evident. Through the 
document, Assad ingratiated him with the Christians and traditional Sunni leaders, while 
distancing himself from the Lebanese-Palestinian opposition. Jumblatt and Arafat became 
isolated, as the other groups accepted the Document. The Constitutional Document revoked 
what the Christians could do without and gave the moderate Muslims enough to appease 
them. Assad did not seek to remedy the Lebanese system; he sought to find a compromise that 
would be palpable to most Lebanese leaders, in order to make the Lebanese leadership 
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associates of Damascus. In order to implement the Constitutional Document, Syria needed to 
enforce a lasting cease-fire, a Pax Syriana.306 
 
To the Christians, the Constitutional Document meant two things: Firstly, Assad promised to 
control the Palestinian guerrillas, based on the 1969 Cairo Agreement, in keeping with the 
Assad-Gemayel agreement of early December 1975.307 Secondly, the Maronites conserved 
much of their power compared to deconfessionalism, which would have left the Christian in 
in a minority. As the Christian forces were militarily inferior to the National Movement and 
the PLO, it made more sense for the Christians to concede some powers under Syrian 
auspices than to lose them all in a war with Jumblatt.308 
 
Sunni and Shia leaders reluctantly accepted the Constitutional Document. With improved 
representation and a stronger prime minster, the Sunni establishment saw the Document as a 
foundation to build on. The Document was less palatable to the Shias. Having grown more 
than any other group since the 1932 census, the Shias were more grossly underrepresented 
than the Sunnis. Shia leaders accepted the Constitutional Document as a meager starting 
point. Neither Shia nor Sunni leaders sympathized with Jumblatt’s fervent 
deconfessionalism.309 
 
Jumblatt and the National Movement rejected the Constitutional Document on principle: They 
fought for deconfessionalism, abolishing sectarian distribution of power and representation. 
The Document proposed a more equitable distribution of power between the sects, but it was 
still sectarian. The deconfessionalism of the posts of President, Prime Minister and speaker of 
the House was an ultimatum for Jumblatt, as it denied his long-standing ambition to become 
president. Having the military upper hand made Jumblatt disinclined to accept a lowball 
proposal.310 
 
Jumblatt’s inflexibility cost him tactically. Damascus-National Movement relations had 
faltered since late 1975, while Christian-Syrian relations improved. When Jumblatt dismissed 
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the Constitutional Document, his popularity within the Lebanese and Syrian leadership 
reached a new low. For most of the civil war, the National Movement had received cautious 
support from Lebanese Muslims, who wanted a reformed political system. Jumblatt lost much 
of their support when he rejected an opportunity to end fighting and reform Lebanon. 
Jumblatt hoped to circumvent both Syria and the Constitutional Document and approached 
the Phalangists. Gemayel thought Syria a more valuable ally than the National Movement, 
and rejected the Jumblatt’s overture.311 
 
Washington had perceived the escalating chaos as increasing the chance of Israeli and Syrian 
intervention, as well as Soviet involvement. Washington had started to lose faith in 
Damascus’ ability to control Lebanon, and had launched its own third party initiatives to 
mediate and limit the flow of arms to Lebanon. Everything changed once Syria had arranged 
the cease-fire and started the political dialogue. Washington’s interest in Lebanon disappeared 
until the middle of March. The US noted that Assad’s standing in the Arab world had been 
strengthened by his success in Lebanon, to the great annoyance of Sadat and Egypt. However, 
Assad’s standing would be ruined if his efforts were destroyed by war.312 
 
The Arafat-Assad Breakup 
Assad’s attempts at enforcing Pax Syriana received a blow when the Lebanese Army fell 
apart in the spring of 1976. It began in earnest on January 21, when Sunni officer Ahmed 
Khatib forsook the Lebanese Army and founded the Arab Army of Lebanon (AAL). The AAL 
grew rapidly, recruiting hundreds of Lebanese Army soldiers within weeks.313 To match the 
AAL, Chamoun and Gemayel formed the Lebanese Front, a coalition of the Tigers and the 
Phalangists militias.314 
 
Fatah aided the Khatib insurgency in attempt to forestall Syria’s increasing involvement and 
rapprochement with the Maronites. Syria had promised the Maronites to control the 
Palestinians in Lebanon. Fatah insisted that the Palestinian movement was not dictated by an 
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Arab state, but remained independent.315 To sabotage Pax Syriana, Fatah escalated the AAL 
insurgency. On March 9, the AAL and Fatah started to seize army posts in a “Battle of the 
Barracks,” particularly in southern Lebanon.316 As the Lebanese Army was falling apart, 
Christian and Muslim militias fought over the Lebanese Army’s abandoned equipment and 
weapons. Thereby, Fatah gained access to heavy weaponry, including anti-tanks and -aircraft, 
and artillery. 317  Assad replied by attacking two pro-PLO newspapers that criticized 
Damascus, almost killing Arafat’s close associate Shafiq al-Hout. In the last half of February, 
Saiqa leader Zuheir Mohsen launched a propaganda campaign against Arafat. Mohsen called 
for changing PLO, hinting that Saiqa should assume Fatah’s dominant role.318 
 
The Arafat-Assad relationship took another beating on March 11, when Abdel Aziz al-Ahdab, 
aided and encouraged by Fatah, staged the so-called “TV Coup”.319 Ahdab took control of a 
Beirut TV station and called for the resignation of Frangieh and Prime Minister Karami on 
live TV. Ahdab was a Sunni Lieutenant General and commander of the Beirut army district. 
Ahdab and many other Lebanese Army officers were frustrated with the government’s 
inability or unwillingness to control the army. In these Sunni officers view, the Lebanese 
Army had become an ally of the Maronite militias, rather than an instrument of the state. The 
claim was exaggerated: Interior Minister Camille Chamoun was rarely able to use the 
Lebanese Army to Maronite gains, as he had done in Damour.320 Ahdab and his Sunni officer 
allies hoped to reunite and revitalize the army, but rather hastened its deterioration. The AAL 
seized the remaining army locations between west Beirut and southern Lebanon on March 12. 
In reply Christian Colonel Antoine Barakat and his Zgharta barrack broke with the Lebanese 
Army, proclaiming support for Frangieh on March 13. Additional splits followed. The 
Lebanese Army got fragmented and powerless, as soldiers and officers deserted or joined the 
numerous armed factions.321 
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Perceiving PLO’s involvement in the TV coup, Damascus retaliated by closing the PLO 
academy in Syria. The Lebanese Civil War was increasingly becoming a power struggle 
between Arafat and Assad. Assad did not want the PLO to jeopardize his plans for Lebanon 
or attract an Israeli intervention.322 
 
The rift between Arafat and Assad widened as Arafat approached President Sadat of Egypt.323 
Meanwhile, Egypt continued to denounce Syria. Foreign Minister Khaddam even suggested 
the US should supply the Maronites with weapons, if Israel intervened. 324 Egypt had 
dispatched PLA forces stationed in Egypt, the “Ain Jallut Brigade,” to fight alongside 
Arafat’s forces in Lebanon.325 The brigade numbered somewhere short of 1000 fighters. The 
US advised Egypt not to let the Ain Jallut Brigade join in the fighting.326 
 
The US Embassy in Beirut feared Israeli repercussions to the Battle of the Barracks. 
Lambrakis did not think Syria could stop the Army from disintegrating.327 Deputy Secretary 
of State Robert Ingersoll instructed the Damascus Embassy to remind Damascus that it was in 
Syria’s interest to avoid unrest near the Israeli border.328 
 
US interest in Lebanon had lessened significantly since the announcement of the cease-fire. 
Ingersoll wanted Syria’s assessment of the AAL. The State Department also wanted to know 
whether Syria could control the insurgents. Ingersoll thought the AAL’s proximity to the 
Israeli border might impede Syria’s ability to control the army rebels without provoking 
Israel. Syria too worried the AAL’s activity in southern Lebanon increased the chance of an 
Israeli intervention. The concern was wrongly founded: The AAL secretly coordinated with 
Israel regarding southern Lebanon, to avoid provoking Israel. The US did not venture further 
into whether the AAL would cause Israel to intervene. There may be two reasons for this. 
Firstly, the US might have understood that Israel did not perceive the AAL as a threat. 
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Secondly, the following day Washington learned that Syria was planning a military 
intervention into Lebanon, which would have overshadowed the AAL.329 
 
Removing President Frangieh 
The Fatah sponsored TV coup of Ahdab did not lead directly to Frangieh’s resignation. 
Frangieh refused to resign unless the Parliament demanded it. A two-thirds majority was 
needed. On March 17, Kamel el Assad, the Speaker of the House, a Shia, delivered a petition 
to Frangieh. The petition demanded Frangieh’s resignation, with the necessary 66 out of 99 
legislators signatures. Frangieh promptly changed his mind and insisted on finishing his term, 
supported by Chamoun and Gemayel.330 
 
Karami and a collection of Muslim statesmen visited Assad in Damascus. They wanted the 
Syrian President to persuade his Lebanese colleague to resign. 331  Arafat too, visited 
Damascus. Both Arafat and National Movement leader Kamal Jumblatt called for the 
resignation of Frangieh.332 
  
Washington picked up word of the dissatisfaction with Frangieh already in November 1975, 
when Maronite army officers sought US views on throwing Frangieh and Karami, installing a 
military government and issuing new elections. Ambassador Godley replied that the US 
firmly supported Karami. He also said that toppling Frangieh would “open a Pandora’s 
box.”333 
 
The US discussed Frangieh’s removal again in March 1976. Atherton told Kissinger that 
fighting between Christian and opposition forces in the Presidential palace might “bring down 
Frangie[h].”334 Kissinger replied: “Why not let Frangie[h] go that way?” Atherton protested 
that this would make a political solution even more unattainable. The US wanted Frangieh 
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gone, as did the AAL, National Movement, PLO and Syria. However, the US opted out of 
having Frangieh removed in a coup, as it would further destabilize Lebanon.335 
 
By the middle of March, even Assad and Damascus had lost faith in Frangieh. But abruptly 
dethroning Assad’s newfound ally would make the country even more volatile and obstruct 
the implementation of the Constitutional Document. Assad and Frangieh negotiated a 
settlement: The Lebanese presidential election would be held in May rather than September 
and Frangieh agreed to resign once the question of his successor was settled.336  The 
candidates were Maronites Raymond Eddé and Elias Sarkis.337 Eddé was the candidate 
favored by Arafat, Jumblatt and Egypt.338 The US reasoned that Egypt supported Eddé simply 
to oppose Syria.339 Elias Sarkis was the candidate favored by the Lebanese Christians, Sunni 
Prime Minister Karami, as well as Damascus and Washington.340 
 
The TV coup and the subsequent AAL expansion in southern Lebanon created friction within 
the Fatah leadership. The AAL expansion in southern Lebanon that followed the TV coup had 
been instigated by central Fatah member Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad. Arafat 
told Wazir that the rapid expansion would attract Israeli intervention in southern Lebanon. 
Secondly, it undermined the AAL’s legitimacy.341 
 
In the same way that Syria used Saiqa and PLA to hide direct Syrian involvement, Fatah used 
the AAL to camouflage Palestinian action. As the AAL was made up of Lebanese Army 
members and equipment, the AAL had more legitimacy than Fatah. Jumblatt and the National 
Movement had little influence on the AAL.342 
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The Constitutional Document’s chance of survival deteriorated with the fractionalization of 
the Lebanese Army. The ensuing chaos made political progress impossible. The Christian 
forces controlled roughly 20 per cent of Lebanon, concentrated in Mount Lebanon. The 
Muslim-Palestinian forces surrounded the Maronite heartland, at Tripoli in the north, western 
Beirut in the south and the Beqaa Valley in the east. Assad was afraid that the Maronites 
would declare the partition of Lebanon and that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would send 
troops to reinforce the Christian state.343 
 
Damascus made several attempts at controlling the insurgents the AAL, or to reenter the 
insurgents into the Lebanese Army. After the splits in the middle of March, the breakup of the 
Lebanese Army was irreversible and the Constitutional Document was temporarily disabled. 
In the end of March Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam had warned Arafat and 
Jumblatt that Syria would come to view AAL as an enemy if it did not get in line. Damascus’ 
efforts to enforce the Constitutional Document through Pax Syriana were in vain.344 
 
In March 1976 Lebanon was fragmented, with Christian, Muslim and Palestinian forces 
fighting over the pieces. The central authority had become increasingly ineffective since the 
fall of 1975 and with the breakup of the army the government lost its principal instrument of 
control. The only hope for the staggering government was to rely on Syria. During the winter 
of 1975-1976 Syria had all but severed its ties to Arafat and Jumblatt. Assad had calculated 
that the best way to control Lebanon was to ally himself with the traditional rulers of Lebanon 
rather than to replace them. 
 
The US had seen Syria as the only capable power in Lebanon since October 1975. Kissinger’s 
faith in Assad was waning in the end of January as the violence escalated and the threat of an 
Israeli intervention seemed to be increasing. Washington attempted to mediate and stop the 
flow of arms through third parties, though it had little faith in the approach. However, once 
Syria had arranged the cease-fire on January 23, Washington’s regained its confidence in 
Damascus. As Syria regained some control over Lebanon Washington’s perceived threat of an 
Israeli intervention lessened, as did the US interest in Lebanon. Lebanon would resurface as a 
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major concern to the US in the middle of March, when the threat of foreign intervention 
became more pressing than before. 

 77 
Chapter 5: 
The US and the Syrian Intervention 
 
“Now if I could design the solution, I would go to A[s]sad and say “if you 
could move in quickly, and if you could give us an iron clad guarantee that you 
will get out again quickly and that you will not go south of the [Litani] river, 
we will keep the Israelis out.”345 
 
The spring of 1976 was the most dramatic part of the Lebanese Civil War so far. The army 
disintegrated in the course of the spring, through a series of rebellions. Its members and 
equipment was split between the two principal factions of the civil war: The leftist-Palestinian 
camp and the conservative-Christian camp. The leftist-Palestinian camp was primarily made 
up of Lebanese National Movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The 
National Movement was made up of leftist and Muslim parties and militias, led by the Druze 
strongman Kamal Jumblatt. The PLO comprised several Palestinian movements and 
guerrillas. It was led by Yasser Arafat, who also led Fatah, the principal party in the PLO. The 
conservative-Christian camp was primarily made up of Christian Maronites. The principal 
Maronite figures were Interior Minister and former president Camille Chamoun, President 
Suleiman Frangieh, and Phalangist leader Pierre Gemayel. During the spring months the 
National Movement-PLO alliance took control of most of Lebanon and were about to win the 
Civil War. The Christian’s reacted by seeking to partition Lebanon, creating a Christian mini-
state.346 
 
Following the signing of the Sinai II agreement, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was afraid 
of being outmaneuvered by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat as the principal Arab power in 
the Middle East. Assad sought to dominate Lebanon and was traditionally eager to appear as 
the champion of leftists, radicals and the Palestinian struggle. By mid-1976, he sought to 
dominate the PLO, rather than support it. Assad needed a stable Lebanon to dominate; 
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therefore he needed the Lebanese state to survive. A Lebanon dominated by Palestinians and 
radicals would attract unwanted attention and potentially war from Israel, which would ruin 
Assad’s plans. Damascus therefore sought to find a political solution to the Lebanese 
problems, where Syria could shape the development according to Syrian interests.347 
 
Within mid-March, Syria started to work for a military intervention in Lebanon rather than a 
political solution. The problem was Israel. How could Syria intervene without provoking an 
Israeli counter-intervention? From the middle of March, Damascus sent signals to 
Washington of a forthcoming Syrian intervention. Within weeks US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger decided that a Syrian intervention would be the easiest solution for Washington, if 
only Israel would stay out. Only two weeks after Syria’s first warnings, Kissinger learned that 
Israel would allow a Syrian intervention within certain limitations. These limitations have 
since been known as the Israeli red lines. From mid-March, the US worked to realize a Syrian 
intervention that would not cause an Israeli counter-intervention.348 
 
Syrian Intervention in the Making 
To answer Deputy Secretary Ingersoll’s concerns, Richard Murphy, US Ambassador to Syria, 
received Syrian Army Chief Hikmat Shihabi on March 14. Shihabi told Murphy that only the 
introduction of a Syrian Army “peace-keeping” force could restore order in Lebanon.349 
Shihabi even went as far as to state that there was nothing wrong with Syria annexing 
Lebanon, as the Lebanese had practically torn their country in two. Murphy urged restraint, 
suggesting that Syria could use covert forces. The ambassador reminded the Army chief that 
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Israel would react to Syrian intervention, not to mention annexation. Shihabi reiterated that 
introducing Syrian forces was the only solution to the Lebanese Civil War.350  
 
Kissinger saw Shihabi’s statement as a warning of a Syrian intervention, but wanted to be 
sure.351 Ambassador Murphy asked Syrian President Assad about the intervention on March 
15. Assad gave no indication of planning an intervention. Assad stated repeatedly that Syria 
had not yet reached a decision about Lebanon. Assad might already have made plans to send 
Syrian Army Forces to Lebanon, but might have wanted to test the US waters. While he did 
not repeat Shihabi’s warnings, Assad underlined his many concerns: replacing president 
Frangieh, the TV coup and the army insurgency. However, Assad presented no solutions to all 
the problems in Lebanon.352 
 
In Washington, Kissinger discussed the situation with Assistant Secretaries of State Alfred 
Atherton and Harold Saunders on March 15, both prominent members of the Washington 
Special Actions Group meetings and State Department meetings on Lebanon.353 Kissinger 
asked if the US had any leverage with the Lebanese factions, but Atherton replied that the 
Lebanese could only be influenced through Syria. This worried Kissinger: “There is no way – 
no way – in which the Israelis will sit still while the Syrians send in their troops. I am sure of 
that.”354 Kissinger did not think the US could restrain Israel if Syria intervened.355 Atherton, 
on the other hand, thought Israel might tolerate limited Syrian action, as Israel’s Foreign 
Minister Yigal Allon had indicated already in October 1975.356 
 
Kissinger instructed US Ambassador Malcolm Toon to approach Allon. Without making 
direct references to intervention, Washington wanted to learn Israel’s concerns and intentions 
regarding Lebanon.357 Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the US, told Kissinger that 
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Syrian forces had already entered Lebanon.358 Atherton told Dinitz that the US had no such 
information.359 Both Toon and Atherton warned Israel not to intervene in Lebanon without 
conferring with the US.360 
 
Ingersoll and Kissinger instructed Murphy to talk to Assad and try to find out if Syria would 
intervene. Murphy was also told to preach restraint and remind him of the possibility of war 
with Israel.361 Assad told Murphy that Lebanon was an internal Arab dispute that Israel 
should stay out of. Moreover, Assad said that Frangieh had already asked Damascus for an 
intervention. Assad called it Syria’s right and duty to intervene. However, Murphy did not get 
the impression that there was an immediate plan, nor did Assad give a date. The Syrian 
President insisted that it would be a peacekeeping intervention and expected the US to keep 
Israel out.362 
 
The Civil War Heats Up 
Maronite militias reignited the fighting in northern Lebanon on March 16. Christian towns 
with National Movement leanings were laid under siege, as were Palestinian camps in Eastern 
Beirut.363 The National Movement and PLO successively launched an attack in eastern Beirut 
and the Mount Lebanon, the Maronite Heartland northeast of Beirut. The purpose was to put 
political pressure on the Maronites and to relieve the Palestinian camps.364 
 
Arafat and Jumblatt expanded the Mountain offensive to Beirut’s hotel district on March 21. 
The offensives were militarily successful. As the leftist and Palestinian militias advanced into 
Mount Lebanon, Maronites started fleeing to Cyprus. However, Jumblatt and Arafat had 
differing objectives in the Mountain offensive. The PLO’s foremost objective was to secure 
the Palestinian camps in northeast Beirut, while Jumblatt’s primary objective was to escalate 
                                                
358 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume 26, March 15, 1976, Doc. 267. Kissinger, Atherton, Saunders et al. 
359 Cable, STATE 63758, Secstate to Tel Aviv et al., March 16, 1976, Box 13, GF-NSC-SF-MESA 
360 Cable, STATE 62096, Secstate to Tel Aviv et al., March 15, 1976, Box 13, GF-NSC-SF-MESA; Cable, 
STATE 63758, Secstate to Tel Aviv et al., March 16, 1976, Box 13, GF-NSC-SF-MESA 
361 Cable, STATE 62097, Secstate to Damascus et al., March 15, 1976, Box 13, GF-NSC-SF-MESA 
362 Cable, DAMASCUS 1611, Damascus to Secstate, March 18, 1976, Box 13, GF-NSC-SF-MESA; Kissinger, 
Years of Renewal, 1999: 1039, 1043-4; Traboulsi. A History of Modern Lebanon, 2007: 195 
363 Sayigh. The Armed Struggle. 1997: 381 
364 Khalidi. Conflict and Violence in Lebanon. 1979: 55; Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon. 2000: 
339 
Chapter 5 – The US and the Syrian Intervention 
 81 
the civil war, in order to impose political change. In January, the Palestinian camp in 
Karantina, in northeast Beirut, had been razed, its inhabitants killed or evicted.365 
 
Assad was not yet in an all out war with Arafat. When Maronite militias laid siege to the 
Palestinian camps in Beirut, Saiqa troops were ordered to fight alongside Leftist-Palestinian 
forces. Saiqa forces joined the leftist and Palestinian in shelling the presidential palace, 
displacing Frangieh. In addition Saiqa stepped aside when the AAL and Fatah drove Maronite 
militias out of northern villages.366 
 
The AAL, National Movement and PLO’s offensives in March were effective, but spawned 
disagreement within the leftist coalition, within the PLO and within Fatah. On the one side 
was Arafat. He wanted the offensive to relieve the camps under siege. He wanted to avoid 
escalation that might cause Syria to take direct action against the PLO and its allies. On the 
other side were several people and groups: Within Fatah Wazir and the pro-Soviet Fatah 
members disagreed with Arafat. Within the PLO Arafat was opposed by the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) and other rejectionists groups. Lastly, Jumblatt and the 
National Movement did not agree with Arafat. Arafat wanted to use the offensives and their 
military superiority for political means, his opponents for military means. The Jumblatt-Wazir 
camp wanted military victory.367 
 
Israeli ambassador Dinitz had told Kissinger of regular Syrian troops in Lebanon as early as 
January, but Kissinger thought it unlikely.368 Additionally, Atherton told Dinitz that the US 
could not find evidence of Syrian regulars in Lebanon.369 On March 22, however, the State 
Department told Israel that at least 2000 Syrian Army troops were in Lebanon, disguised as 
PLA or Saiqa.370 
 
On March 23 Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam raised the question of Syrian intervention 
with Robert Pelletreau of the US Embassy in Damascus. Khaddam said Frangieh had 
officially requested a Syrian peacekeeping intervention. Pelletreau protested, at which 
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Khaddam asked if the US had any other suggestions. Pelletreau said he would consult 
Washington and Khaddam agreed to delay Syrian intervention until Washington replied. 
Khaddam would not give any details about the size of the intervention, but said it would be of 
short duration.371 George Lambrakis at the Beirut Embassy replied that if Israel would allow 
Syria to intervene, it would be the most convenient solution for the US.372 Washington 
instructed Pelletreau to investigate how many troops and for how long Syria planned to stay 
in Lebanon. The US did not suggest alternatives to intervention, but kept warning the Syrians 
of the danger of provoking Israel and angering the US.373 Simultaneously, Kissinger sent a 
message to Hussein of Jordan, hoping the King might restrain Assad.374 
 
While trying to delay Syria, NSC advisor Brent Scowcroft and Under Secretary of State 
Joseph Sisco asked Dinitz for Israel’s opinion on Khaddam’s message.375 Dinitz said that 
Israeli Foreign Minister Allon held off an Israeli reaction for the moment, but was following 
the developments closely.376 
 
Kissinger discussed Syrian intervention with Scowcroft, Sisco and other NSC and State 
officials, late March 23. Syrian intervention was seen as a real possibility, but not an 
immediate one. The participants realized that a Syrian intervention would support the 
Christians and were keen on the idea. However, the US could not get Israel to accept a Syrian 
intervention. Kissinger and the others explored the idea of letting Israel and Syria intervene, 
without explicitly giving them the green light. Israel and Syria would, respectively, squash the 
PLO in the south and save the Christians in the north.377 In conclusion, they decided to try to 
keep Israel, and thereby Syria, out of Lebanon. Kissinger wanted to buy time: the US would 
approach Syria on details about the intervention, while trying to ascertain Israel’s reaction.378 
 
Kissinger and Scowcroft briefed President Gerald Ford and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld on Lebanon on March 24. Scowcroft thought the PLO would win the Civil War, 
unless someone intervened. Kissinger thought a short-term Syrian intervention was the best-
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case scenario. He said Syria would crush the PLO, comparing it to the 1970 Black September 
War in Jordan.379 
 
To minimize the risk of Israeli intervention, the Syrian intervention had to be short in duration 
and limited in size. Kissinger was afraid that the Syrians would never withdraw from 
Lebanon. The US looked into having an Arab or UN force replace the Syrian Army over time, 
to solve the problem of long term Syrian occupation.380 Ideally, Kissinger wanted to strike a 
deal with Assad: If Assad would stay north of the Litani-river and get out quickly, Kissinger 
would restrain Israel.381 
 
The US principal problem with a Syrian intervention was an Israeli counter-intervention. 
Kissinger though it unlikely that Israel would sit by while Syria entered Lebanon. The 
Secretary did not think the US would have the leverage to restrain Israel. In the event of an 
Israeli counter-intervention, Kissinger thought Syria would have to attack Israel. The 
Palestinian-Syrian clashes in Lebanon were threatening Assad’s domestic position, according 
to Murphy. Assad proclaimed he was acting to protect his fellow Arabs. If the non-Arab Israel 
started fighting Arabs (Palestinians) in southern Lebanon, Assad would have to protect the 
Palestinians, reasoned Kissinger. If Assad was seen as abandoning the Arab cause, Sadat 
would exploit the situation to diminish Syria’s Arab position. In Kissinger’s opinion, “[t]he 
end result would be exactly what we have worked all these years to avoid: it would create 
Arab unity. Worse yet, it could lead to a war.”382 Israeli intervention was out of the question: 
It would draw in “all the other Arab states”.383 Lebanon might turn into a large-scale Arab-
Israeli war in Lebanon. Kissinger thought a new war in the Middle East would increase Soviet 
involvement. The previous Arab-Israeli war, the October 1973 War, had triggered an Arab oil 
boycott on the US and its European allies. American policymakers were anxious to avoid 
another oil crisis.384 
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Israel’s Red Lines 
On March 24, Kissinger was informed that Israel could accept a Syrian intervention, within 
certain limitations. These limits have since been referred to as Israel’s red lines. Kissinger was 
informed that the geographic red line ran 10 km south of the Beirut-Damascus Highway. The 
Highway runs from south to east, from Beirut to Damascus. The other aspect of the red line 
was the size and armament of the Syrian force. If Syria crossed the red lines, Israel would 
counter-intervene in southern Lebanon.385 
 
Having received the Israeli red lines, the Secretary of State continued to discuss how to 
prevent an Israeli counter-intervention. Kissinger thought heavy pressure would be needed in 
order to restrain Israel: President Ford would have to threaten Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin with halting military aid, impose sanctions and criticize Israel in the UN, if the US was 
to restrain an Israeli counter-intervention.386 
 
Kissinger thought Egypt and Israel both wanted a National Movement-PLO victory or a 
partitioned Lebanon. It would weaken Assad’s influence and standing in the Arab world, to 
Sadat’s benefit. Israel would find it easier to rally American and international public support 
if the PLO controlled one of Israel’s neighboring countries.387 
 
A Dead End in the UN 
Kissinger did not want the UN or the international society involved. Involving the UN would 
mean involving Moscow. However, Kissinger wanted to keep the illusion of an international 
effort, as he had done between the October 1973 War and the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations in 
1974: After the 1973 war, the US had involved the UN and the Soviet Union in a conference 
at Geneva. Kissinger made sure the conference was a flop. This allowed Kissinger to engage 
his step-by-step diplomacy, after having seemingly exhausted the UN effort.388 Regarding the 
Lebanese Civil War, it was Egypt who first suggested involving the United Nations Security 
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Council (UNSC) to the US. Kissinger let France discuss the matter of Lebanon in the UNSC, 
while making sure the US did not get involved.389 
 
What About Egypt? 
If Syria allowed Israel to take southern Lebanon, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat would 
proclaim himself the champion of the PLO and use the opportunity to attack Assad’s standing 
in the Arab world. The meeting could not work around this point. In conclusion, they decided 
to try to keep Israel, and thereby Syria, out of Lebanon. Kissinger wanted to buy time: the US 
would approach Syria on details about the intervention, while trying to ascertain Israel’s 
reaction.390 
 
After learning that Israel could accept a limited Syrian intervention, Kissinger was less 
worried about Egypt. If Israel would keep out of Lebanon, Kissinger considered Sadat’s 
displeasure tolerable.391 On March 28 Cairo told Washington that there would be no Egyptian 
reaction to a Syrian intervention. Kissinger wanted to keep this secret from Israel. He did not 
want Israel to get overconfident that the Sinai II agreement would survive.392 
 
Facilitating a Syrian Intervention 
Before the end of March, Kissinger started working to facilitate a Syrian intervention into 
Lebanon without causing an Israeli counter-intervention. On March 26 Kissinger warned 
Assad not to intervene south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Kissinger did not tell Assad 
that he had received this information from Israel, but presented the Beirut-Damascus line as 
his own interpretation of what Israel would tolerate.393 
 
Kissinger wanted to know how what kind of forces and how many Syria was planning to 
dispatch and where. Simultaneously, Kissinger was trying to learn the details of what kind of 
intervention Israel would accept. However, Israel was reluctant to expand upon the red 
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lines.394 The US was also cautious regarding the red lines. Neither Israel nor the US wanted 
anyone to discover that they authorized a Syrian intervention.395 
 
The Assad-Jumblatt relationship had moved from cooperation to enmity between late 1975 
and spring 1976. By the spring of 1976 the two had incompatible objectives: Assad’s needed 
a peaceful Lebanon that he could dominate, to expand his influence in the Middle East. 
Therefore it was essential to Assad that the Lebanese State was preserved. If the Lebanese 
state requested Syria’s aid, Syria could move in to Lebanon without technically invading or 
annexing. Therefore, Assad’s short-term goal was a cease-fire. Jumblatt’s long-term goal was 
to abolish the sectarian system and introduce socialist reforms. As the Arafat-Jumblatt 
alliance was military superior to the Maronites, Jumblatt’s short-term goal was to escalate the 
civil war and topple the Lebanese system.396 
 
Arafat was still hoping to heal the breach between Assad and Jumblatt. The two met in 
Damascus on March 27, at Arafat’s request. The meeting lasted for nine hours, but the two 
were irreconcilable. Jumblatt had come to Damascus to ask for more weapons. Assad wanted 
Jumblatt to lay down his weapons and refused to increase the National Movement’s arsenal. 
The meeting was the final nail in the coffin for the waning Damascus-National Movement 
relationship.397 
 
Assad replied to Kissinger’s implied red lines on March 27, after the failed meeting with 
Jumblatt. Assad gave his answer through King Hussein of Jordan, who Kissinger trusted to 
make precise assessments of Assad. 398  An allegedly downhearted Assad said that the 
Christians were barely holding on and that Syria had to intervene within hours. Assad said he 
would stay out of southern Lebanon and asked the US to keep Israel out. A similar message 
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arrived through France.399 Whether Assad’s warning was a test or he had changed his mind is 
unclear. However, there was no intervention on March 27.  
 
Within the end of March, Washington received details on Syria’s planned intervention. It is 
reasonable to assume that the US passed the information on to Israel. Assad was vague, but 
the information he gave indicated that Syria would respect Israel’s wishes: Syrian troops 
would not be dispatched anywhere near Israel’s border. Assad did not want to give a 
committal answer regarding the size and duration of the intervention, but said the intervention 
would be “only enough to do the job and only in Lebanon long enough to get the job done”.400 
 
On March 28 Arafat paid a visit to Damascus, the day after Assad’s nine-hour quarrel with 
Jumblatt. Arafat and Assad agreed to work for a cease-fire, in order to hold a presidential 
election. Arafat consented to Assad sending a small peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The 
force was scheduled to arrive on April 10.401 
 
On March 28 Dinitz told Kissinger that Israel could not allow a Syrian intervention. 
Moreover, Israel could not understand why the US wanted them to agree to such an 
intervention. Israel did not trust Assad, regardless of his ambition to subdue the PLO and save 
the Christians, opposed to the Kremlin’s wishes. Dinitz said Assad would eventually revert to 
his own ways, bring the PLO back in to the fold and strengthen the Soviet Union’s position in 
the Middle East. Israel supplied the Christians with weapons and thought the Israeli assistance 
would keep the stalemate going.402 The Israeli arms deliveries were carried out with the US’ 
blessing to make sure the Christian’s were not overrun.403 Kissinger told Dinitz that he would 
work to keep both Syria and Israel out of Lebanon, even if there was a Syrian intervention.404 
Kissinger believed Israel was wrong about the Christians’ survival, but right about Syria in 
the long run.405 
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Kissinger would have preferred a stalemate in Lebanon, but believed that the Christians 
would not be able to hold on indefinitely. They would either be crushed or would create a 
Christian mini-state within Mount Lebanon.406 Short of a political solution, Kissinger saw 
merit in a Syrian intervention in Lebanon. However, it had to  be short-term and Israel had to 
be kept out.407 
 
Kissinger hoped American success in Lebanon might help the Ford administration’s step-by-
step diplomacy.408 However, the Ford Administration had no ambitions about furthering the 
shuttle diplomacy before after the election in the fall of 1976. Electoral considerations started 
appearing in meetings on Lebanon in late March 1976. However, Ford lost the election and 
was replaced by Jimmy Carter in 1977. Sinai II was to be Kissinger’s last Arab-Israeli 
agreement.409 
 
By early April, Kissinger thought a Syrian intervention was inevitable, regardless of what the 
US did.410 To avoid suspicions of a Damascus-Washington conspiracy, Kissinger decided that 
the best approach would be to support Assad’s mediation in Lebanon on the one hand and on 
the other hand tell him not to intervene, at least not overtly.411 If a cease-fire could be 
realized, Kissinger presumed Syria could bring in more forces without provoking Israel.412 
Should the cease-fire approach fail, Kissinger wanted to work for a short-term Syrian 
intervention and keeping Israel out.413  
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The US Initiative 
Washington decided to talk to the Lebanese factions. Firstly, Kissinger had little faith in what 
the US could accomplish by talking to the Lebanese factions.414 On March 28, Kissinger 
instructed George Lambrakis and Robert Waring at the Beirut embassy to approach Interior 
Minister Chamoun, National Movement leader Jumblatt and Prime Minister Karami. 
Chamoun could not expect a US intervention, and Jumblatt could not expect UN or 
international involvement. Kissinger wanted to encourage the factions to compromise, urging 
Jumblatt to refrain from violence and Chamoun to avoid partition.415 The State Department 
did not want to preach as much restraint and compromise to Chamoun as to Jumblatt.416 The 
Syrian approach was to be presented as the best alternative, but it must not appear to be 
sponsored by the US.417 
 
Karami declared his complete agreement with Washington’s approach. He told Lambrakis 
that a long-term peacekeeping force was needed and that Assad was the man for the job.418 
Chamoun was less agreeable. While supporting Damascus’ effort, he would rather have 
Washington in charge. Chamoun was frustrated that the US could not repeat its 1958 
intervention.419 Chamoun approached Lambrakis on March 31. Chamoun said he was facing 
thousands of fighters of various Arab nationalities and needed ammunition from the US. 
Lambrakis told Washington that the Chamoun was trying to scare and make the US intervene. 
Lambrakis neither answered nor rejected the request.420 
 
Lambrakis and Waring perceived Jumblatt as inflexible, bent on achieving long-term goals 
through military victory.421 Jumblatt told Waring that he would be prepared to negotiate after 
a few days of military advancement. Jumblatt disliked Syria’s approach, but was prepared to 
comply with Arafat’s request for a cease-fire. Jumblatt was not overly interested in the US’ 
opinion, but was glad to hear that the US opposed foreign intervention. Waring thought 
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Jumblatt misunderstood this point and took it to be US opposition of Damascus’ effort.422 A 
few days later, Washington got word from Assad. Following the US’ talk with Jumblatt, 
Assad said the Syrian threat of intervention had lost its effect on Jumblatt.423 
 
Kissinger asked Malcolm Toon at the US Embassy in Tel Aviv to estimate Israel’s reaction to 
a Syrian intervention.424 Toon thought Israel had come to believe that a Syrian intervention 
would be to keep the factions apart. Previously, Israel believed that Syria would intervene to 
annex Lebanon, prepare for war with Israel or to crush the Christians. Toon thought Israel did 
not actually care about the size and weaponry of a Syrian intervention. To prevent an Israeli 
countermove, Toon advised Kissinger to give Israel as many details as possible regarding the 
time, place, time-span, motive and composition of a Syrian intervention. According to Toon, 
Israel was afraid that an Israeli intervention in southern Lebanon would heat up the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Toon thought it would be easier for Israel to tacitly allow a Syrian 
intervention if the Israelis were confident of Washington’s assessments and Damascus’ 
aims. 425  Kissinger warned the Israeli government not to discuss reactions to Syrian 
intervention with the press.426 
 
There were two problems with the US talking to the Lebanese: Firstly, Kissinger had little 
faith in what the US could accomplish by talking. Secondly, Kissinger and the State 
Department lacked confidence in Lambrakis.427 Lambrakis was seen as able, but had “a 
tendency to take off a bit.”428 The State Department repeatedly reminded Lambrakis to stick 
more closely to his instructions.429 To avoid any blunders from Lambrakis, Kissinger and 
Ford decided to send a diplomat to Lebanon to assess the Lebanese situation more closely.  
Washington was particularly interested in learning whether the Christians were close to 
demise or not.430 On March 31, Kissinger and President Gerald Ford sent Lewis Dean Brown 
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to Beirut, as US Special Envoy to Lebanon and interim ambassador.431 Brown was officially 
instructed to avert Syrian intervention though Kissinger had decided that Syrian intervention 
was the only solution in Lebanon. In reality, his intra-Lebanese mini-shuttle primarily focused 
on bringing about the presidential election, avoiding international involvement and making 
way for a Syrian intervention.432 
 
Brown was US Ambassador to Jordan during Black September, the 1970-71 war between 
King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO. After the war the PLO had been expelled from Jordan 
and moved its headquarters to Beirut.433 
 
On March 30, 1976, Kissinger instructed Brown to warn Jumblatt that he US would make 
sure the National Movement lost the Civil War unless Jumblatt cooperated.434 Brown wrote 
back to Washington on April 1. Despite the dominance of the Muslim-Palestinian forces, 
Brown did not think the Lebanese Christians were in danger of being overrun.435 In a secret 
message to Kissinger, Brown thought it advisable to let three or four Syrian army brigades 
enter Lebanon.436 
 
The April Cease-Fire 
A cease-fire was implemented on April 2. Fatah and Arafat had worked with Saiqa for 
suspension of hostilities since his March 28 meeting with Assad. Fatah and Saiqa had been 
fighting each other and cooperating throughout 1976. Assad used Saiqa to discipline the PLO 
leadership: When Arafat and Assad agreed, Saiqa cooperated with other PLO forces. 
Whenever the two were opposed, Saiqa criticize or sabotage the PLO, particularly Arafat and 
Fatah. Arafat thought a cease-fire was necessary to prevent Syria from intervening. The Fatah 
leader had a hard time bringing about a cease-fire or even controlling Fatah’s forces. Under 
direction of Wazir, Fatah fighters continued to fight and win alongside AAL, National 
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Movement and PLO troops. Most of the Fatah leadership thought the Soviet Union would 
restrain a Syrian intervention, to avoid reheating the Cold War. But they overestimated 
Moscow’s willingness and their power over Damascus. Due to the enmity with Syria, Fatah 
was increasingly leaning towards Egypt. This made Assad even more determined to gain 
control over Lebanon and the PLO. PLO agreed to a cease-fire on April 2, following a Syrian 
threat. Syria covertly started arresting and disarming PLO members, and detained hundreds 
over the following months.437 
 
Assad told Kissinger that the new Lebanese President would be too weak. With no force to 
back up the government, the presidential election would be in vain. Assad said a political 
solution would not be enough to stabilize Lebanon; it was dependent on the backing of a 
Syrian intervention. The Syrian troops in Lebanon were too few to enforce order, said Assad, 
and the Lebanese Army could not be rebuilt.438 Kissinger wanted to cautiously support Assad 
without making Syria too confident, and replied that Assad must avoid military intervention, 
while applauding him for arranging the cease-fire.439 
 
Kissinger and his immediate staff reasoned that Jumblatt would break the cease-fire within 
weeks, provoking a Syrian intervention. Kissinger’s reasoning resembled Assad’s the 
previous day:440 Kissinger saw the lack of a central authority as the principal threat to stability 
in Lebanon. Even a new president would lack the authority to deal with the civil war.441 
 
On April 3, Kissinger reckoned that Chamoun was actively working to create a separate 
Christian state. Brown was instructed to dissuade Chamoun from partition, without making 
Chamoun lose hope. Kissinger wanted the Christians to have the will and strength to survive, 
but not so much that they would not negotiate.442 
 
The Maronites had come to accept Syrian intervention as the best solution. The Maronite trio 
of Chamoun, Frangieh and Gemayel told Brown that Syria was the only power able to enforce 
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a cease-fire. They appealed to the US to stop hindering Syria.443 Privately, Chamoun would 
prefer a US intervention.444 Chamoun’s associate Charles Malik, former diplomat to the UN, 
had approached the US Embassy in Beirut in late March. Malik described the Christians as 
barely surviving the Muslim-Palestinian offensive in the Christian heartland.445 Chamoun 
expressed what Brown called an “alarmist description aimed at producing some kind of U.S. 
action.”446 Brown did not think the Maronites’ situation was as desperate as described, at least 
not for a few weeks.447 Brown told Chamoun that US intervention was impossible; US public 
opinion would oppose military involvement overseas so soon after the end of the Vietnam 
War.448 
 
Gemayel and the Phalangists initially wanted Israel to come to their rescue, but by April they 
were reconciled with Syria intervening.449 Israeli-Maronite meetings had taken place as early 
as September 1975. Rabin agreed to supply Gemayel with arms, but would not intervene.450 
Chamoun also established direct contact with Israel. Kissinger and Brown had indirectly 
inspired Chamoun to contact the Israelis: The Americans had encouraged the Maronites to be 
strong, so they would have leverage in negotiations. Ambassador Murphy was to keep Assad 
informed that the US were “letting some Israeli arms in” to the Maronites.451 Murphy was 
also to reassure Assad that the arms were just for protection, not escalation.452 Kissinger 
allowed the Israeli arms supply as “it helps maintain the balance.”453 
 
After Brown’s first meetings with the Maronite leaders, Washington gathered that the 
Maronites were still working to partition Lebanon, as they had done since January. Brown 
reminded Maronite leaders that the US opposed partition.454 
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Brown thought the cease-fire was frail, and the essential effort was to keep it going.455 The 
Maronite leaders had presented Syria as the only force able to contain the violence in 
Lebanon. Brown was skeptical of Syria’s ability to carry out an intervention effectively. 
Regardless, he thought it untimely to intervene while the cease-fire held.456 
 
To remedy Jumblatt’s impressions of the US initiative, Brown told the Druze chief that the 
US had no actual power to stop or deter Assad from intervening. Central authority had to be 
reestablished before Lebanon could progress, Brown told Jumblatt. Jumblatt did not agree, to 
Brown’s dismay.457 National Movement representatives told Brown they would extend the 
cease-fire following the appointment of a new president. Jumblatt seemed to think it unlikely 
that Frangieh would resign as promised.458 
 
Enforcing the Cease-Fire – Arafat or Assad? 
Washington did not want to give Damascus the impression that the red lines dialogue gave 
Syria free reign in Lebanon. While conducting the Israeli-Syrian mediation, Kissinger started 
looking at alternatives to Damascus.459 The first of the two alternatives surfaced in early 
April, when Brown suggested a security force comprised of Lebanese and Palestinian militias, 
a joint security force.460 The second alternative was to allow a French intervention, to 
counterbalance the Syrian intervention. The French option did not surface until May, and is 
discussed later.461 
 
Brown suggested the joint security option on April 4. He thought the cease-fire was frail and 
had to be backed up by force. He had no hope of reuniting the Lebanese military or even 
assembling an everyday police force. The Maronites would not be able to assume this role, 
even if they were supplied with additional weapons and ammunition. The AAL-National 
Movement-PLO forces were far superior and had seemingly inexhaustible supplies. 462 
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Presidential candidate Elias Sarkis told Brown that security would have to rely on either 
Arafat or Assad. Arafat’s involvement would mean a joint security option: leftist-Palestinian 
and pro-Syrian forces cooperating with Phalange forces. Sarkis preferred the Syrian option.463 
 
The Emissary presented the joint security option and the Syrian option to Kissinger.464 Brown 
did not immediately like the idea of relying on the PLO, but reported that there was contact 
between Gemayel and Arafat and that anything was possible.465 The joint security option 
would require US involvement, in Brown’s opinion.466 Jumblatt later told Brown that Arafat 
had suggested a similar joint security option, but Jumblatt had refused. Brown thought it was 
important to involve Jumblatt in the political process. The Envoy thought this would keep the 
Druze chief less volatile.467 Brown also recommended involving Arafat, who he saw as a 
central actor in Lebanon.468 
 
Kissinger wanted to explore the joint security option and Syrian intervention with the 
Maronite leaders. Kissinger wanted to discuss the joint security option with Damascus as 
well.469 Sisco told Brown that an overture to Arafat would have to be strictly limited to 
discussing a security force. The US would not approach Arafat without consulting with 
Damascus.470 
 
On April 4, Kissinger asked Sadat and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy to use what 
influence the Egyptians had over Arafat and Jumblatt to make them uphold the cease-fire and 
seek compromise. Knowing that Sadat was opposed to Assad increasing his regional power, 
Kissinger told them that this approach was necessary to prevent Syrian intervention.471 Sadat 
avoided this point in his replies.472 
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Kissinger also asked Sadat, Fahmy and Vice President Hosni Mubarak their advice on a joint 
security force. 473 Sadat replied that enemies like the Phalange and PLO were unlikely to 
cooperate successfully over time.474 Kissinger wrote back on April 11, suggesting a symbolic 
Arab force made up of “neutral” Arab countries, though he did not specify which countries.475 
Sadat avoided replying to this as well. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts reasoned that 
Sadat was suspecting Israel-Syria-US conspiracy in Lebanon. Eilts thought Sadat would avoid 
any subject that might somehow strengthen the Syrian effort.476  
 
Within the first days of April, the Syrian Navy blocked the ports of Sidon, Tripoli and Tyre, 
cutting off the National Movement and PLO’s source of supplies. On April 5, Saiqa cut 
Beirut’s electricity and fuel supply. Three days later Saiqa forces shelled Shatila, a Palestinian 
refugee camp in southwest Beirut, later to be made famous for the massacre in 1982. The 
Parliament was finally able to assemble on April 10, 1976. The legislators amended the 
constitution to allow an earlier presidential election. Clinging to his job, Frangieh did not give 
his necessary consent to the constitutional amendment before April 24.477 Frangieh agreed to 
sign after US pressure.478 US Emissary Brown believed Frangieh had delayed out of fear of 
prosecution.479 
 
Kissinger warned Ford on April 7, that the US might have to talk directly to the PLO.480 The 
US had secretly promised Israel not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO in September 
1975, as part of the Sinai II agreement.481 However, Kissinger thought the US could talk to 
the PLO without violating the promise, if the talks were limited to the Lebanese Civil War.482 
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The joint security option came to naught, for three reasons. Firstly, Kissinger thought Assad 
was a better option than Arafat, as Syria and the US had common short-term goals. Damascus 
and Washington both wanted to restore order to a unified Lebanon, while subduing the 
Muslim-Palestinian militias. Additionally, Assad told Washington that he would oppose a 
joint security force. Secondly, Kissinger wanted to avoid giving Arafat a an important role in 
Lebanon. Thirdly, the joint force would be difficult to organize. The Maronite and leftist-
Palestinian forces were too polarized to cooperate without someone making a major effort. 
The US was not prepared to make such an effort in Lebanon.483 On April 13, 1976, Kissinger 
told Brown to shelve the idea of a joint Lebanese-Palestinian force.484 
 
Kissinger was not worried about a Syrian intervention in itself, but an Israeli one. To the Ford 
Administration, an Israeli intervention would sabotage the Kissinger’s plans for future 
bilateral Arab-Israeli agreements by opening a Pandora’s box of potential problems, including 
oil embargo on the US and its allies, as well as increased Soviet involvement in the Middle 
East. If Israel entered southern Lebanon, Kissinger thought Sadat would jump on the 
opportunity to criticize Assad for abandoning the Palestinians and the Arab cause. Syria, in 
turn, might be forced in to armed conflict with Israel. Kissinger thought Moscow would not 
remain on the sidelines, if faced with the prospect of the Israeli Defense Forces defeating the 
Soviet-equipped Syrian Armed Forces. Increased Soviet involvement was Kissinger’s biggest 
concern.485 
 
Within April 7 the US had moved several US Navy ships, including assault ships, to within 
some 20 hours of the Lebanese coast. The naval presence was a show of force to deter Soviet 
intervention. Moscow accused Washington of interfering in Lebanon, but the US replied that 
the ships were standing by to evacuate US citizens. This was true, though the evacuation did 
not begin until June 20. Kissinger hoped the deterrence would pressure the Kremlin to lean on 
Jumblatt and pro-Soviet Palestinians to maintain the cease-fire.486 
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On the morning of April 7, Kissinger briefed the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership about 
the threat of an Israeli counter-intervention.487 He did not mention the first indication of 
Israeli red lines, received nearly two weeks before. In the following NSC meeting Kissinger 
was less worried about an Israeli intervention. Ford and Kissinger had gained confidence that 
Israel might be restrained. Kissinger told the NSC that he wanted to keep the Israeli threat as a 
bargaining card to deter Assad.488 In light of what Kissinger told the Bipartisan Congressional 
Leadership, it would appear that he wanted to use this bargaining card in domestic politics as 
well. 
 
Kissinger told Ford that there was no immediate threat of Syrian intervention either. Kissinger 
believed both the Soviet Union and Syria were eager to avoid an Israeli-Syrian confrontation. 
The current cease-fire had allowed Israel to resupply the Maronites with weapons, so 
Kissinger thought the Maronites were far from impending destruction.489 
 
Lebanese Arms Request 
Lebanese Army chief General Hanna Said contacted the US Defense Department on April 7. 
Said, now an ally of the Lebanese Front, requested shells, rifles and rocket launchers for 
millions of dollars. The US rejected the proposal, stating that requests for arms would have to 
be done by the Lebanese government to the US State Department. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld brought the proposal to Kissinger, who answered “[l]et the Israelis do it. 
They are already arming the Christians.”490 In January the US had tried to limit Lebanese 
factions access to arms, but with a Syrian intervention underway to impose order and 
counterbalance the leftist-Palestinian ascendancy, Kissinger had no qualms about Israel 
arming the Maronites. Israel promptly sent arms to Maronite forces. 491 
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A Cautious Intervention 
Kissinger’s red lines dialogue was successful. Syria started a small-scale intervention in early 
April, without an Israeli counter-intervention. On April 9, additional Saiqa troops arrived in 
Lebanon, while Syrian soldiers took control of the border crossing along the highway running 
between Beirut and Damascus. On April 10 Syrian Army soldiers and armored vehicles 
appeared in the Beqaa Valley, within some 10 km of the Syrian border. Syrian Army soldiers 
and officers were already in Lebanon, but in PLA or Saiqa guise. April 10 was the first 
deployment of official Syrian forces into Lebanon, marking the start of the Syrian 
intervention. Jordan declared its support for Syria. Jumblatt accused Hussein and Assad of 
conspiring to control the Palestinian movements and the West Bank. Rabin did not see the 
deployment as a violation of the red lines and made no public protest.492 
 
In an April 12 speech, Assad said that Syria was obliged to resort to force in Lebanon. Assad 
blamed the National Movement and PLO and issued a general threat: Syria would do 
whatever it deemed necessary in Lebanon and would not be hindered by anyone. Saiqa 
claimed that 17 000 troops in Lebanon were loyal to Damascus, almost matching the size of 
the Lebanese Army before it dissolved. Syria illustrated its determination and power by 
arresting National Movement and PLO members where possible.493 
 
Israel’s tacit consent to Syria Army deployment in Lebanon worried Kissinger. He feared that 
Assad would take Rabin’s silence as a green light and escalate the intervention. Ambassador 
Murphy told Assad to refrain from further deployments.494 
 
When the Syrian troops appeared, Arafat and Jumblatt suspected US involvement. Jumblatt 
confronted the US Envoy, who could not give Jumblatt a satisfactory explanation. Brown 
promised to investigate.495 Fatah suspected that Israel, Jordan, the Maronites and the US had 
silently agreed to give Syria the reins in Lebanon. With one hand, Fatah retreated a large 
proportion of the Fatah forces in the Beqaa Valley and renewed a proclaimed alliance to 
Syria. With the other hand, Fatah summoned additional PLA troops from Egypt. During 
March and April, the connection between Arafat and Sadat in Cairo had been strengthened. 
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As Arafat’s relationship with Assad had deteriorated, he needed to ally himself with another 
Arab leader. Sadat wanted to humiliate Assad. Sadat expressed his dedication to Arafat by 
publically reprimanding Assad and Hussein, accusing them of trying to dominate and weaken 
the PLO.496 
 
On April 12, Ford asked Kissinger about Lebanon, to which the Secretary replied: “We may 
walk through that mine field okay.”497 Both the Soviet Union and Egypt were trying to 
confine the National Movement and Israel had not reacted to Syria’s deployment. Dinitz had 
told Kissinger that Syria’s current military presence was acceptable, though reaching the 
maximum of what Israel could accept.498 Kissinger assured the US Congress on April 14 that 
the intervention was not a threat to Israel.499 
 
Kissinger was satisfied with the way the Lebanon was working out and might even serve 
Israeli and American interests. He reckoned that the Lebanese Civil War would in time 
increase Syria’s power over the PLO, at the expense of Arafat and Fatah.500 Kissinger implied 
that Syria might avoid provoking Israel, as Assad was “scared to death of the Israelis.”501 The 
Secretary was optimistic about furthering the Israeli-Syrian bilateral process, once the Ford 
administration was reelected. Despite his optimism, Kissinger was still worried that Assad 
would escalate the intervention to the point where Israel could no ignore longer ignore it. The 
sources do not indicate that the red lines dialogue was continued after Syria’s small-scale 
intervention, and Washington continued to preach restraint to Damascus.502 
 
Frangieh wanted to suggest to Assad that an international force might accompany the Syrian 
Army, but Frangieh wanted US approval first.503 Kissinger did not want to endorse any plan 
before Assad agreed to it. Brown gave a noncommittal answer to Frangieh. Kissinger told 
Brown that the US might endorse an international force to mask a Syrian intervention.504 
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Unidentified press reports from mid-April had picked up Rabin saying “there is a ‘red line’ in 
Lebanon that Syria cannot cross”.505 Similar remarks from Kissinger caused the Washington 
Post to print a story about Kissinger and Rabin’s joint warning to Assad. Kissinger told Assad 
that there was no relation between the statements. Kissinger did not want Assad to know that 
the limitations Kissinger suggested to a Syrian intervention came from Israel.506 
 
The Damascus Accord 
After demonstrating Syria’s power and determination by deploying the Syrian regular army, 
Assad invited Arafat to Damascus. The April 16 meeting produced the Damascus Accord: 
Arafat would endorse the Constitutional Document and its reforms, rather than support 
Jumblatt’s fight to topple and reform the state. Arafat was also to refrain from appeals to the 
international community. Assad wanted to shape the developments with as little international 
involvement as possible. Assad would thereafter withdraw the Syrian forces that had entered 
on April 10. Both would work for a cease-fire and to resolve the conflict, restore the Lebanese 
government and allow the presidential election to take place. The Damascus Accord proved to 
be weak, facing resistance both from the left and the right. The National Movement and 
rejectionist Palestinian groups opposed the Accord, as did the Lebanese Front.507 
 
The Lebanese Front sought to jeopardize the Damascus Accord through political and military 
escalation, as well as internationalization. Political escalation came with the creation of a civil 
system within the areas under Christian control, a continuation of the Christian de facto 
partition of Lebanon. Military escalation involved opening new offensives. The death tolls 
reached unprecedented levels, with more than a hundred people killed each day. By escalating 
the conflict, the Maronites made it harder for Arafat and Assad to cooperate and refrain from 
fighting each other. The Maronites’ second threat to the Damascus Accord was the 
internationalization of the conflict. On April 22, the Lebanese Front called for US or other 
powers to mediate in Lebanon. A week later, the Front called for an international deterrent 
force. The Maronites attempts at internationalization made Assad impatient. He wanted to 
control the Lebanese Civil War for its own means, which would be sabotaged by international 
involvement.508 
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Kissinger believed Egypt was suspecting a secret trade-off between Damascus and 
Washington, that the US would restrain Israel and let Syria intervene in Lebanon. In exchange 
Assad would crush the PLO and renew the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF).509 UNDOF controlled a buffer zone between Israel and Syria on the Golan 
Heights. UNDOF was established after Kissinger’s Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement 
of May 31, 1974, following the October 1973 War.510 Washington told both Egypt and Israel 
that the US had not authorized a Syrian intervention. Kissinger also told Egypt that there had 
been no Syrian-US discussion of the upcoming UNDOF renewal with Assad.511 
 
Israel announced its red lines publically on April 21. The geographical red line had at some 
point been moved south, from the Beirut-Damascus Highway to the Litani River. The Litani 
runs from outside Baalbek in the Beqaa valley and enters the Mediterranean just north of the 
town Tyre.512 
 
In an April 22 WSAG meeting, Scowcroft said he thought Israel had no wish of actually 
entering southern Lebanon. Kissinger reckoned that Israeli troops in Lebanon would increase 
the pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied areas.513 
 
On April 22, Kissinger and his WSAG colleagues discussed Israeli and Soviet intervention as 
a possibility. The WSAG discussed whether the US might move troops into Lebanon: Either 
as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces, or to deter Soviet involvement. Kissinger 
requested that the Department of Defense look into involving US troops in Lebanon, should 
Israel or the Soviet Union intervene. Plans to evacuate US citizens had already been made. If 
Lebanon turned into a regional war, Kissinger wanted to “pour forces into the Mediterranean 
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to dissuade the Soviets.”514 Kissinger was afraid Lebanon might turn into a quagmire. He also 
thought dispatching US troops might strengthen Assad’s resolve to intervene.515 
 
Kissinger contacted Amman, Cairo and Damascus on April 25, to tell them that Frangieh had 
signed the constitutional amendment that would allow a presidential election. Brown had 
talked to Chamoun, Frangieh and Jumblatt. Jumblatt was prepared to meet Gemayel and 
discuss a political compromise. Chamoun agreed to postpone his plans for partition. Frangieh 
reiterated his promise to resign after the election, but only if he thought “the security 
conditions then prevailing were adequate.”516 
 
Upon learning that the presidential election was moving forward, Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Ismail Fahmy told the US that Sarkis was not a good candidate, because he was associated 
with Syria. Fahmy also hinted that Egypt should take a greater part in Lebanon’s security, to 
balance out the Syrians.517 
 
Jumblatt wanted to sabotage the Damascus Accord by conducting a de facto partition to 
mirror the one of the Maronites. Rejectionist Palestinian groups publically accused Syria of 
cooperating with the US. Within the leftist-Palestinian groups there were calls to react to the 
Maronites’ escalation with increased military force. Arafat vetoed these efforts to sabotage 
the Damascus Accord.518 
 
Damascus told the US Ambassador Murphy that Jumblatt’s attempt at de facto partition was a 
willful defiance of Syria. After discussing Lebanon for a while, Murphy was told that Assad 
wanted to discuss the future of the region with the Americans. Assad had previously raised 
the subject repeatedly after announcing the Constitutional Document in February. White 
House and State Department sources can hardly illuminate president Assad’s thinking, but it 
is reasonable that he wanted the US to reward his Lebanese effort with a new Israeli-Syrian 
agreement. However, the sources give no indications that Kissinger was considering a new 
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Israeli-Syrian agreement at the time. The Ford administration had put off all Middle East 
diplomacy until after the election, which Ford lost to Jimmy Carter.519 
 
Presidential Election 
On April 27, Special Emissary Brown had briefed Ford and Scowcroft on the Lebanese 
Presidential election. The Emissary preferred Sarkis to Eddé, but would not give his support 
publically. This, he said, would be the “kiss of death”, meaning that US support would be to 
Sarkis’ disadvantage.520 Brown assured Ford and Scowcroft that votes would be bought and 
sold in the election.521 
 
With the presidential election on track, Brown’s biggest concern was security. According to 
Brown, “[t]here are countless groups roaming around looting and killing – they have to be put 
against the wall and shot.”522 Brown was pessimistic about Lebanon in the long term. 
According to him, there was little hope for change when every leading politician was a 
basically a chieftain with a personal militia.523 In Brown’s words, Lebanese leaders were not 
politicians, but “war-lords in tailored suits”, unable to restrain their own militias.524 Brown’s 
most brutal description was awarded Jumblatt, when Ford said the National Movement leader 
was not a Muslim: “He is an offshot called Druze. He is crazy.525 
 
Brown returned to Beirut, with instructions to advise a political solution and to prolong the 
cease-fire. He was also instructed to refrain from expressing personal or US views for the 
time being. Kissinger was curious to know how the election might be realized and the current 
chances of Syrian intervention.526 
 
Despite occasional clashes, Jumblatt renewed the cease-fire. If the clashes turned into lasting 
hostilities, Brown thought they would jeopardize the election. Brown told Washington that 
this would increase the chances of Syrian intervention.527 Sisco promptly reached out to Saudi 
Arabia, who had good relations with the National Movement, the PLO and Syria. Washington 
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asked the Saudi government to get Assad and Jumblatt reconciled.528 Kissinger insisted that 
this be kept secret from Egypt. Sadat would be displeased to know that the US was working 
to end a rivalry that was beneficial to Sadat.529 
 
On May 4, Syria told the US that the presidential election was scheduled for May 8. 
Damascus was losing faith in a political solution and the Syrian leadership reminded Murphy 
to discuss the future Middle East peace process with Assad.530 The State Department did not 
instruct Murphy to discuss the process with the Syrians until May 14.531 
 
As the election approached, the State Department gathered that Assad was highly suspicious 
of Washington. Syria allegedly thought the US had allowed an “inadequate” Syrian 
intervention while egging the Maronites to fight, in order to humiliate Assad.532 
 
Sisco had met with Eddé on December 19, 1975, while Eddé was touring Europe and the US 
to win support for his presidency. The US State Department had described Eddé as a 
moderate candidate for the presidency. Eddé was described as critical of both Palestinian and 
Israeli ambitions in Lebanon.533 
 
Eddé thought the involvement of the Palestinians and Syria, as well as Iraq and Libya, 
barricaded an agreement between the Lebanese. Eddé envisioned a joint American-Israeli 
intervention to throw out the Syrian controlled troops, followed by a UN peacekeeping force. 
Eddé accused both Israel and Syria “and other countries” of wanting Lebanon destroyed.534 
Sisco rejected Eddé’s claim. Eddé accused the US and USSR of conspiring to divide the 
entire Middle East between them as spheres of influence. After the meeting with Sisco, Eddé 
toned down his public conspiracy theories involving the US, but continued to attack Israel. 
The Eddé-Sisco meeting did nothing to strengthen his appeal to American policymakers. The 
State Department described Eddé’s ideas as “unrealistic” and called the whole meeting “most 
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unfruitful.” 535 The US was looking for a Lebanese solution, while Eddé’s wanted an 
international solution.536 
 
Hoping to sabotage the Arafat-Assad Accord, the Lebanese Front launched a new offensive 
on May 7.537 The presidential election was held on Saturday May 8. Saiqa and pro-Syrian 
PLA troops provided security for the election.538 
 
Eddé and his supporters, including Jumblatt and some 20 other parliament members, 
boycotted the election. Eddé said a free election could not be guaranteed. Saudi Arabia and 
the CIA spent large sums of money buying votes.539 The National Movement and the PLO 
also boycotted the election and Arafat and Jumblatt agreed to sabotage with shelling and 
roadblocks.  However, Arafat assumed that Sarkis would win and did not want to provoke 
Assad by sabotaging the election. To avoid betraying the National Movement, the PLO took 
part in shelling the election and manning roadblocks. However, the PLO’s shelling was kept 
at a minimum to avoid provoking Damascus. Arafat’s attempt to appease both Assad and 
Jumblatt did not work out. The Arafat-Jumblatt relationship survived, but in just over three 
weeks Assad would go to war against Arafat.540 
 
Jumblatt and the National Movement were becoming increasingly isolated. Jumblatt’s 
inflexible rejection of the Constitutional Document and insistence to keep fighting had 
estranged him from the Sunni leadership, including Prime Minister Karami. Moreover, it had 
further estranged Jumblatt and Assad; lastly in their March 27 meeting. The two would never 
meet again. Within months they were fighting each other and within a year Jumblatt would be 
assassinated. The PLO’s reluctant shelling of the election marked the makings of a third split, 
the one between Jumblatt and Arafat.541 
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After the election, Kissinger wrote to Cairo. He assured Sadat and Fahmy that the US had 
been impartial. Kissinger went on to say that Egypt and the US had common interest in 
supporting Sarkis, as an independent government was the best guarantee against Syrian 
dominance over Lebanon.542 
 
Meanwhile, the Arafat-Assad relationship was deteriorating, despite the Damascus Accord. 
Arafat tried to accommodate Damascus and publically support Syria. However, Arafat 
realized that his relationship with Assad was hanging on by a thread. To make up the waning 
relationship with Assad, Arafat tried to align himself with Sadat and Cairo. Assad perceived 
the rapprochement between Arafat and Sadat, hastening the Arafat-Assad breakup. Damascus 
bared its teeth by deploying Syrian troops around the airport southwest of Beirut and PLA 
troops around the PLO headquarters.543 
 
The Saudi government was eager to get involved in Lebanon, according to the US Embassy in 
Jidda. Ambassador William Porter reported that Saudi Arabia already had a “well-developed 
line of action”, involving Arab and Lebanese contacts.544 The Saudi government requested 
US information to better assess the situation.545 Atherton asked Brown’s opinion on Saudi 
intentions.546 Brown saw no conflict between Saudi mediation and US interest. However, 
Brown stated the “Syrians have been almost fanatically jealous” of anyone trying to share in 
Assad’s Lebanese efforts.547 Kissinger started sharing information with the Saudis on the day 
of the election, insisting that there be no trace of the US in the Saudi effort. 548 
Simultaneously, Kissinger told Assad that Lebanon’s future was “primarily a task for the 
Lebanese and their friends in the Arab world”, indicating that the Washington would not 
stand in the way of Damascus.549  
 
The Lebanese election was followed by military and political escalation. Lebanon moved ever 
closer to partition, as the National Movement started developing a civil administration to 
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match the Christian state that was emerging in central Lebanon. The Lebanese Front had 
launched a three-day offensive on the eve of the election, which was echoed by the National 
Movement on May 11. A collection of National Movement fighters and Palestinian 
rejectionists clashed with Saiqa and PLA forces between May 7 and 13. Saiqa leader Mohsen 
publically called for Syrian intervention, while blaming the Arafat and Jumblatt for the 
violence.550 
 
Meloy was instructed to maintain the contacts Brown had established and to congratulate 
Sarkis.551 Brown had been instructed to approach Arafat on May 10, but this instruction was 
not passed on to Meloy.552 The rest of the instructions mentioned in Ford’s talking points are 
insubstantial.553 Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft met Meloy on May 10, just before the 
Ambassador’s departure. The meeting only lasted nine minutes and little more than 
pleasantries were exchanged.554  
 
By the middle of May, both Israel and the US seemed openly comfortable with Syria’s role 
and possible intervention. King Hussein of Jordan had advocated Syrian intervention to both 
Israeli and US officials, who reassured the king. Rabin publically applauded Syria for having 
“killed more terrorists in the past week than Israel has the past two years.”555 On May 12 the 
Lebanese newspaper An-Nahar quoted US Envoy Brown as saying that the question of a 
Syrian intervention in Lebanon was up to president elect Sarkis.556 
 
Frangieh had an understanding with Syria to resign once a successor was elected. However, 
on May 14 Frangieh announced that he had changed his mind. Just as he changed his mind 
after the petition on March 17, Frangieh now intended to remain in position until the end of 
his term on September 22.557 Ambassador Eilts said Sarkis’ much needed support would not 
come from Egypt. Sadat saw Sarkis as a Syrian ally and would not acknowledge him until he 
dropped his “Syrian tilt”.558 
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The French Option 
Kissinger tried to find alternative approaches that would limit Syria’s sovereignty over 
Lebanon. The option of a joint Lebanese-Palestinian security force arose in early April, but 
had been discarded. The second alternative that surfaced was a French Intervention. On May 
10 Kissinger was informed that France was considering sending forces to Lebanon. Ford and 
Kissinger thought a French intervention could counterbalance the Syrian intervention.559 On 
May 18 French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing told Ford and Kissinger that France would 
only dispatch forces at the request of President elect Sarkis. Meanwhile, Kissinger had 
discarded the idea. Israel opposed the idea of a French intervention, claiming it would be a 
façade to hide a large-scale Syrian intervention. 560  Kissinger told Giscard of Israel’s 
misgivings and added that a large French force would entice Assad to match its size. Giscard 
and French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues promised to keep the US informed before 
deploying French forces. Kissinger did not want to cross Israel. When he learned about 
Israel’s misgivings regarding a French intervention, the idea was off the table. With the joint 
security and the French option both out of the question the US had only one alternative left: 
Syria.561 
 
The French initiative did not appeal to President-elect Sarkis either. On May 24, Sarkis’ 
foreign advisor Fouad Boutros told Ambassador Meloy that French troops were unnecessary; 
Lebanon needed a Syrian intervention. Meanwhile, the violence spiraled on. Frangieh and 
Chamoun used the violence to legitimize Frangieh’s remaining in power. Meloy and the State 
Department thought Sarkis delayed inauguration made it more probable that Sarkis would 
have to rely on the Syrian Army.562 
 
Assad wanted to control Lebanon himself, to meet his own ends. The French proposal 
strengthened Assad’s resolve to take control of Lebanon. He had to act fast to maintain 
control over the small country.563 
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Syrian Intervention 
The violence of the election weekend did not subside, but resurged in the last half of May. In 
a May 17 meeting in Damascus, Assad told Arafat and Libyan Prime Minister Abdessalam 
Jalloud that the Syrian intervention would be increased. By this time, Arafat had realized that 
his alliance with Assad was broken, and consequently perceived the intervention as a direct 
threat to Palestinian activity in Lebanon. The meeting drove another nail in to the coffin of the 
Arafat-Assad relationship. Jalloud had come to Lebanon to soften Assad’s attitude toward the 
PLO, but it was futile.564 
 
Arafat hoped that a Maronite-Palestinian agreement would forestall the increased Syrian 
intervention. Arafat and Jumblatt tried to reach an agreement with Sarkis before Assad could 
launch a major Syrian intervention. Simultaneously, Arafat worked for a joint involvement of 
Arab states, hoping to break Assad’s solitary domination of Lebanon. On May 19, Fatah’s 
intelligence chief, Salah Khalaf, announced the PLO’s intention to increase its military effort. 
Khalaf publically called for the Soviet Union to act. The number of clashes increased, and the 
violence escalated. Saiqa’s public criticism of the Fatah also reemerged, proclaiming Syria as 
the champion of Palestinian resistance. Saiqa’s reprimands only united Fatah and the rest of 
the PLO in their opposition to Syrian dominance.565 
 
Meloy got increasingly annoyed with Chamoun. The Ambassador described Chamoun as 
“mafia-like,” using his control over the port in Jounieh, a Maronite coastal town in Mount 
Lebanon, to increase his personal wealth. In Meloy’s opinion, Chamoun had no regard for the 
consequences of his actions.566 As an illustration of Chamoun’s volatility, Meloy noted: “at 
one time last fall, Chamoun’s forces held the record for the number of cease-fires broken, 
despite Chamoun’s role as Minister for Internal Security.”567 Meloy thought Washington 
should ask Chamoun’s “friends” Iran and Jordan talk to Chamoun, in order to calm him 
down.568 
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On May 27, Saunders told Kissinger that Gemayel’s son Amine Gemayel wanted to abolish 
the sectarian system and cooperate with Jumblatt. Saunders optimistically noted that the 
younger generation of Christians might be more pragmatic than their elders. Like Sarkis, the 
younger Maronites seemed to understand that Jumblatt could not be excluded from Lebanon’s 
future.569 Amine’s younger brother Bashir, the instigator of the 1975 Black Saturday massacre 
and future President-Elect of Lebanon and, also held talks with PLO officials.570 Bashir 
Gemayel had a conversation with Jumblatt on June 2. The two found common ground in their 
opposition to Assad. Bashir conceded to Jumblatt’s demands for political and social reforms. 
Jumblatt had by then dropped his demand for desecularization of the Lebanese state and said 
the Maronites’ could keep the presidency. Saunders’ optimism was poorly founded: Amine 
and Bashir were respected within the Phalangist militia, but had no leverage over Phalangist 
politics. The Phalangists’ political leadership was not interested in dealing with Arafat or 
Jumblatt, and Amine and Bashir’s overtures came to nothing.571 
 
In the end of May 1976 international and regional interest in Lebanon was spiking. Dinitz did 
not think Syrian intervention would be increased in the near future, he told Kissinger on May 
19.572 If Israel did indeed believe this, it was a poor assessment of the mood in Damascus. 
Assad was in a hurry to preempt international or Arab involvement. Syria launched a large-
scale intervention in Lebanon on May 31 and June 1, introducing hundreds of tanks and 8000 
Syrian soldiers, reaching 15 000 within days. The intervention turned into a war between 
Christian and Syrian forces on one side, and leftist and Palestinian forces on the other. The 
first phase of the Civil War ended in October-November 1976, when a Pax Syriana was 
enforced. This was not so much a peace as an absence of war; enforced and defined by 
Syria.573 
 
As late as May 30, Ambassador Meloy described a “trend toward dialogue”.574 On June 2, 
Kissinger told Sadat and Fahmy that despite rumors in the American press, Damascus’ large-
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scale intervention did not have Washington’s approval.575 Fahmy did not accuse the US of 
any approval, but blamed Washington for not working harder to restrain Syria.576 
 
Several factors brought about Syria’s change, from supporter of radicals and Palestinian 
guerrillas. Firstly, Assad wanted to avoid a military confrontation with Israel. Israel might 
have been drawn in if Lebanon became a confrontation state governed by Jumblatt under the 
auspices of Arafat. Israeli might also be drawn in just to stop the chaotic civil war. Secondly, 
Assad would have wanted to avoid the spread of insurgencies and violence to Syria. Lastly, 
Sinai II, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement signed September 1975 under the auspices of 
Kissinger. Assad wanted to avoid being outmaneuvered by Sadat in the Arab World. As a 
counterbalance to Sinai II, Assad opted to develop closer ties with King Hussein of Jordan 
and increase Damascus’ control over Lebanon. These objectives were not compatible with an 
alliance with Arafat, so Assad opted to control the PLO rather than to forge an alliance. The 
spring months of 1976 strengthened Damascus’ ties to Israel, Jordan, the Lebanese leadership 
and the US. Arafat, on the other hand, had been driven into the arms of Sadat. In a way, Syria 
never changed: Assad’s goal was always to secure power for himself and Syria. He only 
assumed the mask of ideology to further these aims.577 
 
Washington regarded Assad as a Soviet ally, champion of leftists and Palestinians, and a critic 
of Israel. However, in the end of May 1976, Assad intervened in Lebanon to save the 
conservative Maronites from the leftist-Palestinian coalition – without Israel and the US 
objecting.578 Kissinger saw himself as the architect of the changes in Lebanon. The Maronites 
were armed by Israel and protected by Syria. The bond between Damascus and Moscow was 
weakened, and the PLO was at war with one of their principal backers. Israel stayed out of 
Lebanon, preventing an Arab-Israeli war.579 
 
The only concern the Ford administration ever showed regarding a Syrian intervention was 
that Israel would enter southern Lebanon, resulting in an Arab-Israeli war and a setback for 
Kissinger’s Middle East policy. Having removed the joint security option and the French 
                                                
575 Cable, STATE 135820, Secstate to Cairo, June 3, 1976, Box 15, GF-NSC-SF-MESA 
576 Cable, ALEXANDRIA 343, Alexandria to Secstate, June 3, 1976, Box 15, GF-NSC-SF-MESA 
577 Khalidi. Conflict and Violence in Lebanon. 1979: 57; Traboulsi. A History of Modern Lebanon, 2007: 198; 
Waage. Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten, 2013: 229-30; Yapp. The Near East since the First World 
War. 1996: 270 
578 Khalidi. Conflict and Violence in Lebanon. 1979: 57; Traboulsi. A History of Modern Lebanon, 2007: 198; 
Waage; Yapp. The Near East since the First World War. 1996: 270 
579 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1999: 1042 
Chapter 5 – The US and the Syrian Intervention 
 113 
option, however, Washington’s path of least resistance went through Damascus. Both the 
Israel and the US stood by and allowed Syria to intervene. Israel knew that Syria had troops 
in Lebanon as early as January 1976, without reacting. Syria was most attentive to Israel 
when operating in Lebanon, as Israel noticed. Assad carefully probed Israel’s tolerance of a 
Syrian intervention through the US when Shihabi and later Assad warned that Syria had to 
intervene. The Syrian leadership would have realized that word of a Syrian intervention 
would reach Israel. And within weeks, Washington sent Damascus Israel’s red lines, though 
Kissinger tried to give the impression that the red lines were just American guesswork. Syria 
probed Israel’s tolerance again in April, when Assad began sending regular Syrian soldiers 
into Lebanon. Israel did not react to the small-scale intervention. In this way Assad was able 
to intervene without Israel counter-intervening, facilitated by the US. The red lines seem to 
pertain to the small-scale intervention of April, not the major intervention that began on May 
31. The sources consulted do not reveal a similar red lines dialogue prior to the large-scale 
intervention. However, by the end of May Syria had mapped out Israel and the US’ tolerance 
regarding Lebanon. Assad’s calculations were right: Israel and the US both tolerated the 
intervention. 
 
The US quickly realized that a Syrian intervention was the best solution to the Lebanese Civil 
War. The US and other powers had tried to exert pressure on the warring factions to lay down 
their arms and negotiate, but the civil war kept deteriorating. Someone had to get more 
actively involved and take control over Lebanon. To Kissinger, the easiest solution was to let 
Assad take control, having learned that the Rabin government would not intervene. The US 
wanted to keep its involvement at a minimum. The Eisenhower administration had intervened 
in 1958, but the Ford administration never considered a military intervention in 1976. 
Lebanon of 1958 was a major US interest, as it was seen as central to the Cold War in the 
Middle East. Lebanon in the mid-1970s was just a sideshow to Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. 
The US had fairly recently pulled out of the Vietnam War and Ford had replaced Nixon 
following the Watergate scandal. The Ford administration did not have the political currency 
for a large US effort in Lebanon. The US Initiative, sending Envoy Brown to Lebanon, was 
also kept at a minimal level. Washington had no ambitions about bringing about a political 
settlement between the factions. Brown was simply there to facilitate what Syria was already 
doing: arranging a presidential election and paving the way for Syria’s intervention. Both the 
Damascus and Washington wanted Syria to take control of Lebanon before international or 
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Arab actors became involved: Assad to secure his dominance over Lebanon, Kissinger to 
keep the balance in the Middle East in check. 
  115 
Chapter 6: 
Conclusion 
 
“It is so complex that it defies logic.”580 
 
The US approach to the 1975-1976 Lebanese Civil War was dominated by Israel. With little 
interest in Lebanon, Washington ignored the civil war until Israel seemed to become a part of 
it. From his globalist perspective, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had no interest in 
solving Lebanon’s intricate problems. The US policy was to keep the Lebanese Civil War 
from becoming a regional conflict. To prevent a regional conflict, Washington tried to to keep 
the civil war from escalating and to keep Israel from intervening. To keep the civil war from 
escalating, Washington developed policies to stabilize the conflict. These proved ineffective, 
but they remained basically unchanged from the fall of 1975 until the end of May 1976. 
Washington’s attempt to prevent an Israeli intervention was mainly done indirectly, by trying 
to avoid a situation where Israel would want to intervene. Directly, Washington did little but 
plead with Israel not to intervene. Kissinger thought the US had little sway over Israel and 
wanted to avoid an Israeli-American conflict. The alternative left to the US was to make sure 
Syria played by Israel’s rules. 
 
US Policy Toward the Lebanese Civil War 
For the first six months of the civil war the US had no policy, as Lebanon was of little interest 
to the US. With the threat of foreign intervention and regional involvement, Washington was 
compelled to develop policies. Kissinger worried that Syria would intervene, Israel would 
counter-intervene and the situation would create Arab unity or an Arab-Israeli war, which 
would ruin or set back his step-by-step diplomacy. In October the US started to preach 
moderation through third parties, hoping this would stabilize Lebanon and minimize the threat 
of foreign intervention. Washington cooperated with countries that had influence with the 
actors in the civil war, advising them to lay down their arms and seek a political solution. By 
the end of October the State Department realized that this approach was ineffective, but 
developed no alternative. From his globalist perspective Kissinger did not want to get more 
involved in a conflict that was in itself of no interest to the US. Washington found that the 
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best approach to the Lebanese Civil War was to let Syria control it, as long as Syria’s efforts 
were limited to mediation. 
 
Washington was prompted to reevaluate its policies in January 1976. Kissinger was losing 
confidence in Syria, as Damascus seemed unable to stabilize Lebanon. Maronite militias were 
practically beginning to partition Lebanon, after which Syria threatened to annex the small 
country. The threat of an Israeli counter-intervention rose again, along with the fear that 
prolonged fighting might draw in the Soviet Union. The added threat of Soviet involvement, 
though thought unlikely, increased Lebanon’s importance from a globalist perspective. 
However, the US main incentive for elaborating its policies remained the threat of Israeli 
intervention. 
 
The US tried to halt intervention and make up for Syria’s lack of influence by adopting a 
more involved, three-part policy. Firstly, Washington increased its effort in advising the 
factions in Lebanon to moderate. The US engaged the Lebanese directly this time, while 
asking influential countries to do the same. Secondly, the US tried to limit the seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of weapons. Washington approached European countries selling arms to 
the Maronites and Syria, who supplied the National Front and the PLO. Thirdly, Washington 
tried to keep Damascus from intervening. The US took a pessimistic view of Lebanon and 
doubted whether its policies would be effective. When Syria arranged a new cease-fire 
Lebanon was stable in the eyes of the US, as it lessened the threat of Israeli involvement. As a 
result, the US interest and effort in Lebanon was brought back down to a lull. 
 
The biggest rise in US interest in Lebanon came in the middle of March, when Damascus 
warned Washington of a planned Syrian intervention. Within the end of the month, the US 
began facilitating the Syrian intervention within the confines of what Israel could accept, the 
Israeli red lines. Facilitating the Syrian intervention was the first US policy to yield results. 
Syria started a small-scale military intervention in the first half of April, with Israel’s 
acquiescence. 
 
After the limited intervention Washington sought to limit Damascus’ power in Lebanon. The 
US was afraid that Syria would take Israel and the US’ acceptance of the small-scale 
intervention as a green light to increase the intervention. Kissinger repeatedly reminded Assad 
of the dangers of a large-scale intervention in Lebanon. Simultaneously, the US began 
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looking at approaches that might lessen Syria’s hold over Lebanon, such as a mixed security 
force, made up of Lebanese and Palestinian factions and a French intervention. Both were 
discarded. The joint security force was discarded for three reasons. Firstly, Washington had 
more common interests with Damascus than with the PLO.  Secondly, Kissinger did not want 
to increase Arafat’s importance and standing in Lebanon. Thirdly, organizing such a force 
would take a more active effort than the US was prepared to make. The French intervention 
was discarded when Kissinger learned that Israel opposed a French intervention. After 
discarding the joint force and the French intervention, the US was left with Syria. The US 
supported the Syrian political effort, hoping this would minimize the chance of a Syrian 
intervention. 
 
In May the US helped Syria carry out the Lebanese presidential election, culminating in the 
election of Elias Sarkis. After the election Emissary Lewis Dean Brown was replaced by 
Ambassador Francis Meloy. Judging by the available sources, the US’ effort in Lebanon 
lessened with Brown’s departure from Beirut. The small scale Syrian intervention in the first 
half of April was preceded by an active US diplomacy, where the US passed information on 
Israeli red lines and Syrian plans to and from the Israeli and Syrian governments. As far as the 
sources reveal, there is no similar diplomacy preceding the large-scale intervention that began 
on May 31. 
 
Washington’s Minimal Involvement 
The reasons for Washington’s late and minimal involvement in Lebanon may be divided into 
two groups: Firstly, the US had little interest in Lebanon and secondly, felt a need to practice 
restraint. Additionally, Washington’s minimal involvement can be divided into domestic and 
foreign considerations. 
 
The US lacked foreign interest in Lebanon in the mid 1970s. There was no longer a strong 
Arabism in the Middle East, as when Eisenhower intervened in 1958. Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat had sought to align himself with the US, unlike his predecessor Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. The US perceived the Arabism in 1950s Lebanon within the Cold War struggle and 
therefore invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine. However, in the mid 1970s Washington realized 
that Moscow had little influence over Lebanon. 
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There was neither any great amount of trade nor business linking Lebanon to the US. 
Kissinger lamented that international businesses were driven from Beirut, but it did not entice 
Washington to hinder this development. Lebanon had been an important western-aligned 
economy in the 1950s, but the economy had waned since the 1960s. Presidents Richard Nixon 
and Gerald Ford’s primary economic interest in the Middle East was a supply of inexpensive 
Arab oil. The countries behind the 1973-1974 Oil Embargo far overshadowed Lebanon’s 
economic importance. 
 
Foreign interest also restrained the US. Kissinger was anxious not to create Arab unity or a 
situation that would lead to an Arab-Israeli war. It was important that Lebanon remained an 
Arab affair, where both Israel and the US stayed out. 
 
Washington was also restrained by domestic considerations. The population was weary of US 
intervention in foreign countries, having just left the Vietnam War behind them. Ford was 
preparing for the 1976 Presidential Election and could not afford a major effort in a country 
of little importance. 
 
There was little domestic interest in Lebanon, as it did not in itself affect the US supply of oil 
or Israel’s security. Only a perceived threat against Israel would evoke Lebanon’s importance 
in the eyes of the American population. Palestinian guerrilla attacks across the Israeli-
Lebanese border had troubled Israel throughout the 1970s. However, it was the hint of a 
Syrian intervention that was perceived as a threat to Israel’s security, not the Palestinian 
guerrilla activity. When Syria launched its intervention in April, however, Israel’s security 
was not threatened, as the red lines were respected. 
 
The Lebanese Civil War posed no direct threat to US foreign interest. Only when the threat of 
Israeli intervention and Arab-Israeli war arose to endanger Kissinger’s step-by-step 
diplomacy did Washington involve itself in Lebanon. Each time the threat seemed to lessen, 
the US interest disappeared. In the end, the US had no interest in solving the Lebanese Civil 
War, only to contain it. As long as the civil war was contained it did not threaten Israel or the 
American diplomacy. 
 
Washington was also restrained by its inability to influence Lebanon. Kissinger and Joseph 
Sisco discussed the US’ impotence in Lebanon in late October 1975. Even in January, when 
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the US thought there was a real threat of intervention and knew that its policies were likely to 
be ineffective, Washington refrained from getting more involved. On the one hand, this 
underlines the US perceived need for non-involvement and lack of confidence in 
Washington’s abilities. On the other hand, this period did not last for more than about three 
weeks before Syria secured a cease-fire and Washington’s concern lessened. The only thing 
that ever made the US really pay attention was the threat of Israeli intervention, as it was 
thought to complicate the US’ step-by-step diplomacy. Kissinger’s diplomacy was to show 
the Arab states that the road to progress in the Middle East went through Washington, not 
Moscow. This globalist approach engulfed the US entire approach to the 1975-1976 Civil 
War in Lebanon. 
 
In the end, the Ford administration could reach a desired solution to the 1975-1976 civil war 
with minimal US involvement. Assad intervened, defeating Jumblatt and Arafat. Israel was 
pleased: the PLO suffered a defeat, Israel’s Lebanese allies were saved and Syria did not 
move south of the Litani river. Syria was pleased as well: Assad had shown Arafat and 
Jumblatt that Damascus was the master of Lebanon, not the radicals or Palestinians. Assad 
had had strengthened his hold over Lebanon and his regional standing. Egypt was displeased, 
but not enough to jeopardize its relationship with Israel and the US. Strengthening Assad to 
Sadat’s chagrin made sense from Kissinger’s perspective: It contributed to inter-Arab rivalry 
rather than unity against Israel and the US. 
 
Preventing an Israeli Counter-Intervention 
The point lending itself to the US preventing an Israeli counter-intervention is the red lines 
dialogue. Israel, through the US, told Damascus what would be an acceptable intervention. 
The US also directly preached restraint to Israel, insisting that Israel did not move without 
consulting the US. This, however, seems less decisive. Kissinger knew that the US had little 
influence over Israel, if Israel considered its security threatened.  
 
There are also several points suggesting that the US’ participation was less decisive. Firstly, 
Washington noted that Israel probably wanted to avoid a counter-intervention anyway. 
Additionally, Assad was eager to control Lebanon and might have intervened anyway. 
Secondly, while there would be no Israeli-Syrian dialogue without the US, there was already 
an Israeli-Syrian monologue. As Allon told Washington in October 1975, Syria paid attention 
to Israel’s public statements, to avoid provoking Israel. Thirdly, the red lines dialogue present 
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in the sources pertains to the first, small-scale Syrian intervention, not the decisive 
intervention that began on the eve of June 1. It is possible that there was a comparable or even 
more decisive dialogue prior to the large-scale intervention and that these documents are 
classified. This seems improbable, as numerous cables and meetings refer to the dialogue. 
There is not a comparable amount of sources relating to a Syrian intervention in late May. On 
the contrary, the US seems markedly less interested in Lebanon following the presidential 
election. Lastly, there is no green light in these sources, no point on which Israel and the US 
tells Syria to go ahead with an agreed upon intervention. However, it is probable that such 
concrete evidence of collaboration would be classified, if it exists. 
 
It seems Assad’s large-scale intervention was a gamble, but with a calculated risk. Syria had 
tested Israel’s limits for more than six months by the time Damascus initiated the large-scale 
intervention. Even if Rabin was eager to avoid a counter-intervention, the US’ contribution 
would have made it easier. It is hard to say whether the US participation in the red lines 
dialogue was decisive to Israel not intervening. What is certain is that Washington made it 
easier for Damascus to calculate its intervention. The US most decisive contribution to 
preventing an Israeli counter-intervention then, was to help Syria avoid stepping on Israel’s 
toes, rather than restraining Israel. 
 
The US and the Lebanese Civil War 
The US approached the Lebanese Civil War with caution. The initial approach was to more or 
less ignore Lebanon, a wait-and-see approach. Washington’s involvement only truly rose 
above this approach when an Israeli intervention seemed probable. It is unreasonable to 
assume that the US did not suspect a Syrian intervention in May: Syria’s previous threats to 
intervene were preceded by a period when Syria could not stabilize Lebanon. The US still 
reminded Syria not to intervene, but not with the intensity or conviction of late March. It 
seems probable then, that Washington was more comfortable with a Syrian intervention in 
May than the US had been in the middle of March. By the time of the large-scale Syrian 
intervention the US was confident that Israel would not enter southern Lebanon, at least more 
so than in March. Washington had no interests in Lebanon except to keep it from threatening 
Israel and the US’ standing in the Middle East. With Israeli intervention prevented, Lebanon 
was of no importance to Ford and Kissinger. 
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Primary Sources and Abbreviations 
 
Archives: 
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Collections consulted: 
- National Security Adviser. Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files 
o Abbreviated GF-NSA-KS 
o Box 3 
- National Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for The Middle East and South 
Asia 
o Abbreviated GF-NSA-PC-MESA 
o Boxes 1, 5, 6, 9, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31 and 32 
- National Security Adviser. Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger 1974-
1976 
o Abbreviated GF-NSA-THAK 
o Boxes 15 and 17 
- National Security Council. Operations Staff Files for Middle East and South Asia 
o Abbreviated GF-NSC-SF-MESA 
o Boxes 7, 13, 14, 15 and 23 
- National Security Council. U.S. Institutional Files 
o Abbreviated GF-NSC-USIF 
o Boxes 20 and 25 
 
  
Sources 
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Digital Archives: 
Foreign relations of the United States 
Abbreviated FRUS 
Available at: http://www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments  
Collection consulted: 
- Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Volume XXVI 
o Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26 
 
Gerald R. Ford Library – Digital collections 
Available at: http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/ 
Collections consulted: 
- National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977 
o Abbreviated GFD-NSA-MC 
o Available at:  
o Boxes 10, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 19 
- National Security Adviser. National Security Council Meetings File, 1974-77 
o Abbreviated GFD-NSA-NSCM 
o Available at:  
o Box 1 
 
The U.S. National Archives – Access to Archival Databases 
Abbreviated NARA-AAD 
Available at: http://aad.archives.gov/ 
Collection consulted: 
- Central Foreign Policy Files, created, 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1977, documenting the period 
1973 ? - 12/31/1977 - Record Group 59 
o Available at: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-
description.jsp?s=4073&cat=all&bc=sl 
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